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Laura E. Brade: Networks of Escape: Jewish Flight from the Bohemian Lands, 1938-
1941 
(Under the direction of Christopher R. Browning and Chad Bryant)  
This dissertation tells the remarkable of a quarter of the Jewish population of 
Bohemia and Moravia who managed to escape Nazi-occupied Czechoslovakia between 
October 1938 and October 1941. Given all of the obstacles to emigration—an occupation 
government, a world war, international reluctance to grant visas, and extortionist Nazi 
emigration policies—this amounted to an extraordinary achievement. Czechoslovak Jews 
scattered across the globe, from Shanghai and India, to Madagascar and Ecuador. How did 
they accomplish this daunting task?  
The current scholarship has approached this question from the perspectives of 
governments, voluntary organizations, and individual refugees. However, by addressing the 
various actors in isolation, much of this research has focused either on condemning or 
heroizing these actors. As a result, the question of how Jewish refugees fled Europe has gone 
unanswered. Using the Bohemian Lands as a case study, I ask when and how rescue became 
possible. 
I make three major claims. First, I argue that a grassroots transnational network of 
escape facilitated leaving Nazi-occupied Europe. Scholarship on Jewish refugees has 
typically concentrated on individual acts of heroism or government initiatives, largely 
ignoring the interconnectedness of relief workers and government programs. This network 
connected Boston-based Unitarians, London-based socialists, and Prague-based Jewish social 




workers in a complex web of interfaith refugee assistance. These efforts required a 
remarkable amount of creativity and flexibility. Second, I argue that the interwar connections 
and the contingent, ad hoc nature of the network was the very key to its success. In the early 
1930s, many of the same social workers had quickly assembled to assist refugees from 
Nazism in Czechoslovakia. Lacking rigid centralization, yet tightly bound by domestic and 
international connections, refugee aid groups effectively responded to the rapidly changing 
circumstances of wartime Europe. Finally, voluntary organizations and their representatives 
had different motivations for assisting refugees that affected who they helped. Still, voluntary 
workers were connected by their international awareness and interest in social work.  
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Between October 1938 and October 1941, approximately 30,000 Bohemia and 
Moravian Jews managed to escape Nazi-occupied Czechoslovakia. There were immense 
obstacles to migration, including international reluctance to accept refugees, extortionist 
emigration policies, and a world war that closed off possibilities for escape. Despite these 
obstacles, a quarter of the Jewish population of the Bohemian Lands managed to leave the 
region before the Nazis made Jewish emigration illegal in October 1941.1 Given all the 
obstacles to leaving this was an extraordinary achievement. Czechoslovak Jews scattered 
across the globe, from Shanghai and India, to Madagascar and Ecuador. How did they 
accomplish this daunting task?  
This study makes two major claims. First, I argue that a grassroots transnational 
network of escape was essential to leaving Nazi-occupied Europe. This global web coalesced 
to bring Jews out of the Bohemian Lands, connecting individuals with relief organizations, 
Jewish Religious Communities, relevant governments, various consulates, and travel 
agencies.2 Scholarship on Jewish refugees has typically concentrated on individual acts of 
heroism or government initiatives, largely ignoring the interconnectedness of relief workers 
                                                 
1 The official statistics compiled by the Jewish Religious Community in Prague for the Nazi authorities state 
that 26,110 of the 118,310 Jews living in the Protectorate on March 15, 1939 left the Bohemian Lands. This 
figure does not account for those who fled illegally over the border to Poland or Slovakia. Between 4,000-6,000 
additional individuals fled in this manner. Archiv Židovské muzeum v Praze (hereafter ZMP), Dokumenty 
perzekuce, file 47/1. These 118,310 individuals were not all Jewish by religion, but considered racially Jewish 
by Nazi racial policies. 
 
2 Yad Vashem Archive (hereafter YVA) O.7.cz /112. 





and government programs. This network included Boston-based Unitarians, London-based 
socialists, and Prague-based Jewish social workers connected in complex web of interfaith 
refugee assistance. These efforts required a remarkable amount of creativity and flexibility. 
For example, Czechoslovak weapons manufacturers agreed to waive Ecuadorian debts in 
exchange for accepting refugees while British Unitarians worked with a Czechoslovak shoe 
manufacturer to find positions for refugees in India.  
Second, I argue that the interwar connections and the contingent, ad hoc nature of the 
network were the very keys to its success. Earlier in the interwar period, many of the same 
social workers had quickly assembled to assist refugees from Nazism arriving in 
Czechoslovakia. Lacking rigid centralization, yet tightly bound by domestic and international 
connections, refugee aid groups quickly and effectively responded to the rapidly changing 
circumstances of Nazi occupation and WWII.  
Networks, particularly of relief organizations, played a crucial role in the migration 
attempts of thousands of Jews by helping them to overcome significant obstacles to leaving 
between 1938 and 1941. For individuals fleeing from Czechoslovakia, kinship networks 
quickly proved inadequate to facilitate migration abroad, due in large part to increased 
immigration restrictions and decreased travel options following the outbreak of war. Despite 
attempts to contact friends and family abroad, potential migrants increasingly turned to the 
various relief organizations and the Jewish Religious Community in Prague for help in 
facilitating migration. Networks of institutions coordinated by international relief agencies—
Hebrew Immigrant Aid Society (HIAS), HICEM (the result of a merger between HIAS, the 
Jewish Colonization Association or ICA, and Emig-Direct),  the American Jewish Joint 
Distribution Committee, the British Committee for Refugees from Czechoslovakia, the 





American Unitarian-Quaker Committee for Service in Czechoslovakia, the American Friends 
Service Committee (or AFSC), the Red Cross, and Makkabi-Hechalutz—provided the most 
realistic and successful opportunities for escape, since they could coordinate the necessary 
resources and manpower for migration attempts. Rather than focusing on what German 
perpetrators did to their victims, I explore Jewish action in response to Nazi policies as well 
as the interaction between individual survival strategies and policies of persecution. And 
rather than extolling the virtues of rescue and relief workers, I ask how these individuals—
and the organizations they represented—coordinated migration attempts. I explore the 
movement of migrants and the interactions among migrants, relief workers, relief 
organizations, and governments to understand how people moved and were moved in 
response to the Nazi occupation.  
Historians of rescue and rescuers have typically approached the topic from the 
perspective of one rescuer or one rescue organization, and for good reason. The situation in 
Europe and in Czechoslovakia in particular was so multifaceted that the story of rescue is 
most easily described through the biography of one individual or the profile of an 
organization. The overwhelming magnitude of the refugee crisis as well as the limited 
resources available for rescue is evident in the documents of rescuers and voluntary 
organizations. Since part of the historian's task is to provide a narrative of the past, the 
prosopographic approach makes good sense.3 This has led to two primary tendencies in the 
                                                 
3 For specific works, see: Yehuda Bauer, American Jewry and the Holocaust: The American Jewish Joint 
Distribution Committee, 1939-1945 (Detroit: Wayne State University Press, 1981); Efraim Zuroff, The 
Response of Orthodox Jewry in the United States to the Holocaust: The Activities of the Vaad ha-Hatzala 
Rescue Committee 1939-1945 (New York: Yeshiva University Press, 2000); Edward David Pinsky, 
“Cooperation Among American Jewish Organizations in their Efforts to Rescue European Jewry During the 
Holocaust, 1939-1945” (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation), New York University, 1980; William Nawyn, 
American Protestantism’s Response to Germany’s Jews and Refugees, 1933-1941 (Ann Arbor: UMI Research 
Press, 1981); Haim Genizi, American Apathy: The Plight of Christian Refugees from Nazism (Ramat Gan: Bar-





historiography of rescue. As Christopher Browning has argued, and as I have argued with 
Rose Holmes, histories of rescue have often led to accusations of insufficient aid to refugees 
on the one hand and hagiographics of individual rescue on the other.4 Yet it does not answer 
precisely how or why rescue and escape were possible.  
I explore the connections between the individuals and organizations that came from 
abroad to the Bohemian Lands after October 1938. There was a considerable amount of 
overlap in resources (personnel, finances, records, etc.) that created networks of relief and 
rescue in Europe during the Second World War. In addition to the complex, multifaceted, 
international community that facilitated migration, I examine the nature and the function of 
the network it formed. This community of rescue, I argue, formed a migration network that 
was crucial to helping individuals to leave the Bohemian Lands. By “migration networks,” I 
mean the “sets of interpersonal ties that link migrants, former migrants, and non-migrants in 
origin and destination areas through the bonds of kinship, friendship,” religion, profession, 
and shared interests.5 I study the diverse motivations that prompted these individuals and 
                                                 
Ilan University Press, 1983). On Varian Fry, see: Andy Marino, A Quiet American: The Secret War of Varian 
Fry (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1999); David Kerr, Varian Fry: The Artist’s Schindler [videorecording] 
(Chicago: Home Vision, 1997). Documentary filmmaker Pierre Sauvage (Weapons of the Spirit) is working on 
another documentary on Varian Fry, And Crown Thy Good: Varian Fry in Marseilles. On the Sharps, see: 
Susan Elisabeth Subak, Rescue and Flight: American Relief Workers Who Defied the Nazis (Lincoln: University 
of Nebraska Press, 2010) and the upcoming PBS documentary by Ken Burns and Artemis Joukowsky, Defying 
the Nazis: The Sharps War (No Limits Media, Inc. and Florentine Films, 2016). On Gilbert and Eleanor Kraus, 
see: Steven Pressman, 50 Children: One Ordinary American Couple’s Extraordinary Rescue Mission into the 
Heart of Nazi Germany (New York: Harper, 2014) and the film by Steven Pressman, 50 Children: The Rescue 
Mission of Mr. and Mrs. Kraus (HBO Documentary Films, 2013). 
 
4 Christopher R. Browning, “From Humanitarian Relief to Holocaust Rescue: Tracy Strong, Jr., Vichy 
Internment Camps, and the Maison de Roches in Le Chambon,” Holocaust and Genocide Studies 30, no. 2 (Fall 
2016): 211-246. See also: Laura E. Brade and Rose Holmes, “Troublesome Sainthood: Nicholas Winton and the 
Contested History of Child Rescue in Prague, 1938-1940,” History and Memory 29/1 (Spring/Summer 2017): 3-
40. 
 
5 Doreen S. Massey, “Economic Development and International Migration in Comparative Perspective,” 
Population and Development Review 14 (3): 396. 





groups to come to assist refugees from the Bohemian Lands; the connections between the 
members of the community; and the roles and contributions of the members to the overall 
network.  
Determining the criteria for inclusion was perhaps the most challenging aspect of this 
entire project. How many migrants did an individual or organization need to assist in order to 
be included in this study? How much money needed to be offered to migrants to warrant 
inclusion? What activities could be considered “rescue”? Did the organization need to 
explicitly provide assistance to Jews in order to be included? For instance, organizations such 
as the American Joint Jewish Distribution Committee (AJDC) primarily distributed funds to 
other aid organizations, doing very little rescue work on the ground. Yet the funds provided 
by the AJDC were essential for supporting the major refugee organizations. Without the 
funds provided by the Joint, these groups likely would not have been able to finance 
migration and escape attempts. Excluding the Joint from the networks of Holocaust rescue 
would have been a crucial oversight. For the purposes of this study, I have chosen to include 
the organizations that elected to have a specific mission to support migration from the 
Bohemian Lands between 1938 and 1941. This mission did not have to be the group’s 
primary focus, but the group must have, at some point, decided to support migration and/or 
migrants explicitly.  
 
Scope of the Dissertation 
This dissertation focuses on the mechanics of escape by examining the roles of 
institutions in coordinating flight from the Bohemian Lands after the Munich Agreement in 





October 1938 until Nazi authorities forbade Jewish emigration in October 1941.6 As Slovakia 
was under a separate government beginning in early 1939 and since Jewish experiences in 
Slovakia differed significantly from those in the Protectorate, I have chosen to exclude 
Slovakia for this study. In particular, I focus on the interconnectedness of individuals, 
communities, governments, and organizations to understand how humanitarian relief and 
rescue occurred to help migrants flee the Bohemian Lands. How were networks created and 
implemented? How do networks function and respond to the changing circumstances of the 
war? Which routes took people out of the Bohemian Lands and how did these routes change 
over the course of the Nazi occupation and the Second World War?  
I address these questions from multiple perspectives: Nazi emigration policies and 
schemes; the international governmental response to migration and refugees; the response of 
relief and rescue institutions; and individual choices. To achieve this, I bring together a wide 
variety of sources from archives in the Czech Republic, Israel, and the United States (where I 
could access records from various other countries at the United States Holocaust Memorial 
Museum). These sources can largely be grouped by the various perspectives. For the 
perspective of the Nazis and the Protectorate government, I studied the Institute for Refugee 
Welfare of the Ministry of Social Welfare (first a Czecho-Slovak and later a Protectorate 
government institution) as well as some Sicherheitsdienst (SD), Gestapo, and Zentralstelle 
für jüdische Auswanderung reports. I also use the reports of the Jewish Religious Community 
in Prague as well as the Community's newspaper to understand how organizations within the 
Bohemian Lands tackled the issue of migration and escape. I have also incorporated, when 
                                                 
6 For more on the Jewish population of Slovakia, see: Rebekah Klein-Pejšová, Mapping Jewish Loyalties in 
Interwar Slovakia (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2015). 





possible, documents from various other governments pertaining to their immigration policies 
specifically aimed at individuals with Czechoslovak or Protectorate passports.  
I also draw on the institutional records from various relief organizations that focused 
on helping those in the Bohemian Lands who wanted to leave Central Europe. Not only do I 
utilize the reports and correspondence of relief workers, but I combine these organizational 
records with the personal accounts, testimonies, and correspondence of some relief workers. 
While I include documents from various organizations based throughout the world, I focus 
on four different organizations: HICEM, the American Jewish Joint Distribution Committee, 
the Unitarian Universalist Service Committee, and the American Friends Service Committee. 
Although this in part due to the extensive source base for these four organizations, I have 
selected these four organizations in part because of their international nature. More so than 
any other organizations, these four involved themselves with migration attempts to all 
corners of the globe. Since American immigration laws were so restrictive during the entire 
wartime period, relief organizations based in the US did not attempt to bring migrants 
directly to the United States, but to various parts of the world where the migrants could wait 
for their visa to the U.S. Finally, these four organizations, because they worked to get 
migrants to various parts of the globe, have some of the greatest levels of interaction with 
various other organizations and have the clearest documentation to demonstrate these kinds 
of interactions.  
Finally, I use the personal collections and testimonies of numerous individual 
migrants to understand how various organizations worked with individuals on their migration 
attempts as well as how those individuals understood or remembered these encounters. 
Beginning with the individuals’ accounts of their migration attempts, I work backward 





through the various organizations, tracing their individual escape attempt experiences 
through the organizational records of various institutions with which the individuals 
corresponded or interacted. Surprisingly, perhaps, oral testimonies only rarely mention 
migration assistance, even when successful migrants received it. Often memory of migration 
assistance provided by organizations is entirely absent from the narratives of flight even 
though I have evidence that several organizations were involved in an individual's escape. 
While testimonies are certainly a rich source for historians, they approach broader historical 
trends from a unique, foxhole-like perspective. Details of refugee assistance networks are 
often unknown to Holocaust survivors, either because they were too young to remember the 
details of the escape or because they dealt with assistance organizations only indirectly 
through letters, applications, and cables. The work of refugee assistance organizations often 
only appeared on paper documents the migrants never saw: they dealt with applications and 
correspondence with the State Department, potential affiants, potential employers, and the 
refugees themselves. Given the obstacles to leaving, the organizations often worked with a 
particular migrant only briefly and from a distance.  
The lack of detail about voluntary organizations in testimonies points to the fact that 
institutions often played a background role in an individual's flight. These organizations 
handled paperwork, wired money to pay for steamship or railway passages, tracked down 
visa applications, and dealt with the various governments of the countries through which 
migrants would pass. These steps were crucial for a migration attempt to be successful, yet 
this process of migration and refuge-seeking was not one to which the individual migrant was 
privy. Thus, although the work done by these organizations was essential for the flight 
attempt, the behind-the-scenes efforts of these desk workers would not factor into an 





individual's memory of escape. Finally, these faceless institutional efforts serve as 
inconvenient heroes for those searching to attribute their survival to a particular person. The 
brave persistence of parents, benevolence of family members or acquaintances, or individual 
rescuers provide more fertile ground for hero-myths. The impersonal structure of a voluntary 
organization and the work of numerous anonymous individuals does not. In the cases where 
individuals had specific refugee workers who spent a great deal of time working directly with 
them, then those individuals are thanked directly. In the cases where the organization as an 
amorphous whole worked indirectly for the refugees, oftentimes their efforts were never 
remembered. 
 
Theory and Methodology 
To examine the network and experiences of refugees from the Protectorate, I adopt an 
inherently transnational approach. Historians Deborah Dwork and R. J. van Pelt argue that 
“fleeing does not write refugees out of the story; it simply takes the story elsewhere. Indeed: 
it takes it everywhere.”7 As the authors demonstrate, the history of refugees “defies 
traditional plotlins” and “has many starting points, even more end dates, and actors scattered 
across the globe.”8 To understand the history of those leaving from the Protectorate, which is 
more complex than movement from one place to another, from the perspective of the 
international and the local, from the perspective of policy and experience, as well as from the 
perspective of Nazi perpetrators and Jewish victims, I use a number of interdisciplinary 
                                                 
7 Deborah Dwork and R.J. van Pelt, Flight from the Reich: Refugee Jews, 1933-1946 (New York: W.W. Norton, 
2009), xiii. 
 
8 Deborah Dwork and R.J. van Pelt, Flight from the Reich: Refugee Jews, 1933-1946 (New York: W.W. Norton, 
2009), xiii. 





approaches drawn from history, sociology, anthropology, and demography. Applying 
network theory to world migration systems, I use letters, visa applications, shipment records, 
and other documents that show connections between individuals and organizations.  
I contend that the act of Jews leaving their homes in response to Nazi persecution 
might best be described as ‘coerced voluntary migration.’ Migration literature generally 
discusses the push/pull factors that convince individuals to leave their homes and drew them 
to another place.9 However, this paradigm is not helpful in determining the factors that led 
Jews to emigrate from the Protectorate. While persecution and Nazi emigration policies 
pushed individuals to emigrate, no classic pull factor—such as family or the promise of 
economic betterment—drew them to another country. In fact, Jews pursued migration despite 
significant difficulties: low immigration quotas, overwhelmed foreign consulates, the 
restriction of immigration to Palestine, and the successive closing of pre-war migration 
routes.  These mounting obstacles often forced family members to seek leaving separately 
rather than as a unit—a clear indication of the desperation out of which Jews acted. Although 
migrants ultimately escaped through diverse routes to a number of destinations, including 
Italy, the Soviet Union, China, the United States, England, Palestine, Hungary, Yugoslavia, 
and South America, not everyone escaped. Most who succeeded in leaving nonetheless lost 
family and friends in the Holocaust.  
A discussion of terms is useful within the context of coerced voluntary migration. The 
word “refugee” has multiple, often competing definitions. As Rogers Brubaker argues in his 
article on Muslim in Europe, terms are often used as both a “category of analysis” and as a 
                                                 
9 For excellent surveys of migration history, see: Klaus J Bade, Migration in European History (Malden, MA: 
Blackwell Pub, 2003); Leslie Page Moch, Moving Europeans: Migration in Western Europe Since 1650, 2nd 
ed. (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2003). 





“category of practice.”10  As a category of analysis, legal and historical scholars have 
described those fleeing from Nazism as refugees. In Refugees in an Age of Genocide, 
Katharine Knox and Tony Kushner define refugees as “people forced to flee outside their 
country of origin because of persecution.”11 In a slightly more nuanced definition, legal 
scholar Claudena Skran states that a refugee “leaves his or her home voluntarily albeit under 
compulsion from outside forces. The decision to flee, rather than to fight or die, is a personal 
one.”12 As a category of practice, there exists an “interplay between self-identification and 
other-identification” as a refugee.13 Contemporaries sometimes used the word “refugee” and 
sometimes the word “emigrant” to describe experiences of leaving, and these did not always 
align with the legal definition of “refugee” laid out by countries of immigration or the 
League of Nations.  
The distinction between refugees as a category of analysis and as a category of 
practice is difficult to maintain. Individuals leaving the Bohemian Lands were both refugees 
                                                 
10 Rogers Brubaker, “Guest Editorial: Categories of analysis and categories of practice: a note on the study of 
Muslims in European countries of immigration,” Ethnic and Racial Studies 36/1 (January 2013): 1 
 
11 Kushner and Knox, Refugees in an Age of Genocide, 1. For other important works on refugees in the 1930s 
and 1940s, see: Some of the most important books on refugees in the 1930s and 1940s are: Wolfgang Benz, ed., 
Das Exil der kleinen Leute (Munich: Beck, 1991); Wolfgang Benz and Marion Ness, eds., Deutsch-jüdisches 
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and emigrants. Using “refugee” as a “category of analysis,” those leaving the Protectorate 
would certainly be refugees: under pressure from Nazi policies and with the encouragement 
of the Jewish Religious Community in Prague, these individuals made the decision to leave 
their homes. However, archival documents reveal significant discrepancies about the use of 
“refugee” as a category of practice. Documentation from the period reveals that the 
international community considered those who fled the Sudetenland for the interior after the 
Munich Agreement to be “refugees.” However, once these Jewish “refugees” considered 
leaving the Bohemian Lands for overseas countries, both local and international governments 
described these same individuals as “emigrants.” Voluntary organizations distinguished 
between “political refugees” and Jewish migrants, who were classified as “economic” or 
“racial” refugees. Countries of immigration demonstrated a clear preference for “political 
refugees,” who were granted special visas for asylum purposed, while “economic refugees” 
were expected to go through the legal channels for immigration (if they were admitted at all).  
Indeed, the migrants themselves described the process of leaving Central Europe as one of 
emigration, as they needed to procure visas, exit permits, train and steamship tickets, and 
landing money. Only in postwar testimonies do these individuals become identified as 
refugees. However, Jewish decisions to leave the Protectorate were certainly made in 
response to restrictive policies and persecution toward Jews. It is here that the term ‘coerced 
voluntary migration’ becomes particularly important; while individuals made decisions to 
leave or stay in the Protectorate, without the element of persecution these individuals would 
not have been coerced into making such choices.  
Thus, I used ‘coerced voluntary migration’ to avoid confusion between refugees as a 
category of practice and as a category analysis. In order to adequately address the issues of 





memory as well as the political and moral connotations of certain forms of movement, I 
contend that migrant or migration are neutral terms that attempt to understand the movement 
of people as a key element of historical change. Following the work of Leslie Moch, I adopt 
a broad definition of migration, that is “a change in residence beyond a municipal boundary, 
be it a village or town … migration includes moves from one village to another as well as 
from one side of the Atlantic to another,” regardless of whether or not those individuals 
intended for that move to be permanent or temporary.14 As a result of the Nazi occupation of 
the Bohemian Lands, the social fabric and political situation radically changed, forcing 
Jewish families across the region to consider migration as an option. When referring to 
movement from the Bohemian Lands outside of the context of specific documents, I will 
refer to it as migration. I trust that the reader understands that this migration is both coerced 
and voluntary. 
Another important term that appears throughout this study is “network.” I argue for 
the importance of networks to the success of migration attempts. Sociologists such as 
Harrison C. White have used the concept of networks to illustrate the interconnectedness of 
individuals by mapping relationships and interactions to uncover patterns of social 
connections.15 Network theory studies the ties (relationships, represented by lines) between 
identities (individuals and organization, represented by nodes), the stories that bond or 
solidify these ties, and the conventions regulating these stories. Although I do not include a 
                                                 
14 Leslie Moch, Moving Europeans: Migration in Western Europe Since 1650 (Bloomington: Indiana University 
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formal social network analysis in this dissertation, I will use the concept of migration 
networks to explore the connections necessary to create viable migration attempts.  
The key to social network analysis is in its study of relationships, whether that be 
kinship, group memberships, exchange of resources, transactions, etc. These relationships are 
measurable (i.e. numbers of letters exchanged, the dollar amounts of financial support 
provided by one organization to another, etc.). Broadly, social network researchers are 
interested in determining the factors that influence the relational ties within populations or 
the influence that the structure has on outcomes (in this case, bringing migrants out of 
Europe). Social networks are structures comprised of individual actors (or “nodes”). These 
nodes are connected by relationships (or “ties”), whether that be friendship, acquaintance, 
ideology, kinship, or religion. Unlike formal organizational structures, networks lack formal 
hierarchies, clearly articulated membership criteria, or coherent ideology; however, they may 
have a center that forms over time.16 In the case of rescue networks during the Holocaust, 
different organizations with a variety of ideologies assisted individuals persecuted by the 
Nazis. Over time, the center of the network developed into one that was distinctly anti-Nazi; 
yet, the network never developed a formal hierarchy with clearly articulated membership 
criteria or a coherent ideology. 
Harrison White argues that the “network metaphor is always a metaphor of flows,” 
which I understand to mean the strength of the relationship (exchange of letters, information, 
and migrants) in the migration network.17 To understand flows in the migration network, I 
trace the levels of interaction between individuals and organizations as well as the number of 
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successful migrations using a particular network, to understand how people escaped.  Other 
studies of migration also use a metaphor of flows, measuring the number of letters, money, 
and people that travel across borders. Migration historians such as Klaus Bade generally 
focus on economic and kinship networks to explain how migrants establish themselves in the 
country of immigration.18 Using networks to examine leaving, I will be better able to 
understand the connections between individuals and organizations which assisted in escape 
from the Bohemian Lands.  
Transnationalism will also inform my study of the migration network. I draw upon 
social anthropologist Steven Vertovec’s “migrant transnationalism” approach to networks, 
which analyzes the “range of practices and institutions linking migrants, people, and 
organizations” operating outside of national boundaries. Thus, I approach migration from a 
transnational perspective to interrogate how relief organizations and individuals operated 
within and outside of national frameworks to move people across borders and out of the 
Protectorate. As the situation within the Bohemian Lands became increasingly dire, those 
involved with creating migration opportunities became less concerned with where a migrant 
was going to and focused primarily on the fact that the individual was leaving the Bohemian. 
Migration from the Protectorate thus operated on a transnational, rather than a nation-to-
nation level. By adopting the world systems and transnational approaches to migration 
networks, I use letters, visa applications, shipment records, postwar testimonies and official 
documents that show the connections established to create migration attempts, both 
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successfully and unsuccessfully, through particular sets of ties between individuals and 
organizations within a transnational framework.  
When combined with a careful study of survivor testimonies, an analysis of the 
migration network allows me to demonstrate how individuals established the connections 
crucial for migration as well as describe the experiences of creating these connections in the 
face of Nazi persecution. Although oral testimonies can be problematic, a careful 
methodology can extract many insights from these valuable primary sources. In 
Remembering Survival: Inside a Nazi Slave Labor Camp, Christopher Browning argues that 
by collecting a “critical mass of testimony”19 the historian can recover with relative success 
the victims’ experience of the Holocaust and can determine the relative accuracy of 
individual accounts. Browning compares and critically tests 292 survivor testimonies from a 
single camp complex against each other to extract a “core memory” from which he is able to 
draw conclusions about the plausibility of individual testimonies and the experiences they 
describe despite a lack of corroborating archival sources. While one survivor testimony does 
not allow a historian to reconstruct a collective biography of migration attempts, multiple 
accounts allow for an in-depth analysis of individual experience, with relative certainty about 
where the testimony is reasonably reliable and where it is problematic. Even when the 
survivor does not describe assistance from a voluntary organization, descriptions of their 
migration attempts reveal where they might have connected with a network, which can be 
corroborated through archival documentation. 
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While the Holocaust is a key feature of twentieth-century history, a German-centered 
approach to the Holocaust has its limits, as Saul Friedländer argues in The Years of 
Extermination.20 While a few scholars such as Yehuda Bauer and Francis Nicosia expand 
their focus geographically beyond Germany, most Holocaust histories insofar as they deal 
with migration generally focus on Nazi policies rather than on the experience of the migrants. 
Additionally, most works emphasize the implementation of these policies in Germany or 
Austria at the expense of considering other countries from which Jews fled.21 Likewise, the 
major studies of flight from Nazi-occupied Europe—while often examining the experience of 
refugees and migration—focus primarily on migrants from Germany or Austria. True, 
migration from the majority of countries in Eastern Europe was difficult and after German 
occupation nearly impossible. The Bohemian Lands were unique to the region: unlike 
countries further east, they were occupied by the Nazis prior to the outbreak of World War II 
and in many ways were treated similarly to Austria. However, the opportunity to escape was 
more limited for individuals in the Protectorate than those in Germany or Austria because of 
the relatively short time between the onset of German occupation and the outbreak of war, 
and thus far fewer escaped.22 Not only did migrants from the Protectorate have a smaller 
window of opportunity to leave than individuals in Germany or Austria, but Protectorate 
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migrants also entered an international setting that was already struggling to receive the large 
number of German and Austrian migrants and was still reeling from the aftershocks of the 
international depression. As the war approached, borders became ever more difficult to cross.  
Despite these obstacles, significant numbers did emigrate and should be included in the 
historiography of the Bohemian Lands during World War II. 
Rather than using the framework of immigration for this dissertation, I approach the 
topic of migration from the perspective of leaving the Bohemian Lands. Since most of the 
migrants were displaced multiple times and crossed multiple borders as they attempted to 
flee Nazi Germany, confining the study of migration to one or two national contexts (the 
country of immigration or emigration) does not allow us to understand how people moved as 
they fled Nazism. By focusing on the actual movement of people, we can better understand 
how information was transmitted (or got lost) between organizations as the migrants moved, 
and how organizations attempted to help a constantly moving group of people. 
 
Bohemian Lands/Czechoslovakia 
Why choose the Bohemian Lands as the starting point for this kind of study? Not only 
has there been little scholarship on the Holocaust in the Bohemian Lands in general or on the 
migrants from this region (which represented the third major country from which Jews were 
able to escape by migration), but there are also a number of reason why the Bohemian Lands 
were an ideal choice for this kind of study. 
Many of the migration and refugee institutions that assisted those hoping to leave 
were peculiarly Czechoslovak. Czechoslovakia’s particular conditions allowed for large 
numbers of people to rapidly leave once the region was under Nazi occupation. Although 





larger numbers of Jews were able to leave Nazi Germany and Austria, the Bohemian Lands 
apparently responded to the Nazi occupation much more rapidly and large numbers of people 
were still able to successfully flee in a very constrained period of time. 
This was due in large part to the refugee and migration institutions that had sprung up 
in the Bohemian Lands over the course of the 1930s. Before the Bohemian Lands were a 
place of emigration, the region was one of the first places to which individuals fleeing Nazi 
persecution in Germany and Austria fled. Between 1933 and the Munich Agreement, 
approximately 20,000 German and Austrian migrants passed through the First Czechoslovak 
Republic as they fled the Nazi regime. As Kateřina Čapková and Michal Frankl 
demonstrated, these migrants were only granted temporary asylum in the First Republic—
both because the Nazis would soon occupy the Bohemian Lands and because the 
Czechoslovak government resisted accepting Communist and Jewish migrants.23 Jan Benda’s 
compelling analysis of refugee policies extends this argument to the period of the Second 
Czecho-Slovak Republic after the Munich Agreement. Benda demonstrates that 
Czechoslovak refugee policy was based largely on ethnic categorization, and provided 
justification for expulsion and forcible migration of Jews and German-speakers.24 
The experience of working with German and Austrian migrants proved invaluable for 
Czechoslovak voluntary organizations. On the eve of the Munich Agreement, 5,000 migrants 
from Germany and Austria remained in Czechoslovakia. But as a result of the Munich 
Agreement, the refugee population in the rump state of Czecho-Slovakia—which became 
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known as the Second Czecho-Slovak Republic—would swell to close to 250,000 as 150,000 
migrants fled the Sudetenland and a further 100,000 fled regions ceded to Hungary and 
Poland.25 Both international and Czechoslovak rescue organizations considered the situation 
to be a “triple refugee problem:” those from Germany and Austria, Czech-speakers from the 
Sudetenland, and German-speakers from the Sudetenland. As the Second Republic 
government debated how to cope with the over 250,000 refugees, the voluntary workers who 
had previously assisted German and Austrian refugees now assumed responsibility for 
providing relief and migration assistance to those from the Sudetenland. By the time the 
Nazis occupied the Bohemian Lands on March 15, 1939, the region—and the voluntary 
organizations—had been grappling with a refugee crisis for years. 
As Rose Holmes discusses in her work on the British Quakers’ humanitarian work 
during the 1930s, the interwar years resulted in the professionalization of the voluntary 
sector, what she describes as a “business humanitarianism” made possible through the 
Quakers’ extensive global business connections.26 Using the Quakers as a case study, Holmes 
argues that voluntary organizations should be understood as the “broker for the post-war 
establishment of international, government-led relief agencies” and Quaker efforts should, in 
particular, be understood as a grassroots intermediary “negotiating between desperate 
refugees, an uninterested British government, and the violent hostility of the fascist 
regimes.”27  
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In the Second Czecho-Slovak Republic voluntary organizations also served as 
intermediaries between migrants and the government and used preestablished connections to 
assist migrants.  However, the Czecho-Slovak government was not indifferent to the work of 
Czechoslovak voluntary organizations after the Munich Agreement. Instead, the Second 
Republic government was very concerned with the refugee problem within its borders, and 
especially sought to provide Czech-speakers with housing and employment, while 
simultaneously encouraging German-speakers and Jews to emigrate. While framing its 
assistance to refugees as humanitarian, the Second Republic depended on voluntary 
organizations to carry out its mission of the emigration of Jews and German-speakers from 
the Bohemian Lands.  This “intersection of racism and humanitarianism” is not only evident 
in government policies and programs, but also in the work of voluntary organizations 
working alongside the government to “encouraging the emigration of national minorities and 
protecting the interests of Czech migrants.”28 
As a result, a preexisting set of institutions made it possible for large numbers of 
people to leave the Bohemian Lands prior to the outbreak of World War II in spite of the fact 
that Czechoslovaks had an incredibly small window of time in which to escape. However, in 
postwar testimonies and accounts of flight and escape, these institutions—which were crucial 
in the migration of most who left the country because of their simultaneous Czechoslovak 
and global natures—are conspicuously absent from personal narratives of escape and 
survival. Consequently, few histories of the region discuss in depth the issue of flight and 
escape. This study is certainly rooted in Czechoslovakia, but it is also a global story—and, I 
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This dissertation is divided into five chapters and framed by an introduction and a 
conclusion. In the first chapter, I sketch out the general contours of migration policies in the 
Bohemian Lands (as dictated by the Czechoslovak government, the Second Czecho-Slovak 
Republic after the Munich Agreement, and ultimately the Nazi regime in the Protectorate of 
Bohemia and Moravia). In addition to discussing the legal history of migration from the 
region, this chapter discusses the general trends in attempted flight from the Bohemian Lands 
throughout the period after Munich Agreement in order to provide the necessary context for 
the following chapters, each of which focus on a specific link in the flight network. 
The bulk of this dissertation focuses on various organizations involved in structuring 
migration from the Bohemian Lands. Chapters 2, 3, and 4 focus on different migration 
organizations, both voluntary and coerced, in the Bohemian Lands as they made the 
connections necessary to create a migration network. Chapter 2 details refugee assistance in 
the Bohemian Lands provided by Czechoslovaks after the Munich Agreement. While the 
Czechoslovak government became actively involved in assisting individuals considered to be 
refugees in the Second Czecho-Slovak Republic, the assistance provided by the government 
was largely based on ethnic categorization and relied on the work of voluntary organizations 
to distribute aid. The chapter pays particular attention to the work of the prominent Jewish 
social worker, Marie Schmolka, to demonstrate the complex connections that she formed to 
assist migrants fleeing the Bohemian Lands.  





The refugee crisis caused by the Munich Agreement inspired the international 
community to action. Although the western democracies hesitated to accept Czechoslovak 
migrants, British and American voluntary organizations sent representatives to Prague to 
provide relief and migration assistance. Chapter 3 explores work of the British voluntary 
workers who worked in Prague between October 1938 and July 1939, especially the most 
famous rescue effort from the Bohemian Lands: the Kindertransports (children’s transports). 
The Kindertransports, although typically attributed to the efforts of Nicholas Winton, were in 
fact the achieved through the close cooperation of a number of individuals and organizations. 
Chapter 4 addresses American relief efforts, led by the American Unitarian pastor Waitstill 
Sharp and his wife Martha. As the only American representatives in Prague, the Sharps 
represented the interests of three different voluntary organizations. The Sharps arrived much 
later than British voluntary workers—in February 1939—but were able to draw upon and 
cultivate preexisting connections to organize with remarkable speed.  
Migration assistance changed substantially once the British and American voluntary 
workers left Prague in August 1939. Although international voluntary organizations 
continued to offer assistance, these groups no longer had direct contact with individual 
migrants. This task was left primarily to the Jewish organizations in the Protectorate, 
especially the Jewish Religious Committee in Prague (JRC). Chapter 5 treats the Protectorate 
period to examine how the JRC Prague relied of connections established earlier in the 1930s 
to assist the Jewish community to flee the Bohemian Lands, despite the obstacles presented 
by the Nazi bureaucracy and the changing circumstances of the war.








CHAPTER 1: LOCAL ENDEAVORS, INTERNATIONAL CONNECTIONS: 





The young Czechoslovak democracy seemed to many German refugees, and 
especially political refugees like Social Democrats and Communists, to be an ideal sanctuary 
from the political persecutions in Nazi Germany. After World War I, the Wilsonian policy of 
self-determination helped inspire the redrawing of the map of Central Europe. Out of the 
former Habsburg empire, new states such as Czechoslovakia received their independence. 
For many, 1930s Czechoslovakia was proof that a multinational state could thrive. As 
Czechoslovakia had a significant German-speaking minority, refugees from Germany did not 
have to learn a new language and could live in a place that was in many ways culturally 
similar.  
Throughout the 1930s, waves of refugees fled from Nazi Germany: in 1933, shortly 
after the Nazi rise to power; in 1935, after the passage of the Nuremberg Race Laws; and in 
1938 after the Anschluss, which united Germany and Austria in March 1938. While many 
German refugees fled west to the Netherlands (such as Anne Frank’s family), or France (such 
as many prominent German writers and artists, including Franz Werfel, Lion Feuchtwanger, 
and Heinrich Mann), others—particularly politically active individuals—found temporary 
refuge in Czechoslovakia, where the Social Democratic Party of Germany (SoPaDe) 
established its first exile headquarters. 





In this chapter, I sketch the general contours of refugee and migration policies in 
much of the Bohemian Lands during the First Czechoslovak Republic (October 1918-
September 1938), the Second Czecho-Slovak Republic (October 1938-March 15, 1939), and 
the Protectorate of Bohemia and Moravia (March 15, 1939-1945). This chapter discusses the 
development of refugee assistance in the Bohemian Lands as it emerged in response to the 
influx of German and Austrian refugees fleeing Nazism. It also traces the local and 
international response to the Sudeten refugee crisis, and the efforts of the Jewish community 
of the Bohemian Lands to arrange its own escape. Flight into, within, and from the Bohemian 
Lands evolved through five phases: flight from Nazism in Germany and Austria; internal 
flight from the Sudetenland after the Munich Agreement; panic and illegal flight abroad after 
the creation of the Protectorate of Bohemia and Moravia; bureaucratization of flight under 
the Nazi-run regime; and Nazi experiments with expulsion and forced migration until 
October 1941, when further Jewish emigration was forbidden. 
Several questions guide this chapter. By the end of 1938, Czechoslovakia had become 
a point of departure, not a destination, for refugees. How did this happen? And how did the 
people and organizations tasked with caring for refugees adapt? The answers, in part, lie with 
largely forgotten individuals who and voluntary organizations that assisted German refugees 
arriving in Czechoslovakia in the 1930s and adapted to the changing circumstances in the 
Bohemian Lands. In providing refugee relief and migration assistance, these individuals and 
organizations formed various connections with the Czechoslovak government and with 
international aid groups. These connections, which predated the Nazi occupation of the 
Bohemian Lands, expanded into an international network during the period of the Second 
Czecho-Slovak Republic. Under the Protectorate of Bohemia and Moravia they were then 





utilized by Czechoslovaks seeking to flee the region. This chapter focuses on the creation, 
expansion, and utilization of the international network to reframe the story of flight. Rather 
than concentrating solely on individual stories of escape or on the role of one government or 
organization, stories that dominate our understanding of escape and rescue, this chapter (and 
indeed this dissertation) emphasizes the importance of these more durable connections as 
they developed over the course of the 1930s.  
 
German and Austrian Refugees in the First Czechoslovak Republic 
Less than a year after the Nazis rose to power, Miriam Darvas fled Germany with her 
parents and younger sister. Her father, a journalist, feared political persecution. So, following 
the lead set by her aunt and uncle, the family decided to leave Germany for Prague. Without 
taking any belongings, the family boarded a train in Cologne bound for the border with 
Czechoslovakia. Once at the border, the family disembarked into the rainy night to cross the 
border illegally on foot. From his contacts in the Communist party, Darvas’s father knew that 
there was a footbridge that crossed the Eger/Ohře river over the border and into 
Czechoslovakia. Although water flowed over the bridge, Darvas’s mother went across first, 
carrying her younger sister, while Miriam remained behind. She stared at the bridge, which 
was covered in frigid water. “I just couldn’t make up my mind to step into this water” 
running across the bridge, Darvas later recalled. Suddenly German border guards appeared 
and apprehended both Darvas and her father. The family had specifically left without their 
identifying papers, so that in the event that they were caught, they could not be identified as 
Communists. After an interrogation with the Nazi border officials, Darvas and her father 
were returned to the train station near the border, where the Nazi officials forced the pair to 





leave Germany. Darvas and her father crossed the bridge into Czechoslovakia and were 
reunited with her mother and sister. From there, the family took a train to Prague.1 
 Adolf Hitler assumed leadership of Germany on January 30, 1933, and quickly sought 
to solidify his power. After an arsonist set fire to the German Reichstag building on February 
27, 1933, Hitler and Göring blamed the Communists for attempting to seize power. The 
German president issued an emergency decree suspending civil rights in favor of expanded 
police powers to search and arrest people, without a warrant, for any reason. These expanded 
powers allowed for the persecution and detention of political enemies of Nazism in the first 
concentration camps. The arrests and detention of leading Communists and Social Democrats 
and laws purging Jews from civil service as well as the boycott of Jewish businesses 
prompted the first wave of flight from Nazi Germany. Jewish refugees made up the second 
wave fleeing Nazi Germany. In September 1935, the Nuremberg Race Law denied German 
Jews their citizenship and forbade marriages between Jews and Aryans. German Jews 
(especially those in mixed marriages) fled Germany in increasingly larger numbers. Jewish 
flight from the Reich intensified again in March 1938, with the Anschluss of Austria. In the 
days immediately following the Anschluss, Austrian Nazis attacked Viennese Jews with 
incredible brutality. Jewish shops were boycotted, Jews were forced to perform menial and 
demeaning tasks, and, very quickly were subjected for a forced migration policy. Adolf 
Eichmann, a SS officer who later became an expert on the forced expulsion of European 
Jewry, was tasked with “[implementing] the SD policy of engineering Jewish emigration,” 
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which he accomplished by creating the Zentralstelle für jüdische Auswanderung [Central 
Office for Jewish Emigration].2 Thousands of these refugees sought refuge in neighboring 
Czechoslovakia. 
 National agendas significantly influenced refugee policies in the First Czechoslovak 
Republic. The First Republic was created on October 28, 1918, as revolutions convulsed the 
failing Austro-Hungarian Empire at the end of World War I. As part of the postwar peace 
negotiations, the new East-Central European states, including Czechoslovakia, signed 
declarations of minority rights protections. The Allies argued that Sudeten Germans, denied 
the right of self-determination to join Germany, deserved fair minority treatment in the new 
Czechoslovak Republic.3 This minority rights declaration was enshrined in Section VI, 
Article 1289 of the 1920 Constitution of the Republic of Czechoslovakia, which stated that 
“All citizens of the Czechoslovak Republic shall be in all respects equal before the law and 
shall enjoy equal civic and political rights whatever be their race, their language or their 
religion.” In towns where a “considerable fraction of Czechoslovak citizens speaking a 
language other than Czechoslovak,” children were entitled to receive an education in their 
mother tongue. Minority groups had the right to political representation in the Czechoslovak 
Parliament.4 
                                                 
2 Cesarani, Final Solution, 152. 
 
3 For more on minority rights protection after the First World War, see: Carole Fink, Defending the Rights of 
Others: The Great Power, the Jews, and International Minority Protection, 1878-1938 (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2004). 
 
4 Jiří Hoetzl and V. Joachim, eds., The Constitution of the Czechoslovak Republic (Prague: Politika, 1920), 45-
46. 





 The United States and Britain regarded the First Republic as a triumph of democracy 
in the interwar period, both for its minority rights protections as well as Czechoslovakia’s 
commitment to democracy. This reputation survives today. Recent research on 
Czechoslovakia has probed into the meaning of democracy in the young country by focusing 
on the national conflicts, primarily between Czechs and Germans, conflicts about gender 
equality, as well as the narratives constructed by the leading Czech nationalists about the 
First Czechoslovak Republic.5 Andrea Orzoff has argued that the Czechoslovak nation was 
founded on a myth of the enduring democratic nature of the Czech nation constructed 
through propaganda, history books, photographs, and biographies of the first president T.G. 
Masaryk. Although Orzoff is primarily concerned with the process of myth-making, she 
successfully demonstrates that Czechoslovak democracy had more authoritarian qualities 
than the popular myth would otherwise lead us to believe. 
 Czechoslovak democracy, then, also served a purpose for the West, by creating the 
image of “an East European state that was dedicated to tolerance, egalitarianism, and human 
rights, and was capable of joining the West” and thereby “help withstand German aggression 
and contain Bolshevik social radicalism.”6 Since the nineteenth-century, Czech nationalists 
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had been in conflict with German nationalists in the Bohemian Lands, shaping the 
development of democracy. Despite the commitment to minority rights protection in the 
1920s constitution, “Czech nationalists promoted practices of national classification with 
new zeal and with the power of the state on their side” often at the expense of individual 
rights.7 These nationalist conflicts affected all aspects of the lives of citizens of 
Czechoslovakia. It influenced where they shopped, what languages they spoke, where they 
sent their children to school, which organizations they participated in, and whom they 
married. Still, there were those who defied easy classification by nationalists: “amphibians” 
who spoke both Czech and German and moved between the social milieus.8 However, even 
these “amphibians” were required to select a nationality on the Czechoslovak census, which 
was based primarily on “mother tongue.” 
 The one exception was for Jewish citizens, who could identify themselves as being of 
“Jewish” nationality on the census even if they did not speak Hebrew or Yiddish (and instead 
listed Czech or German as their mother-tongue). Jewish citizens of the Bohemian Lands 
occupied a space between and beside the nationalist conflicts between Czechs and Germans. 
Jewish nationalists were primarily split between the Zionists and the Czech-Jewish 
movement, the latter having argued for assimilation and integration into the wider Czech 
nation. Although many Prague Jews spoke German, the German-Jewish movement remained 
small and had only limited political influence. Still, Jewish citizens of the Bohemian Lands 
had flexible national identities, as many spoke both Czech and German fluently.9 Still, the 
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Czechoslovak census attempted to fix national identities by requiring citizens to declare their 
nationality, mother-tongue, and religion.   
 Ethnic categorization of refugees began early on in the First Republic. As Michal 
Frankl writes, when the First Republic accepted refugees primarily from East Europe after 
the end of the First World War, the Czechoslovak government created refugee camps to 
facilitate care for them, but also to separate the refugees according to ethnic categories.10 
Additionally, these refugees from the east represented the first encounter between residents 
of the Bohemian Lands and Ostjuden, “Eastern Jews,” resulting in a spike of anti-Jewish 
demonstrations at the end of the war. But, as Frankl and Kateřina Čapková demonstrate, the 
defining feature of Czechoslovak refugee policy in the interwar period “was the very lack of 
[rules] and of any definition of the ‘refugee’ or ‘emigrant,’” which allowed the government 
to appear relatively accommodating to German political refugees fleeing persecution in Nazi 
Germany, while excluding refugees of less “desirable” ethnicity and language of everyday 
use.11 Thus, the Czechoslovak government was relatively accommodating to political 
refugees fleeing Ukraine and Russia (as fellow Slavic-speakers, these refugees helped to 
solidify the Slavic majority and the pan-Slav movement) in the 1920s and the politically 
active German refugees (for their anti-Nazi positions) early in the 1930s, while being 
increasingly less welcome to Jewish refugees, first from Eastern Europe (although their 
number were limited, especially in Bohemia) and then from Nazi Germany after 1935.12 
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 The first major refugee action undertaken by the First Republic was the Russian 
Action (Ruská pomocná akce) in March 1921, in which the Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
offered 100,000,000 crowns to support the 20,000 Russians exiles as well as Russian cultural 
institutions in Czechoslovakia. Czechoslovak legionnaires had fought for the Whites during 
the Russian Revolution, and were eager to provide refuge to these emigres after the 
Revolution. For such a young state, this was an incredible humanitarian undertaking; yet, the 
Russian action both served to solidify the Slavic-speaking majority in the young republic and 
Czechoslovakia’s place in the world order as the stabilizing force in Central and Eastern 
Europe (between a Russia in the throes of a Bolshevik Revolution and Civil War), a defeated 
Germany, and a collapsed empire in Austria.13 Jewish refugees arriving in Czechoslovakia (at 
least 10,000) at the same time, in contrast, were perceived by the government to have 
“sharpened already tense ethnic relations, strained already overextended scare resources, and 
added to the sense of moral panic and civic crisis.”14 Still, the Czechoslovak authorities 
provided refugee status to Jewish migrants and in some cases, local transportation, even 
though financial responsibility for Jewish migrants lay with local and international Jewish 
communal organizations like the American Joint Jewish Distribution Committee. To 
facilitate the distribution of these funds, the authorities created specific camps for Jewish 
migrants until they could emigrate further.15 As Rebekah Klein-Pejšová has argued, 
“Czechoslovak state cooperation with their [local Jewish groups] aid efforts, alongside its 
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policies of Jewish minority protections, formed an integral part of their own political 
reorientation process, reassured international Jewish organizations, and lent further support to 
Czechoslovak state consolidation,” even if the actual aid and funding came from Jewish 
groups.16  
During the 1930s, many refugees fleeing Nazism in Germany—and later Austria—
sought refuge in Czechoslovakia. These refugees were only granted temporary asylum in the 
First Republic.5 Czechoslovakia was indeed an uncertain refuge. Approximately 4,000 
refugees from Germany arrived in Czechoslovakia during the first wave of 1933.17 Most of 
them—especially Jewish and Communist refugees—were granted only temporary residence 
in Czechoslovakia, thus using it as a way station as they tried to flee continental Europe, and 
some even returned to Germany. By October 1934, the first wave of refugees had passed and 
many of the 4,000 migrants who came to Czechoslovakia in the first year of Nazi rule had 
already left Czechoslovakia for other countries. Nevertheless, more refugees kept coming 
and thus there were 5,000 German and Austrian political refugees living in the Bohemian 
Lands on the eve of the Munich Agreement.6 
Managing the maintenance and migration assistance efforts of these individuals was a 
considerable task. Following the Czechoslovak policy toward Jewish refugees in the 1920s, 
the Czechoslovak government was often willing to provide temporary asylum, Nansen 
passports, and local transportation for refugees, especially those fleeing political persecution. 
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However, the government did not provide financial support for the maintenance of these 
refugees or their cultural institutions and feared that these political refugees would attempt to 
permanently resettle in Czechoslovakia.18 These duties fell to the five major refugee 
committees that emerged to care for these refugees based on their political and ethnic 
categorization: the Democratic Refugee Relief Committee (DRRC), the Social Democratic 
Relief Committee, the Communist Central Association to Aid Refugees, the Union of White 
Collar Employees, Šalda Committee for Intellectuals, and the Jewish Aid Committee (later 
the Jewish Social Institute). 
At first, regional and local committees sprouted up to deal with the immediate 
problems associated with an influx of refugees: food, lodging, clothing, as well as concerns 
about policing and internal security. In addition, national groups representing particular 
subsections of the refugee population arose. Responding to a call from the League of Human 
Rights of Czechoslovakia in March 1933 to aid refugees, the Democratic Refugee Relief 
Committee was formed. Given the preponderance of political refugees early on, the other 
major refugee organizations represented political parties, including the Social Democratic 
Relief Committee (with connections to the Social Democratic Parties of Germany and 
Czechoslovakia), the Communist Central Association to Aid Refugee, the Union of White 
Collar Employees, and the Šalda Committee, which supported intellectuals with Communist 
tendencies (named after the Czech writer F.X. Šalda). A final layer of refugee relief work 
from the international relief organizations also set up shop in the Bohemian Lands, including 
the relief funds provided by the AJDC. 
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With the support of the Czechoslovak government, representatives of the five primary 
aid organizations formed an umbrella coordinating organization known as the Czechoslovak 
National Committee for Refugees Coming from Germany in July 1934.19 The founding 
members of the National Committee—the Social Democratic Refugee Welfare Organization, 
the Union of White Collar Employees, the Šalda Committee, the Democratic Refugee 
Welfare Organization, and the Jewish Aid Committee (later, HICEM)—joined the National 
Committee in order to represent refugee interests to the Czechoslovak government, 
coordinate refugee aid, evenly distribute international funds for refugees, and present a united 
front for Czechoslovakia at international meetings on issues related to refugees. Over time, 
other organizations joined the National Committee, including the Association for the Support 
of German Refugees, the Social Welfare Institute of the Jewish Religious Community, and 
the Registration Center for German Refugees. The elected head of the National Committee, 
the prominent Jewish social worker Marie Schmolka, frequently met with government 
ministers to ask for assistance on behalf of refugees. Throughout the 1930s, she often met 
directly with Minister of the Interior Josef Černý and was quite successful in persuading him 
to grant her requests.20 
Although the National Committee did not exercise an extraordinary amount of 
power—and even formally disbanded for several months beginning in 1935 due to 
differences with the Communist refugee groups—the organization would be crucial in the 
creation of connections between international and national refugee aid work later essential 
                                                 
19 YIVO, Records of the HICEM Office in Prague, RG 245.10, folder 1, MKM 15.135, Meeting Minutes of the 
National Committee, 4 July 1934, p.000003. 
 
20 Erich Kulka, “The Jews in Czechoslovakia between 1918 and 1968,” in Czechoslovakia: Crossroads and 
Crises, 1918-88 edited by Norman Stone and Eduard Strouhal (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1989), 281. 
 





for helping refugees leave the Protectorate of Bohemia and Moravia. The National 
Committee’s goals in its first few years was to provide relief for the refugees in the form of 
lodging, medical care, clothing, and food. The National Committee also initiated several 
programs to support the children of refugees and intervened with the police authorities on 
behalf of certain individuals who had difficulty receiving refugee status from the Police 
Commissariat.21 As the situation in Germany and then Austria worsened, the National 
Committee’s work shifted more toward securing migration opportunities for the refugees, 
which required a substantial amount of correspondence with individuals and organizations 
abroad. The connections necessary to support migration were formed by the National 
Committee’s participation in international refugee conferences. Furthermore, the National 
Committee responded to government policies toward refugees, and thus established a 
responsive internal network to refugee issues through cooperation with each other and other 
organizations serving refugees. 
The National Committee’s primary goal was to provide representation for 
Czechoslovak refugee organizations at an international level and at a national level to collect 
the funds necessary to support the refugees.22 The League of Nations High Commission on 
Refugees, required that each country send only one representative and that the representative 
provide services to refugees without regard to their political or religious affiliations. Thus, 
the National Committee served primarily as a collective fundraising organization that lobbied 
the Czechoslovak government as well as the High Commission on Refugees, while the 
member committees maintained autonomy in distributing their share of the funds and 
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supporting the refugees on their roles. Political tensions between the refugee committees 
(particularly the Social Democrats and the Communists, as well as Jewish organizations 
reluctant to support Communist refugees) remained throughout the 1930s and prevented 
closer cooperation between the refugee organizations in Czechoslovakia. Still, the National 
Committee attempted to resolve disputes between the various refugee organizations when 
they arose. 
The National Committee’s influence over Czechoslovak refugee policy was relatively 
limited. Still, Jewish organizations emerged to lobby against the differentiated treatment for 
Jewish refugees. Although the National Committee regularly sent memoranda with 
recommendations and proposals to the government about refugee policy, the government 
rarely approved these changes. For instance, in July 1936, the National Committee attempted 
to sway the government to more clearly define the legal definition of “refugee” as well as the 
rights and accommodations that would be afforded to individuals who received refugee 
status. The government’s definition of refugee, enforced by the Ministry of Interior, was 
vaguely articulated of which was “individuals in practice or de jure not afforded the 
protection of their state.” This status was difficult to prove and, because of its vagueness, 
could be applied inconsistently. The National Committee hoped to more clearly define 
refugees to include both those who were being persecuted in Germany as well as those who 
had lost their citizenship. Furthermore, the National Committee felt that the government too 
often used the classification of “economic refugee,” individuals who did not receive full 
asylum rights, especially in cases where the persecuted individual fled because of anti-Jewish 
legislation. Pointing to the French refugee committee as an example, the member 
organizations in the National Committee wanted to have a hand in identifying and defining 





“refugees,” and then hoped to be able to secure work permits for refugees on their rolls, in 
order to ease the financial burden on the individual committees. This proposal and others like 
it were ignored by the Czechoslovak government.23 
The National Committee often lamented its most challenging problems in supporting 
refugees: the government’s expulsion of unwanted refugees and the difficulty in securing 
residence permits. In the first three years of refugee flight from Nazi Germany, 
Czechoslovakia did not require German passport holders to obtain a visa; still, many refugees 
crossed into Czechoslovakia illegally. With the assistance of refugee committees (who were 
allowed to vouch for refugees), illegal refugees could obtain a residence permit and 
eventually a “stateless” passport. While Czechoslovakia was one of the few countries that 
allowed accredited refugee committees to certify refugees as such, the First Republic laws 
that allowed the government to expel foreigners for political or otherwise “dangerous” 
activities nonetheless pertained to these refugees. These laws were often vague and unclear 
and gave the government the ability to deny some Communist and Jewish refugees (who 
were often regarded as “economic refugees” and therefore a threat to the Czechoslovak 
economy recovering from the worldwide depression) a residence permit, and those without 
the crucial residence permit were thereafter often expelled from Czechoslovakia.24 Although 
the National Committee attempted to convince the government that refugees arriving in 
Czechoslovakia should be allowed a grace period of three months in which to find an 
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migration opportunity before being expelled, the government again ignored the National 
Committee’s proposal.25 
Czechoslovakia was not the only country to differentiate between political and 
economic refugees during the 1930s. International definitions of “refugee” status were 
influenced by the political nature of emigres from Russia in the 1920s—most countries, 
including Britain, France, and Czechoslovakia prioritized refugees who fit this narrowly 
defined category of a “political” refugee. Czechoslovakia and other European countries 
accepted these political refugees. The earliest refugees from Nazi Germany fit this model of a 
refugee, that is, they were specifically fleeing political persecution rather than economic 
plight caused by legal discrimination. Still, other countries, particularly France and Belgium 
adopted more liberal asylum and refugee assistance policies. Although France never had a 
single refugee statue nor offered a clear definition of who could claim refugee status—opting 
instead to address refugees according to country of origin, demonstrating a strong prejudice 
against East European refugees—the French government did grant amnesty to German 
refugees arriving prior to 1936, which alleviated some of the fears of deportation.26 
Furthermore, the refugee committees in France worked with the pro-refugee lobby to 
pressure the government to overturn some of its more anti-refugee positions.27 By 1936, both 
France and Belgium had instituted reformed refugee policies that reviewed refugees on a 
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case-by-case basis and allowed all German refugees (whether they had arrived legally or 
illegally) to petition for asylum. The refugee committees in both countries “then advised their 
respective Ministers of Justice on whether these people should be granted refugee status and 
it seems that in most cases their advice was followed.”28 
The majority of Jewish refugees from Germany did not fit this classical model of 
refugee established in the 1920s and 1930s. Rather, many Jewish refugees fled Germany for 
what countries of immigration determined were “economic” or “racial” reasons. Nazi anti-
Jewish legislation in 1933 and 1934 aimed to limit Jewish participation in German civic and 
cultural life by excluding Jews from the civil service, universities, and the medical and legal 
professions. Since the international community saw that the external pressure driving these 
individuals to emigrate was the loss of their professions, Jewish refugees from Nazi Germany 
were typical classified as “economic refugees,” that is, those who found it difficult to 
continue living in Germany because of unemployment or economic factors.29 In the context 
of the worldwide Great Depression, allowing the immigration of economic refugees was a 
slippery slope: many people had lost their jobs in the Depression and this was simply not, in 
the eyes of many, a sufficient reason to allow someone to enter a new country. Workers in 
the countries of immigration were struggling enough as it was and allowing economic 
refugees to immigrate would exacerbate the unemployment of local workers.30 
                                                 
28 Frank Caestecker and Bob Moore, “The Development of Refugee Policies, 1933-1937,” in Refugees from 
Nazi Germany and the Liberal European States, edited by Frank Caestecker and Bob Moore (New York: 
Berghahn Books, 2014), 228-229. 
 
29 For a discussion of the use of “political” and “economic” refugees, see: London, Whitehall and the Jews, 144-
145. 
 
30 See: Saul Friedländer, Nazi Germany and the Jews: Volume I: The Years of Persecution, 1933-1939 (New 
York: HarperCollins, 1997), 43-72. 
 





As the number of “economic” or “racial” refugees escaping anti-Jewish persecution 
rose, the Czechoslovak government made it increasingly difficult for these refugees to 
receive asylum or remain in Czechoslovakia. The Czechoslovak government instituted a 
number of policies that prevented refugees from obtaining residence permits in the country, 
without which it was impossible for the refugees to work. The Czechoslovak government 
also planned to institute additional policies aimed to discourage refugees from remaining in 
Czechoslovakia in an effort to appease the increasingly powerful Nazi government. One of 
these proposed policies was a 1937 plan to confine refugees in several of the poorer regions 
of the Bohemian Lands, and thereby prevent refugees from gaining access to the larger urban 
centers such as Prague and Brno, in an effort to maintain “social order” and encourage these 
refugees to leave more quickly. Following protests from local and international refugee 
organizations, the Czechoslovak government pulled back from this plan.31 
By the time the Anschluss brought Austria into the German Reich, the Czechoslovak 
government had actively begun to prevent refugees from entering the country.32 The most 
striking evidence of this was the case of the Burgenland Jews. Though this case was quite 
unusual, it does demonstrate in dramatic fashion the international, European, and 
specifically, Czechoslovak reaction to Austrian-Jewish refugees. Shortly after the Anschluss, 
a group of forty Jews was expelled from their homes by the Austrian government and forced 
across the Austrian-Czechoslovak border. When the Czechoslovak border guards denied the 
group entry, they were forced to return to Austria. Several weeks later, another group of 
Austrian Jews was expelled from their homes, sent by train to the Czechoslovak border, and 
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forced to illegally cross into Czechoslovakia by a boat crossing of the Danube River. Also 
denied entry to Czechoslovakia, this group of Jews was driven back and forth between the 
borders of Austria, Czechoslovakia, and Hungary for several months, always being denied 
entry. Eventually, Jewish Community representatives in Bratislava devised a plan to place 
the refugees on a barge on the international waters of the Danube – there, no country could 
refuse them. The Czechoslovak representative of HICEM, Marie Schmolka, visited the 
group, offering some social aid where she could, and reported on their poor living conditions. 
Finally, in September 1938, the group dispersed among Palestine, the United States, and 
Bolivia.33 
 As the Nazis rose to power in Germany, tensions between Czech- and German-
speakers in the Bohemian Lands assumed a more intense character as well. The 
Czechoslovak state became increasingly authoritarian, banning organizations or arresting 
individuals considered to threaten the security of the republic. The residents of the 
Sudetenland were subject to heightened press censorship, oversight of public meetings, and 
the increased presence of Czech police forces in German-speaking areas.34 The German-
speaking population in the Sudetenland region, which was upward of 90 percent of the 
population in some towns, pressed for greater representation in the Czechoslovak parliament. 
This movement, led by Konrad Henlein and the right-wing Sudetendeutsche Partei, SdP 
(Sudeten German Party) pressed for autonomy for the German minority. The German-
speaking regions of Czechoslovakia were hardest hit by the global depression, suffering 
higher rates of poverty and unemployment (almost twice as high) than those in Czech-
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speaking regions. In response to the appearance of Czech repression and Nazi German 
dynamism, the SdP became increasingly aligned with the Nazi party in Germany  throughout 
1937.35 
  After the Anschluss, Henlein and his party gained increasing international attention in 
their calls for the full autonomy of the Sudetenland from Nazi Germany. In April 1938, 
Henlein openly declared loyalty to Nazi ideals and demanded political autonomy in the 
Sudetenland. The British Parliament and British newspapers discussed the tense situation in 
the Sudetenland after the Anschluss, arguing that something should be done to give the 
German-speakers in the region some measure of self-government.36 In August, the British 
government sent a delegate to investigate the tensions between Germans and Czechs in 
Czechoslovakia.37 Fearing another European war, the British pressured Beneš to accept 
Henlein’s calls for political autonomy in September 1938. Henlein then escalating his 
demands, calling for the annexation of the German-speakers into the Greater Reich. Beneš 
responded by banning the SdP and its affiliated organizations and before mobilizing the 
Czechoslovak army on September 23, 1938.38 As the crisis escalated, Czechoslovak citizens 
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as well as a number of refugees from Nazi Germany began to flee the border regions for the 
Czechoslovak interior. 
 
The Munich Agreement and the Second Czecho-Slovak Republic 
 Edith Landau and her family moved to the spa town Mariánské Lázně in 1934, when 
she was twelve years old. The family had previously lived in Vienna before relocating 
because of her father’s travelling wholesale business. Because he often travelled between 
Poland, Czechoslovakia, and Austria, Czechoslovakia served as a central location for 
operating his business. Edith’s parents were both born in Poland and were observant Jews 
who kept a kosher household. Still, the family spoke German at home and had Jewish and 
non-Jewish friends. Edith remembered her life in Marienbad happily: her local rabbi offered 
a bat mitzvah ceremony for Edith and her friends, and she participated in Jewish youth 
groups. Then, in September 1938, came what Edith called,  
one of the worst days during my experience, because that day I went to school and I 
never went home. My mother came to school to get us with a minimum of our 
belongings and said that we have to leave town and that it has to be done fast. I 
cannot recall going back home to get things. It was all done, how shall I say? Panicky 
way. It was all done in a one, two, three, we have to go.39 
 
Fearing the German occupation of the Sudetenland, the family left directly for Prague. For 
Edith, the journey to Prague was accomplished in a fog of confusion, sadness, and fear. “I 
don’t remember where we stopped, how long it took us to get to Prague. All I remember is 
that we were in Prague. We had an apartment there. And we stayed in Prague from 
September 1938 till May of 1939.”40 
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 The Landau family was part of an early wave of refugees who, in anticipation of the 
German annexation of the Sudetenland, fled to the interior of the Bohemian Lands. 
Throughout the fall and early winter of 1938 150,0000 refugees fled the Sudetenland, at least 
20,000 of whom were Jewish.41 While the Landau family found refuge in Prague, many 
others did not receive the same treatment from a Czechoslovak government embroiled in a 
political, economic, and refugee crisis.  
Even before the settlement of the Munich Agreement, refugees like the Landau 
family began escaping from the border areas into the interior of Czechoslovakia. Tensions in 
the border regions increased throughout 1938 as Konrad Henlein, the leader of the Sudeten 
German Party, had begun to pressure the Czechoslovakian government and move toward 
implementing Nazi policies. To add to the tension, there were small-scale border raids and 
local battles between Czech and German nationalists.42 By August 1938, the JRC Prague 
reported that the Jews in the Sudetenland were “already in great danger. Morally: by social 
boycott, insults, the degrading of children in schools; physically by assaults in schools, 
outrages against synagogues, business, threatening letters etc.; economically: by a boycott of 
merchants, doctors and lawyers, systematically organized, as in the Third Realm.”43 As a 
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result of these pressures, the JRC report continued, many Jewish professionals and business 
owners had already fled to the interior of the country.44 
On September 29, the heads of the British, French, German, and Italian governments 
met in Munich to discuss the future of the Sudetenland. In the early hours of September 30, 
the Four Powers signed the Munich Agreement, which stipulated that the Czechoslovak 
government would evacuate from the Sudetenland beginning on October 1 and German 
troops would occupy the territory by October 10. Sensing no other option, the President 
Edvard Beneš and the government succumbed to the pressure and ordered the Czechoslovak 
troops to stand down. 
As a result of the Munich agreement, Czechoslovakia lost to Germany 30 percent of 
its territory including its natural and military border defenses, 40 percent of its major 
industry, and over a third of its population.45 President Edvard Beneš fled the country, and 
Czechoslovakia became the Second Czecho-Slovak Republic. In the months that followed, 
Hungary and Poland both asserted claims to Czechoslovak territory, annexing portions of 
southern and eastern Slovakia and Silesia respectively. The Second Republic government, 
which ruled by decree and without Parliament, was led by rightist anti-democrats, clerico-
fascists, and others who opposed Beneš and his followers. The government introduced strict 
censorship, banned the Communist Party, and began instituting anti-Jewish legislation. 
Between September 1938 and the summer of 1939, over 200,000 (some estimates are 
as high as 250,000) refugees fled the border region for the interior of the country. Twenty to 
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thirty thousand of those refugees were Jews, meaning that the majority of the Jewish 
population of the Sudetenland fled the region.46 Not only did the interior of the Bohemian 
Lands absorb several thousand refugees from German and Austria prior to the Munich 
Agreement, but the region became flooded with two additional groups of people fleeing the 
Sudetenland after the Agreement: first, Czechoslovaks (primarily Czech-speaking) who 
retained their Czechoslovak citizenship and wanted to be resettled from the Sudetenland; and 
second, residents of the Sudetenland (primarily Jews and German-speakers) who had been 
stripped of their Czechoslovak citizenship after the Munich Agreement, but who feared and 
disliked the Nazi regime. Owing to the loss of territory and the promise of a plebiscite (which 
meant that the borders remained uncertain until the plebiscite was abandoned on October 13), 
the refugee situation in the Bohemian Lands was far more complex and disorienting than in 
other countries coping with the influx of refugees, both for the government and for those 
displaced. Germany and Austria were busy creating refugees while other countries, like 
France or the Netherlands, tried to cope with the influx of massive numbers of people fleeing 
Nazi oppression.47 But the Munich Agreement and the subsequent occupation of the 
Sudetenland catapulted the refugee situation in Czechoslovakia onto the global scene. For 
those Czechoslovak refugees in Czecho-Slovakia, the situation was particularly disorienting. 
A Jewish refugee described the confusion in her diary on September 30, “Refugees in groups, 
in queues, and singly; some noisy and some very still. How can this little country, now 
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amputated and impoverished, receive and support them? How can I hope to go abroad now 
that I am a refugee in my own country?”48  
Refugees fled the Sudetenland in waves, the first of which began during the 
September 1938 crisis. By September 27, 24,359 refugees had fled the Sudetenland. Just four 
days later, on October 1, an additional 3,778 refugees had arrived in the interior of the 
country. For the next two weeks, the numbers of refugees declined slightly as the Czecho-
Slovak government encouraged Czechoslovaks to remain in the areas where a plebiscite was 
to take place. When the plebiscite did not happen, refugees began to leave the Sudetenland in 
droves. Between October 15 and November 1, at least 55,000 refugees fled the Sudetenland. 
By December 1, more than 64,000 refugees arrived (bringing the total number of refugees to 
145,903).49 
The social workers who came to Czechoslovakia in October 1938 to help the refugees 
began referring to the situation in Czechoslovakia as a “triple refugee problem”50—refugees 
from Germany and Austria; Jewish and German refugees from the Sudetenland; and Czechs 
from the Sudetenland—because of the varying treatments of Sudetenland refugees. For those 
fleeing the Sudetenland, the Second Republic period was marked by confusion and urgency. 
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The Munich Agreement stipulated that Nazi Germany would gradually occupy the Sudeten 
region beginning on October 1 and that residents of the border regions would have the 
opportunity to choose their nationality. In reality, for Jews and pro-Czechoslovakia Sudeten 
Germans, this was not often the case. Since the Munich Agreement stipulated that plebiscites 
would be held in the most interior zones of the Sudetenland, the Czechoslovak government 
was anxious to keep supporters of Czechoslovakia in those areas as well as to prevent the 
interior of the country from being further “Germanized” by the presence of these mostly 
German speaking refugees. As a result, many of these refugees were forced back across the 
newly created border or held in no-man’s-land. 
The precedent for accepting refugees was based on favoring “political” refugees over 
“economic” or “racial” (code for Jewish) refugees. In the Second Republic period, this 
manifested in a state-organized preference for Czechs and Slovaks over German refugees, 
and especially over German-speaking Jewish refugees. The Second Republic’s response to 
the refugees to the “triple refugee crisis” was similarly threefold. As Michal Frankl has 
argued, “The refugee question became increasingly intertwined with citizenship, ethnicity 
and minority rights,” so that in the Second Republic “the understanding of the nation and of 
citizenship … now was based on a narrower, ethnic definition.”51 For the first time since the 
Russian Relief Action in the 1920s, the government felt compelled to provide relief services 
for refugees, but only for “Czechoslovak” refugees – that is, those who had claimed 
“Czechoslovak” nationality on the last census. Still, the government depended on voluntary 
organizations associated with the National Committee to provide actual relief services. By 
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November 1938, the refugee situation in the Second Republic, dominated by the 
displacement of ethnic Czechs, had worsened to the point that the government founded an 
Institute for Refugee Welfare as a subdivision of the Ministry for Social Welfare, directed by 
Lev Zavřel. The Refugee Institute’s tasks were twofold: first, the Institute was to provide 
resettlement services to provide resettlement services to Czech- and Slovak-speaking 
refugees from the borderlands, including health, employment, and housing services. In 
theory, these services for Czechoslovak refugees were to be distributed based on the 1930 
census. 
Second, the Refugee Institute assisted in the continued migration of those refugees, 
primarily German-speakers, Jews, and other national minorities.52 To accomplish this, the 
Refugee Institute worked closely with Robert Stopford and the BCRC representatives as the 
Czecho-Slovak administers of the “Czech Gift Fund.”53 The Refugee Institute additionally 
participated in the negotiation of the “Czech Gift Fund,” with the goal of securing funds to 
promote Jewish migration from the Bohemian Lands. 
In theory, these services were to be offered to refugees regardless of religion, political 
affiliation, or ethnicity. In practice, the Refugee Institute offered services based on ethnic 
criteria: while social, medical, and resettlement services were offered to Czech and other 
Slovak refugees, the Institute promoted the continued migration of Jewish and anti-Nazi 
German refugees.54 In the Institute’s internal documents, there is a clear division between 
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services offered to “our people” and those offered to “Jews” and other national minorities. 
By early January 1939, the Refugee Institute held regular meetings to debate several 
‘voluntary’ migration schemes for Jews to places like Rhodesia, Madagascar, southwest 
France, New Caledonia, Bolivia, Canada, and Nicaragua. 55 The Refugee Institute’s primary 
responsibility prior to March 15, 1939 was to communicate refugee policy to the refugee 
assistance organizations and to administer the Czech Gift Fund to facilitate migration. On 
January 14, 1939, the Refugee Institute stated that this fund would be administered in such a 
way so as to “partially solve the Jewish emigration question.”56 As historian Tara Zahra 
argues, the Refugee Institute was simultaneously a humanitarian organization and one that 
contributed to the removal of the Jewish population from the Bohemian Lands, 
demonstrating that there was “an ambiguous frontier between rescue and removal at the 
international level.”57 Perhaps because of this dual role, the Refugee Institute served an 
essential role in helping connect foreign and Czecho-Slovak voluntary workers. The Refugee 
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Institute hosted regular meetings for all refugee aid organizations and even offered office 
space to foreign voluntary groups.58 
Voluntary organizations again arose to fill the void left by the Czechoslovak 
government, joining the pre-existing organizations established early in the 1930s. The task of 
migration case-work and social assistance to refugees required to leave the Bohemian Lands 
was left to Czechoslovak voluntary organizations and social workers. For Jewish refugees, 
migration casework was handled by the HICEM (an international organization formed in 
1926 to centralize the refugee assistance work of the Hebrew Immigrant Aid Society, or 
HIAS, the Jewish Colonization Office, or ICA, and EmigDirect) office, while other forms of 
immediate social assistance were taken up by the Jewish Religious Community of Greater 
Prague and the local Jewish religious communities throughout the Bohemian Lands. Similar 
services were offered to refugees from Germany and Austria and other anti-Nazis by 
voluntary organizations dedicated to particular subsets of the refugee population (like the 
Šalda Committee which concentrated on Communist refugees and intellectuals, the Social 
Democratic Refugee Aid Committee, the Democratic Refugee Aid Committee, and the 
Union of Private Employees). Organizations such as the Czechoslovak Red Cross offered 
funds to help support the relief work of other voluntary organizations. Representatives of 
both Jewish and non-Jewish organizations had been working closely with the Czechoslovak 
government on issues of refugee policy since the early 1930s and continued to meet regularly 
with the Refugee Institute during the Second Republic period.  
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The refugee policies of the Czecho-Slovak government after the Munich agreement 
reflected the government’s concern about the national demographics of the country. For 
Czechoslovaks and other East Central Europeans, the refugee crisis caused by Nazi Germany 
was an opportunity to remake the demographics of the country. Indeed, for leaders in the 
West, the Munich Agreement was the culmination of the belief that the minority rights 
treaties signed after World War I had failed. Governments and humanitarian organizations, in 
working to assist refugees, also were complicit in making Czechoslovakia more 
Czechoslovak. For the Czechoslovak government, the presence of refugees provided a visible 
signal to the world about the instability of the Second Republic. As a result, the Prague police 
recommended the detention of Jewish (and German-speaking refugees) for reasons of public 
safety. Refugees provided a visible sign of the instability of the country. 
These policies also served to encourage unwanted refugees to leave the Bohemian 
Lands.  In addition to anti-refugee policies, the Czechoslovak government instituted a 
number of anti-Jewish policies designed to shut the Jewish population out of the wider 
population economically, civically, and socially. The Czecho-Slovak government continued 
to enact policies that targeted Jewish refugees and encouraged them to pursue migration after 
the Munich Agreement went into effect. On October 11, the chair of the District Office in 
Prague warned all regional and district government and police offices that “persons of Jewish 
religion who intend on opening a trade company on a smaller scale must be immediately 
relocated elsewhere to prevent this [opening of new Jewish businesses] from happening.”59 
Throughout the fall 1938, the Second Republic government engaged in talks with the Nazi 
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government regarding the “Jewish question” as a means of legitimizing the new state to the 
German authorities.60 In December 1938, rumors swirled that the government would dismiss 
Jewish civil servants. This legislation did not go into effect until January 27, 1938—after the 
signing of the British-French loan to Czechoslovakia—and did not specifically mention Jews, 
though it was clearly directed at Jewish civil servants. Additionally, the Czecho-Slovak 
parliament passed a series of laws in January 1939 that “revised the citizenship of those who 
were naturalized after the establishment of Czechoslovakia in 1918 or who had lived in the 
Sudetenland until the Munich Agreement; the eligibility of such people was largely defined 
by ethnicity. Without mentioning Jews at all, the main objective was clear to everybody: to 
strip a significant proportion of Czechoslovak Jews of their citizenship and –in this way—to 
transform them into real refugees.”61 That same day, the government passed an additional 
regulation, which required that “foreigners” leave Czecho-Slovakia within six months, an 
ordinance Michal Frankl has compared to a Polish law of 1938 that stripped Polish Jews 
living abroad of their Polish passports.62 
Approximately 20,000 Jewish refugees flooded into the rump state of Czechoslovakia 
after the Munich Agreement in September 1938, though only 7,325 participated in the 
refugee census run by the Refugee Institute on December 5.63 Facing persecution in the 
Sudetenland and unwanted by the Czecho-Slovak government, many of these refugees were 
forced to live along the roadsides, erecting makeshift refugee camps until more permanent 
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housing could be found. In January 1939, there were at least twelve refugee camps in No-
Man’s-Land along the Second Republic borders with Germany, Hungary, and Poland. In 
Ivančice, a refugee camp was erected in an abandoned leather factory for approximately 200 
refugees. 64 These refugees, mostly from Břeclav/Lundenberg, had been driven out of their 
homes in late October and “after weeks of wandering about in forests and camping in the 
open air, permission was granted by the Czech Government to accommodate the persecuted 
people in a camp that was set up in a factory in Ivančice near Brno by the Jews of that town. 
In order to set up this camp, money was placed at its disposal from the Lord Mayor’s 
Fund.”65 One of the refugees, Gerard Friedenfeld, who had fled with his parents, recalled that 
the refugee camp experience left him feeling that, “Everybody knew that we would have to 
emigrate. Soon.”66 
The vast majority of all refugee relief in the Bohemian Lands was provided by private 
aid groups, both Czecho-Slovak and international. While Czechs and Slovaks who fled to the 
interior received more assistance from the Refugee Institute than other refugees, the Refugee 
Institute depended on local voluntary organizations to actually provide relief. British 
voluntary organizations, many of which were politically left-leaning, responded to the 
refugee crisis within two weeks. In a letter to the British Foreign Minister Lord Halifax, 
British refugee expert John Hope Simpson explained that “the British people has a peculiar 
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responsibility” toward refugees from Czechoslovakia, since “it was the sacrifice of the 
Sudeten areas made by Czechoslovakia at the instigation of Great Britain and France, which 
relieved us from the horrors of war. The suffering of these refugees … is the price which is 
being paid for our own peace.”67 Other Labour Party members and British refugee workers 
shared Hope Simpson’s sentiment, as many representatives arrived in Prague in the early 
days of October.68 Representatives of other British organizations soon arrived, including the 
Lord Mayor’s Fund, which financially supported the British Committee for Refugees from 
Czechoslovakia (which later became the Czech Refugee Trust Fund). In addition to secular 
organizations, several British religious groups, including the Society of Friends (Quakers) 
and Unitarians also sent representatives to Czechoslovakia. These groups and their 
interactions with each other, the refugees, and the Czecho-Slovak government will be 
discussed in greater detail in chapter 3.  
However, fears about Czecho-Slovakia’s increasing political and economic ties to 
Nazi Germany, as well as concerns about the stability of the Second Republic, prompted the 
British and French government to offer a ten-million-pound loan to Czecho-Slovakia. In 
addition, Britain gave an additional four-million-pound grant to Czecho-Slovakia to be used 
toward assisting refugees to migrate from the Bohemian Lands. Of the “Czech Gift Fund,” 
four hundred thousand pounds was used by the Czecho-Slovak government to help 
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approximately 1,500 refugee emigrate during the period of the Second Republic.69 Two 
British officials, Walter Creighton and Robert J. Stopford, were sent to Prague to serve as 
managers of the funds in cooperation with the Czecho-Slovak government’s Refugee 
Institute. Still, the Czech Gift Fund agreement defined “refugees” in a way that meant the 
majority of the funds went to supporting German-speaking refugees. Given that the 
BCRC/Czech Refugee Trust Fund was designated primarily to help political refugees from 
Nazism—Jewish refugees were primarily categorized as “economic refugees”—some in the 
British Home Office felt that it would be counter to the purpose of the Czech Gift Fund to 
support only Jewish migration from former Czechoslovakia. Through extensive lobbying by 
Jewish organizations, £500,000 was specifically earmarked for Jewish migration to Palestine. 
The Refugee Institute supported the earmarking of funds for Jewish migration to Palestine, as 
this achieved the goal of encouraging non-Czech and Slovak refugees to emigrate 
immediately.70  
In contrast to their British counterparts, American relief did not arrive in Czecho-
Slovakia immediately. In October 1938, the President of Columbia University, Nicholas 
Murray Butler, launched a private fundraising drive, though the “Butler Commission” 
explicitly promised not to send any American representatives to manage the funds; every 
cent raised would be dedicated to relief. The American Committee for Relief in 
Czechoslovakia sponsored an exploratory mission to Czecho-Slovakia in mid-November, led 
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by a joint commission of the American Society of Friends and the American Unitarian 
Association. The commission concluded that while the British relief was sufficient for the 
current refugee problem, the situation would continue to worsen as the limited British funds 
ran dry. As a result, the commission suggested sending representatives to Prague a few 
months later and offered to serve as the American representatives for the funds raised by 
Nicholas Murray Butler’s committee. Thus, the first American relief representatives did not 
arrive in Prague until February 1939.71  
The period of the Second Republic was a maelstrom of activity for relief workers. As 
refugees flooded into the much smaller country, the increasingly authoritarian government 
attempted to balance maintaining an independent Czecho-Slovakia with assisting national 
minorities that, in the government’s opinion, could not be allowed to stay if the country was 
to remain independent. Furthermore, the government attempted to consolidate the 
administration of refugee organizations, even as they ballooned with the influx of foreign aid 
and foreign social workers. 
  
The Nazi Occupation of the Rest of the Bohemian Lands 
 The Nazi occupation of the rest of the Bohemian Lands on March 15, 1939, is a clear 
memory for those who lived through the event. Accounts of that day, even by those who 
were children at time, clearly recall the weather, the troops marching in, and the response of 
the wider population. In her diary, ten-year-old Helga Weiss recalled the day that the Nazis 
occupied all of the Bohemian Lands on March 15, 1939. She had gone to school like any 
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other day, but recalled, “Not much teaching went on. We were all distracted and felt relieved 
once the bell rang again. After classes lots of our parents were waiting for us. My mom came 
for me. On the way home we saw loads of German cars and tanks. The weather was chilly; it 
was raining, snow fell, the wind howled. It was as if nature was protesting.”72 Other children 
had similar memories of that day. Věra Diamantová, ten-years-old at the time, later recalled 
that she was awoken on the morning of March 15 by a “strange sound from the street,” as the 
German soldiers marched past their house into the town square. 
I remember it was snowing. And the streets were lined with people and there was an 
utter silence. And then one person started singing the Czech National Anthem. It 
starts with the words, “Where is my home?” And everyone joined in. Our little family 
joined in. And as we sang, “Where is My Home?” I wondered what was happening to 
our dear home. And that really shook me…73  
 
Six-year-old Eva Fleischmannová—whose father Rudolf Fleischmann, was a prominent anti-
fascist who had helped the writer Thomas Mann to flee Germany—remembered that on 
March 15, her father:  
decided that he needed to leave. He felt that only by being alive could he help the 
family get out. So the question was where to go and you know it was sort of a hurry. 
A briefcase and that was it. And he took the train to Berlin, where he decided nobody 
would ever think of looking for him, which was probably accurate. And so he had on 
March 15, he left.74 
 
 For Jewish citizens of the new Protectorate of Bohemia and Moravia, March 15 was a 
catastrophic event. Suicides among the Jewish population spiked alarmingly.75 Instances of 
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antisemitic propaganda and violence rose dramatically, Jewish organizations and businesses 
were shuttered, and Jews were rapidly excluded from the economic, social, and cultural life 
of the Protectorate. Children remembered the changes that March 15 brought to the 
Bohemian Lands. Helga Weiss later wrote: 
Since March 15 there has not been a single calm day. There have been orders one 
after another that repress and wound us more and more. Not a day goes by without 
bringing some new turmoil. The worst of it has landed on us Jews. They heap 
everything on our backs. We’re the cause of one thing after another, everything is our 
fault, even though we didn’t do anything. We can’t help being Jews, and nor can we 
help any of those other things. No one asks; they just feel they have to pour out their 
anger on someone and who’s better for that than—of course—the Jews. Anti-
semitism is rising; the newspapers are full of anti-Jewish articles.76   
On March 15, 1939, the Nazis occupied the remainder of the Czech portions of 
Czecho-Slovakia and established the Protectorate of Bohemia and Moravia. Slovakia was 
nominally independent Slovakia, but in reality, was governed by a German-installed puppet 
dictatorship. Czechoslovak autonomy was restricted to a limited number of domestic affairs, 
while the German military (and eventually the Reich Protector’s office) assumed control of 
foreign affairs and matters of defense and security. Faced with an ultimatum from Hitler, the 
president of the Second Republic, Emil Hácha, called for Czechoslovak soldiers to lay down 
their weapons and permit the Nazi troops to cross the border in exchange for Hitler’s promise 
of some autonomy and freedoms for Czechs. When the Reich Protector (Konstantin von 
Neurath) assumed the leadership as the head of the Bohemian Lands in April 1939, the 
government maintained the three-tiered system from the First Czechoslovak Republic. At the 
top was the Reich Protector and his office; the second level was made up of the Bohemian 
and Moravian representative bodies (with very little power); and at the third level were the 
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local Oberlandräte (thirty-five until the summer 1939, when they were reduced to nineteen, 
and reduced again in 1940), which served as intermediaries between the leadership in Prague 
and the local German administration.77 Although many top officials from the Second 
Republic government remained at their posts (including Hácha, his cabinet, the Minister of 
Justice Jaroslav Krejčí, and the heads of the Ministry of Social Welfare and the Refugee 
Institute), the Czech government (including police and legal system) exercised very little 
independent authority, and all of its actions required approval from Neurath. 
Neurath also maintained control over the registration of the Jewish population. In July 
1939, Neurath announced a policy for defining Jews and Mischlinge, based largely on the 
Nuremberg Laws, as someone with grandparents belonging to the Jewish community. Using 
the registration and birth rolls of Jewish religious organizations, racial policies defined a Jew 
as an individual with three or four Jewish grandparents and a Mischling as an individual with 
one or two Jewish grandparents.78 According to this definition, there were 118,310 Jews in 
the Protectorate as of March 15, 1939; of that total there were 14,350 individuals considered 
to be Jews by Nazi racial policies but were of non-Jewish faith.79 Protectorate Jews could not 
opt for German citizenship nor could they marry Germans (though they were not prevented 
from marrying Czechs).80 
 Immediately after the occupation, the Nazi authorities refused to issue exit permits to 
Jewish refugees, permanently closed the major Jewish emigration office HICEM and all 
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other international Jewish organizations, and arrested the Jewish leadership involved in 
refugee assistance.81 All migration from the Bohemian Lands was banned beginning on 
March 15. The Gestapo and the Sicherheitsdienst began immediately arresting political 
enemies (approximately 4,600 Communists and German refugees) under the “protective 
custody” statute that gave the state broad powers to arrest and detain in concentration camps 
individuals deemed to be a threat to the state.82 Among those arrested were the leaders of the 
Czechoslovak refugee organizations. Reports circulated about “border riots” as several 
hundred Jews seeking to escape were stopped in border towns.83  
On March 29, the Nazis released many of the Jewish leaders of Prague and the 
Palestine Office was permitted to reopen its doors, though all other Jews organizations 
remained closed.84 Jewish migration was allowed to resume, but in limited numbers. 
Reinhard Heydrich, chief of the RHSA, announced that Jewish migration from the 
Protectorate could not interfere with the migration of Jews from the Reich as Protectorate 
Jews. Making Germany, and then Austria, Judenrein (or “free of Jews”) was the priority.85 
Still, Göring enforced the sale of Jewish assists in exchange for issuing exit permits, a 
necessary document for emigration from the Protectorate, as a way to gain control of Jewish 
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property.86 Persecution served a push factor that convinced many Protectorate Jews to leave 
their homes. Anti-Jewish violence erupted in various cities, including Olomouc, Jihlava, and 
Ostrava, where synagogues were destroyed and Jewish residents were forced to clear snow 
from the city streets.87 
On the day of the occupation, individuals seeking to leave the Bohemian Lands 
overran the consulates and relief organizations in Prague. Only a small number managed to 
leave legally before the Nazis temporarily halted emigration. The rest had to find other, less 
official routes out of the Protectorate. As a result, in the first months of the occupation, many 
of those who feared being on a Gestapo arrest list, such as Eva Fleischmannová’s father 
Rudolf, fled across the border to Poland. Of the four to eight thousand refugees who went to 
Poland between March 15 and the beginning of World War II in September, the vast majority 
were Jewish.88 Others fled to Slovakia and Hungary. In leaving the Protectorate through 
these unofficial channels, these refugees hoped to evade detection by the Nazi authorities and 
reach foreign consulates in other countries.  
 For those who fled to Poland, the majority went first to Moravská Ostrava in Moravia 
before attempting to cross the border. Others attempted to reach Poland by passing through 
Slovakia. Many were prevented from entering Poland by the Polish border guards and over 
one thousand were imprisoned in Ostrava.89 Prior to the start of World War II, the Soviet 
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Union accepted refugees only on an individual basis and thus offered asylum only to the 
leading Czechoslovak Communists.90  Once in Poland, many refugees attempted to move 
further west. Refugees from the Bohemian Lands tended to congregate in Katowice (where 
the British Consul and a branch of the British Committee for Refugees from Czechoslovakia 
were located), Krakow (where the former Czechoslovak consul was located), or Warsaw. All 
three of these cities had active Jewish communities that provided assistance to refugees.91 
Many of the refugees who ended up in Poland joined or attempted to join the Czechoslovak 
Legions that were beginning to form. The individuals who fled to Poland or Slovakia did so 
without notifying the Nazi authorities, without proper visas, and often without passports.  
For international organizations as well as for organizations based in the Bohemian 
Lands, the arrival of the Nazi administration and Nazi security forces brought with it a period 
of uncertainty about the possibility of migration from the Bohemian Lands. Their work 
coordinating legal migration halted as well, and the international voluntary workers—like the 
BCRC representatives and the American representatives, Waitstill and Martha Sharp—
focused their efforts instead on coordinating illegal entry into Poland, where migrants could 
then proceed to the British embassy in Gdynia to receive entry permits to Britain. Still, some 
of these workers were careful to maintain relationships with the Nazi and Czech Protectorate 
officials, so as to continue their legal migration casework once the authorities resumed 
distribution of migration permits. Still, those most involved in escorting illegal transports of 
political refugees out of the Bohemian Lands (especially prominent British voluntary 
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workers), found themselves on Gestapo arrest lists in the late spring 1939 and were forced to 
leave the Protectorate.92 
Despite the temporary stop on emigration, British and American relief workers 
remained and encouraged individuals outside of the Protectorate to maintain contact with 
Czech refugee workers. When emigration resumed on March 29, hundreds of Jewish 
migrants left each day.93 A transport left the Protectorate for Palestine on April 4 (without 
approval from the British).94 Then, on April 5, with Italy’s efforts to annex Albania as an 
Italian protectorate, Europe once again seemed on the brink of war.95 The Protectorate 
government temporarily stopped issuing exit visas for one week as a result of the tense 
international situation.96 When the authorities resumed issuing exit visas in mid-April, British 
and American relief workers were swamped with migration cases. The Kindertransports 
resumed on April 19, one month after the first transported and continued throughout the 
spring and summer. The final transport of children departed Prague on August 2, 1939. 
Although many British relief workers left Prague during the late spring, several stayed on 
until early August, along with the American representatives.  
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The fact that official Nazi policies toward the Jews of the Protectorate both encourage 
and denied their emigration, creating a confusing and chaotic atmosphere during the first few 
months of the occupation. Anti-Jewish policies similar to those in place in Germany and 
Austria were instituted almost immediately. Although the Czech government drafted a list of 
measures to exclude Jews from the economic, cultural, and social life of the Bohemian Lands 
only two days after the creation of the Protectorate, Neurath assumed control of all anti-
Jewish policies. The Czech government began drawing up measure to Aryanize Jewish 
property and transfer Jewish business to Aryan managers, or Treuhänder. On June 21, 1939, 
the Reich Protector’s Office declared that it, rather than the Czech government, was 
responsible for developing and issuing all Aryanization policies. That same day, the Reich 
Protector decreed that the Nuremberg Laws officially applied to all Jews of the 
Protectorate.97 Jews were dismissed from serving in the public administration, the courts, and 
from teaching in German schools. Signs forbidding Jews from entering restaurants and other 
public places sprouted up soon after. Aryanization accelerated as Jews were barred from 
various professions in 1940 (including manufacturing, banks, and insurance) and were 
required to sell off their valuables and make deposits in foreign currency banks.98  
However, the staff of the Refugee Institute remained in their positions throughout the 
Nazi period. Lev Zavřel remained as the director, stating in June 1939 that “As the director 
emigration department of the Institute for Refugee Welfare, I want to work in full 
compliance with the interests of the Reich and the Protectorate and in close cooperation with 
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the German authorities, particularly with the [Gestapo] to solve … the delicate problem of 
Jewish emigration.”99 The Refugee Institute continued to negotiate with Robert Stopford for 
the use of the Czech Gift Fund. By June 1939, the funds that had been advanced to banks in 
the Protectorate had been exhausted. The Refugee Institute was able to negotiate the release 
of further funds for migrants, though the funds were kept in special accounts in London.100 
However, after the Nazi authorities took control of Jewish migration, the Refugee Institute 
ceased to be actively involved in migration attempts from the Protectorate.101 Rather, the 
Refugee Institute focused on securing housing and employment for Czech refugees from the 
Sudetenland, primarily by confiscating and redistributing Jewish houses and businesses. 
Working with local officials, Zavřel and the Refugee Institute facilitated the transfer of 
Jewish property (and thus “encouraged” Jewish migration) to Czech refugees displaced by 
the Munich Agreement.102   
The systematic disenfranchisement and impoverishment of the Protectorate Jewish 
population pushed many to consider migration. In June 1939, Adolf Eichmann arrived in 
Prague to enforce Jewish migration. Using the model that he had tested in Vienna and 
deemed successful, Eichmann founded the Prague Zentralstelle für jüdische Auswanderung 
(hereafter, Zentralstelle). The same forced migration policies were imposed in the 
Protectorate as had been established in Vienna the previous year. Throughout the spring 
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1939, Jewish flight from the Protectorate was both marked by the chaos and confusion 
caused by the catastrophe of the Nazi occupation and for the most part illegal migration. In 
July, Jewish migration became increasingly regulated—with fewer instances of illegal border 
crossings—as the Nazis instituted policies of forced migration. 
 
The Zentralstelle für jüdische Auswanderung and World War II 
 The character of flight from the Protectorate of Bohemia and Moravia changed 
significantly in mid-July 1939 with the establishment of the Zentralstelle and the outbreak of 
World War II a month and a half later on September 1, 1939. Whereas migration from the 
Protectorate during the first few months of its existence had remained largely decentralized, 
the Zentralstelle now served as the central authority for migration. Furthermore, Nazi 
policies for Jewish emigration shifted toward expulsion in the summer and fall 1939. 
 The Zentralstelle Prague was officially founded in July 15 and began operating on 
July 21, 1939, as a joint operation of the SD and the Gestapo to promote Jewish migration. 
Drawing on Czechoslovak Jewish emigration organizations, the Zentralstelle was intended to 
streamline the complicated process of migration. Whereas migrants applying for exit permits 
previously were required to visit a multitude of offices to receive official permission 
(including the local police, tax agencies, banks, among others) to migrate, the Zentralstelle 
provided a one-stop-emigration-shop for those completing their emigration paperwork.103 
With its establishment, all foreign refugee aid workers were informed that their services 
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coordinating emigration from the Protectorate were no longer needed and that they were to 
leave the Bohemian Lands by early August.  
The task of finding migration opportunities was now left entirely to the newly 
established Emigration Department of the Jewish Religious Community in Prague and the 
Palestine Office. Following the Viennese model, the JRC Prague was ordered to consolidate 
emigration services in a newly established Emigration Department, which would work in 
close collaboration with the Zionist Palestine Office and the Zentralstelle. Adolf Eichmann 
informed the leaders of the JRC Prague (Franz Kafka and František Weidmann) and the 
Palestine Office (Franz Friedmann) that 30,000 Jews needed to leave the Protectorate by the 
end of 1939 and that by the summer of 1940, the number of migrants needed to total 70,000. 
To meet this goal, 200 Jews needed to leave the Protectorate per day – an impossible feat that 
reflected the Nazis forced migration policies.104  
The Zentralstelle and the JRC Prague were only responsible for Jews living in Prague 
and its immediate vicinity. In order to obtain emigration documents Jews living in the 
provinces needed to travel frequently to or resettle in Prague in order to emigrate.105 
Furthermore, the Zentralstelle wished to concentrate and more easily expel the Jewish 
population of the Bohemian Lands. In August 1939, the Zentralstelle ordered the relocation 
of all Jewish residents to Prague. From there, they were supposed to go overseas. Although 
this particular resettlement campaign was not realized for logistical reasons, it did cause a 
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significant degree of panic among Jews living in the provinces as well as among the Jewish 
leadership in Prague as rumors of the resettlement spread.106   
 With the Nazi invasion of Poland on September 1, 1939, flight out of the Protectorate 
became nearly impossible. The number of migrants sank dramatically in the first month of 
the war as the former countries of emigration were now at war with Germany (especially 
Great Britain and France). Migrants were also now presented with the challenge of finding 
their way to a port city, from which they could leave continental Europe. Holland, France, 
Italy and Portugal were the most popular countries of exit from the continent. Over seventy 
percent of migrants in the first months of the war went to Palestine.107 With the most 
desirable immigration locations accepting fewer and fewer Protectorate citizens, migrants 
were forced to consider more seriously “undesirable” locations in South America, Africa, and 
Asia. Fearful of a complete emigration stop following the outbreak of war, the Nazis ordered 
the JRC Prague to begin publishing a newspaper in late November 1939, which had as its 
expressed goal to encourage Jewish migration and inform the Jewish community about 
migration opportunities.108 In addition to securing migration opportunities, the JRC Prague 
offered retraining and language courses for potential migrants. In short, the JRC Prague 
transformed into an emigration institution while simultaneously attempting to maintain the 
community socially and culturally in the Bohemian Lands. 
                                                 
106 Jewish Religious Community in Prague Weekly Report, 23-29 July 1939, YVA O.7.cz/53. 
 
107 Gruner, Die Judenverfolgung, 86. 
 
108 Helena Krejčová, Jana Svovodá, and Anna Hyndráková, eds., Židé v Protektorátu: Hlášení Židovské 
náboženské obce v roce 1942. Dokumenty (Prague: MAXDORF and Ústav pro soudobé dějiny AV ČR, 1997), 
157. 
 





 Many former Czechoslovak citizens who had fled across the border into Poland after 
the creation of the Protectorate were faced with a choice up to the outbreak of the war: either 
stay in Polish towns such as Katowice with the hope that they might be able to get a visa for 
Britain or continue their flight eastward. There is evidence of migrants using both routes. 
Some Czechs who were able to get a visa for Britain had left Katowice and ended up on the 
Czech Refugee Trust Fund’s registers, and there is also evidence of Jewish refugees passing 
through parts of western Ukraine or continuing eastward toward the Soviet Union. Ironically, 
some refugees from the Protectorate who ended up in Soviet-occupied Poland were arrested 
and sent to labor camps in the Soviet Union – and would later join up with the Czechoslovak 
divisions of the Red Army fighting to liberate Eastern Europe at wars’ end.109 
 The Jewish population of the Protectorate also faced additional restrictions: 
Aryanization continued to rob Jews of their property and belongings, an evening curfew was 
instituted beginning at eight, orders were given that Jews had to build their own air raid 
shelters, an order to take a census of the Jewish population of the Protectorate, and the arrest 
and deportation.110 Expulsion was now a key part of Nazi Jewish policy. By late September, 
Reinhard Heydrich approved plans to create a Jewish reservation in eastern Poland. Adolf 
Eichmann, who was present at the meeting and, concerned about increasingly stalled 
migration from the Protectorate and Austria, was placed in charge.  
In early October, Eichmann’s forced migration plans began to take shape. After 
selecting Nisko on the San in the western Lublin district as the location of the transit camp, 
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transports of approximately 1,000 Jewish men (mostly carpenters, builders, and mechanics) 
left Moravská Ostrava in the Protectorate, Krakow, and Vienna. When the first transport 
arrived in the marshy area, they found no housing and were instructed to construct barracks. 
From each of the transports, the best workers were selected, and the rest were marched to the 
river San and told to flee east and not return.111 The Nisko Plan was quickly abandoned and 
the deportees were left to fend for themselves. Although several hundred did return to the 
Protectorate, the vast majority were sent to ghettos and camps in Poland. However, several 
hundred did attempt to cross into Soviet-occupied Polish territory. Many were shot, some 
successfully found refuge in eastern Poland, but others were captured by Soviet forces and 
sent to Soviet labor camps.112 The JRC Prague’s representatives visited Nisko and protested 
the deportations and the conditions of the deportees as much as possible.  
 Concerned about the deportations to Nisko, the leadership of the Jewish Religious 
Community in Prague pressed ahead with the plans to find migration opportunities abroad. In 
order to facilitate these migration attempts, the JRC Prague negotiated agreements with 
Jewish and non-Jewish aid organizations abroad to uncover migration opportunities in new 
countries of immigration (including Shanghai, Latin America, and Asia), secure funds (kept 
in accounts in neutral countries) to pay for tickets and landing money in foreign currency, 
and to secure entry and transit visas for migrants who had completed their emigration 
paperwork. At this time, the JRC Prague was most concerned with facilitating the largest 
numbers of migrants possible, and so sought to support and organize “emigration actions” or 
“group transports” to the Dominican Republic or Bolivia. To promote these new migration 
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opportunities, the JRC Prague issued a biweekly newspaper beginning in late November 
1939, Jüdische Nachrichtenblatt/Židovské listy, which featured stories about Protectorate 
citizens in the “goal countries” and offered advice on how to obtain an migration 
opportunity. For a time, these initiatives worked, as several thousand Protectorate Jews were 
able to migrate in November and December 1939 and through the early months of 1940. But, 
as the Sitzkrieg transitioned into the Blitzkrieg in the spring of 1940, the number of obstacles 
that migrants faced increased and, as a result, the number of migrants decreased. 
 
Wartime Migration After 1940 
Although official routes out of the Protectorate still existed, the number of migrants 
using these routes declined throughout 1940 and 1941. As the Nazis occupied greater swaths 
of Europe, fewer and fewer individuals left the Protectorate for destinations on the continent 
(less than twelve hundred in 1940 and around three hundred in 1941). In 1940, migration to 
North America (156), Central America (81), Africa (33), and Palestine (49) decreased from 
thousands the previous year. Migration to Australia stopped completely. In contrast, 
migration to Asia more than doubled (2,715) and decreased only slightly to South America 
(1,988). In 1941, these numbers dropped dramatically again. While 305 individuals went 
elsewhere in Europe, less than 100 went to North America, Central America, South America, 
Africa, and Asia.113 During this period, the leading members of the JRC Prague were allowed 
to travel to Geneva, Paris, London, Berlin, and Hamburg to request assistance from 
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international relief organizations and to negotiate with foreign consulates and shipping 
companies.114  
For its part, the JRC Prague abandoned the idea of “group transports” and focused 
instead on facilitating the migration of individuals. In 1940, it became clear to the JRC that 
group transports were impractical (for instance, finding several hundred available tickets for 
steamship passage was nearly impossible) and financially unfeasible, as the coffers of the 
JRC Prague hemorrhaged money to support the increasingly destitute Jewish community. 
Instead, the JRC representatives communicated with contacts abroad on behalf of individual 
migrants to connect them with friends and relatives who could provide the funds, affidavits, 
and visas necessary to facilitate migration. This migration case work was supported by a 
number of Jewish and non-Jewish organizations abroad to coordinate the steps in the 
migration case. 
 Until the spring of 1940, when the Nazis launched their offensive on western Europe, 
refugees from the Bohemian Lands continued to try to move westward in a piecemeal fashion 
– first to France, Belgium, or the Netherlands, and from there out of continental Europe. 
Unfortunately, this meant that many Czechoslovak refugees ended up in occupied western 
Europe and Vichy France. Ports in Italy were closed just before Mussolini officially entered 
the war, shutting down the routes through Italy to Palestine and overseas to Asia. By late 
1940, Portugal was the primary port still open to leave continental Europe. In July 1940, the 
British officially recognized Edvard Beneš as President of a Czecho-Slovak government-in-
exile, which allowed him some opportunity to reach out to Czecho-Slovak officials still in 
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Europe (including the former Czechoslovak Consul in France, who had refused to leave his 
post) and intervene on behalf of refugees, if only in a limited fashion.115 
 A major hindrance to leaving the Protectorate legally was money. “If only there were 
dollars!” exclaimed historian Ruth Bondy.116 Not only did steamer passage cost increasing 
amounts of money as the war progressed and ships were utilized for military purposes, but 
transit visas, landing visas, and entrance visas cost several hundreds of dollars each. Not to 
mention the Reichsfluchtsteuer (“emigration tax”), designed to rob Jewish migrants of all of 
their wealth. However, other obstacles arose. In early 1940, the British Parliamentary 
Committee on Refugees inquired about the possibility of bringing more refugees from the 
Bohemian Lands to England, which the Committee had done on the behalf of Czechoslovak 
families residing in England. The Home Secretary Sir John Anderson responded on March 24 
that the Bohemian Lands were now enemy territory, and as such, no further refugees could 
be admitted to England, Palestine, or Australia.117 
 Up until March 1940, the jurisdiction of the Jewish Religious Community in Prague 
had extended only to the Greater Prague region. On March 18, 1940, the Zentralstelle 
extended the reach of the Jewish Religious Community in Prague to be responsible for the 
affairs of all Jews in the Protectorate and responsible to the Zentralstelle. Hannah Steiner was 
named the director of the Emigration Support Division, while Dr. Munk organized the 
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transports of children and teens and Josef Lichtenstein organized “workers’ transports,” code 
for illegal immigration transports.118 Later that spring, the Zentralstelle additionally ordered 
that the JRC Prague oversee the registration of all Jews with their local Jewish congregation 
office.  
 Throughout 1940, the push factors driving Jews to pursue migration increased day by 
day. Ever more decrees from the Reich Protector systematically aimed at segregating Jews 
from the rest of Protectorate society, as Nazi Jewish policy transitioned to ghettoization and 
deportation. Jews were almost completely shut out of the economic life of the Protectorate by 
March 1940, and Arynization continued to transfer Jewish property to non-Jewish ownership, 
straining the resources of the Jewish community as they supported the poor members of the 
community with food, clothing, and housing. To cope with the pauperization of the 
community and to increase individual chances at migration, the JRC Prague began offering 
“retraining courses” to teach potential migrants new skills, provide them with activities to fill 
their days, and to make products (gloves, clothing, furniture) useful to members of the 
community. As each decree was passed down from the Office of the Reich Protector, the 
JRC Prague bilingual newspaper printed notifications of these decrees to spread the word 
amongst the Jewish population of the Protectorate.119  
 Migration became increasingly impossible throughout 1940 as destination countries 
such as the United States, Palestine, and Great Britain limited the number of visas granted, 
and western European countries such as Spain and Portugal gave transit visas only to those 
migrants who had secured destination visas. Prior to June 1941, with the German invasion of 
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the Soviet Union, the primary destination country for migrants from the Protectorate was 
Shanghai, as no visa was necessary for entry into Shanghai (but a steep $400 deposit was 
required), and migrants had to travel overland through the Soviet Union.120 The steep price 
limited the number of migrants with the ability to go to Shanghai, and then the German 
invasion of the Soviet Union in 1941 completely closed off this route. By the summer 1941, 
only “return migrants” who could prove citizenship in other countries (primarily Slovakia 
and Hungary) were able to leave the Protectorate. 
By the fall of 1941, migration from the Protectorate of Bohemia and Moravia was 
nearly impossible. According the JRC Prague’s reports, only 133 individuals emigrated from 
the Protectorate in 1942, all of whom went elsewhere in Europe (and most of whom could 
prove citizenship in another European country).121 In October 1941, two major events 
changed the shape of migration: first the opening of the Theresienstadt transit camp and 
second, the Nazi ban on all Jewish emigration from occupied Europe. At this point, Nazi 
Jewish policy had firmly shifted from emigration and expulsion to systematic mass murder.  
Weekly transports from the major cities in the Protectorate left for Theresienstadt beginning 
in late November.  
 For those who had managed to escape the Bohemian Lands by late 1941 but still 
remained in occupied Europe, the danger was not over. The British diplomat Philip Nichols 
estimated that 35,000 Czechoslovak nationals were in France in the beginning of 1941, and 
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many of those would still remain at the end of that period.122 Refugees found themselves 
looking for further escape routes south through Spain and Portugal and most were interned in 
Vichy French internment camps. Still, several organizations were specifically devoted to 
helping Czechoslovak refugees, including some American and British organizations that had 
been active in coordinating migration from the Protectorate prior to August 1939. These 
organizations attempted to help refugees leave the internment camps, escape France, and 
depart continental Europe. Others escaped illegally over the mountains into Switzerland, 
where they were either admitted or turned away (approximately half were admitted by the 
Swiss, while another half were refused and sent back to France). For refugees who had 
escaped the Bohemian Lands before 1941 but remained in continental Europe, their journeys 
were fraught with continued searches for escape.  
 
Conclusion 
 This chapter has presented the trends regarding refugees and flight from the 
Bohemian Lands in the 1930s and 1940s. With the Munich Agreement, international 
organizations sent representatives to help Czecho-Slovakia cope with the “triple refugee 
problem.” These international connections would last through 1941, as we will see, since 
many of these international refugee workers remained in Europe during the war to help 
refugees. The rest of this dissertation will be devoted to exploring how local Czechoslovak 
relief workers connected with government officials in the Bohemian Lands, governments 
abroad, and international relief workers to support migration from the Bohemian Lands.  
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 According to the official reports of the Jewish Religious Community submitted to the 
Zentralstelle, 26,110 Jews emigrated from the Protectorate between March 15, 1939, and 
June 15, 1942. These reports included only individuals who notified the Nazi authorities of 
their migration and therefore do not cover all who left the Bohemian Lands; however, this 
number does give a sense of how many left and where individuals went. Of those migrants, 
nineteen thousand left in 1939. The vast majority (10,490 people) went elsewhere in Europe. 
Over 2,500 fled to South America and another 2,000 to Palestine. Far fewer, only 1,200, 
managed to make it to North America and Asia, and only several hundred went to Central 
America, Australia, and Africa.123 At least 5,000 more emigrated through unofficial channels, 
most of whom left in 1939. Given that migration was nearly impossible after the outbreak of 
war in 1939, these numbers are striking. As we shall see in the chapters that follow, despite 
all the obstacles to emigration, the refugee relief network established during the interwar 
period facilitated the escape of Bohemian and Moravian Jews from Central Europe.  
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CHAPTER 2: “TRIPLE REFUGEE CRISIS”: RESPONSES TO THE MUNICH 
REFUGEES IN THE SECOND REPUBLIC 
 
Introduction 
In November 1938, Noel Aronovici—of the European Office of the American Jewish 
Joint Distribution Committee—submitted a report on Jewish refugees in Czecho-Slovakia 
after the Munich Agreement. He noted that “today there is no organization in Prague which 
directs and controls social work in the whole of Czechoslovakia. It results therefore that 
various qualified and unqualified persons get in touch directly with the Government and 
different administrations.” Instead, the task of emigration and social assistance to refugees 
was the responsibility of voluntary organizations. Aronovici reported that “the [voluntary] 
Committees, and especially Dr. [Marie] Schmolka in Prague, Jewish Communities in Bruenn 
and Maehrisch Ostrau, are doing a prodigious amount of work. Night and day all possible 
interventions are made with different authorities.” The social care of Jewish refugees fell to 
the Social Institute in Prague, while the local branch of HICEM, led by Marie Schmolka and 
Hannah Steiner, “carries on the registration of refugees, helps them with their preparation for 
emigration, such as the securing of visas and other formalities. … It is difficult to imagine the 
situation of the Hicem in Prague. It is besieged by desperate people who have been expelled, 
by women whose husbands have been arrested following the expulsion. There are perpetual 
calls for information and advice from the provinces.” Time and again, Aronovici stressed the 
importance of one particular voluntary worker. “One cannot exaggerate the work done by 
Frau Dr. Schmolka. Besides her activities at the Hicem it is she who intervenes for almost all 





of the expelled people with the authorities. She is constantly asked about activities for the 
refugees, and for advice by Jewish organizations, the Czech authorities, diplomatic 
representatives, etc.”1 
Who was Frau Dr. Marie Schmolka and how did she come to be the face of the effort 
to aid Jewish refugees in the Second Czechoslovak Republic? How did thousands of 
migrants manage to leave Czecho-Slovakia before the Nazi occupation on March 15, 1939, if 
the system of providing aid was as chaotic as Aronovici described? This chapter zeroes in on 
the refugee relief and emigration assistance provided by women like Schmolka at the 
moment when the Czechoslovak government became invested in refugee assistance—when 
Czech-speaking Czechoslovaks fled the Sudetenland after the Munich Agreement. While the 
Czechoslovak government took care of what it referred to as “our” refugees, the government 
assumed that Jewish organizations would take care of “their” refugees—overwhelmingly 
Czechoslovak Jews. This chapter focuses on the efforts of Schmolka, the organizations she 
represented—Hicem, WIZO, the Social Institute of the Jewish Religious Community in 
Prague, and the National Committee for Refugees in Czechoslovakia—and other voluntary 
organizations, as they navigated the Second Republic’s refugee policies to provide first relief 
and then emigration opportunities for Jewish refugees. As the Second Republic government 
increasingly pushed emigration as the only option for Jewish refugees and offered only 
limited government support, the leaders of the Czechoslovak Jewish community turned to 
their contacts abroad—contacts formed in the 1930s to assist refugees fleeing Germany and 
Austria—to assist Czechoslovak Jews. The chapter will tease out the various connections 
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Schmolka made during this period with international aid organizations, governments, other 
refugee committees, and within the Jewish Committee – all of which would become 
indispensable for refugee relief in Czechoslovakia as well as in assisting those attempting to 
flee the Protectorate.  
This chapter outlines the refugee assistance provided to refugees in Czecho-Slovakia 
by Czechoslovaks. I begin by discussing the experiences of voluntary workers in the First 
Czechoslovak Republic, which prepared them with the skills, knowledge, and connections to 
assist refugees. Then, I turn to the refugee crisis sparked by the Munich Agreement. Unlike 
earlier refugee populations in the Bohemian Lands, the government needed to develop a 
response plan for the refugee crisis, as these were Czechoslovak refugees. The government’s 
response to refugees was limited and based largely on ethnic categorization. For non-Czech 
refugees, the government relied on voluntary organizations. This chapter discusses the 
relationship between the Refugee Institute and Czecho-Slovak voluntary organizations as 
well as their relations with international voluntary workers. Although non-state actors served 
the needs of refugees, they simultaneously enabled the government to ignore and expel 
refugees based on nationalist conceptions of ethnicity. 
 
Zionism, Gender and Social Work in Central Europe 
 In the interwar period, Czechoslovak women engaged in philanthropic work to 
demonstrate their patriotism, nationalism, and to engage in the project of nation-building in 
the newly created republic.2 Czechoslovak philanthropic work often involved care for 
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refugees, first from Russia and later from Germany and Austria. Marie Schmolka was 
representative of a group of women whose work in philanthropic organizations allowed them 
access to the more typically masculine gendered realm of diplomacy, international politics, 
and internal government affairs.  Given the needs of poorer Orthodox Jewish groups in 
eastern Czechoslovakia, Zionist women in the First Republic were particularly active in 
assisting those in need.3  
 Schmolka is also representative of the activities of Zionist social workers in 
Czechoslovakia. Interwar Zionism in the Bohemian Lands had a peculiar Central European 
character.  Czechoslovak citizenship rules allowed individuals to self-identify as being of 
Czech, German, or Jewish nationality while still holding Czechoslovak citizenship. It was 
therefore possible to closely identify as both Jewish (or Zionist) and a Czechoslovak. Indeed, 
Zionists were often great supporters of the First Republic. Furthermore, many Zionists in the 
Bohemian Lands, including Schmolka, were actively involved in the creation of the young 
republic and closely identified with the fate of Czechoslovakia. Zionist women often enacted 
their patriotism through charitable work. 
 In the First Czechoslovak Republic, the majority of Jews in the Bohemian Lands were 
urban, middle class, well integrated, and not Orthodox religiously. As Kateřina Čapková 
demonstrates, Bohemian Jews were “almost more ‘western’ than the Jews of western 
Europe” as the Bohemian Lands lacked a strong Yiddish influence aside from a relatively 
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small influx of migrants from eastern Europe.4 Čapková further argues that the Jews of 
Bohemia (whether Zionist, nationalist, Czech-Jewish, assimilationist, or secular) in general 
felt a strong sense of loyalty to Czechoslovakia, were deeply devoted to the land of Bohemia, 
and typically were not overly religiously Jewish.5 Whereas Jewish nationalism and Zionism 
are often described as two distinct movements in other European countries, in the Bohemian 
Lands the two groups overlapped significantly.6 Although Jewish nationalist and Zionist 
associations supported the creation of a Jewish state, many of the individuals involved in 
these movements were just as committed to creating a Jewish national minority within 
interwar Czechoslovakia.  
Marie (née Eisner) Schmolka was born in 1890 to an assimilated Czech-speaking 
Jewish family. Her early life was very secular and she was more interested in the founding of 
a Czechoslovak state than she was in her Jewish identity. Schmolka enthusiastically 
supported the effort to create an independent Czechoslovakia both during and after World 
War I.  Schmolka’s friends commented on her “mannish qualities;” that is, Schmolka’s 
energy and efficiency in her professional life, first working in her family business and later 
joining the management staff of a local bank. Schmolka looked several years older than her 
actual age, with a high forehead, and cared very little about her outward appearance or her 
dress.7 A diabetic, she smoked a great deal and often worked long hours, especially once she 
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began focusing on refugee issues. Schmolka’s friends described her as imaginative and 
indefatigable, whether she was working on “a question of getting a house, writing reports on 
her travels and meetings, planning a fund-raising campaign, intervening with the authorities 
or interpreting the rules of international organizations.”8  
After the death of her husband in the late 1920s, Schmolka decided to travel outside 
of Europe. Encouraged by friends, Schmolka visited Palestine, sparking an interest in 
Jewishness and Zionism.9 Upon her return to Czechoslovakia, Schmolka joined the local 
chapter of the Women’s International Zionist Organization, the WIZO. The Czechoslovak 
branch of WIZO was founded in 1925, led by the efforts of Hannah Steiner.10 Hannah (neé 
Dub) Steiner was born on April 27, 1894, in Česká Lípa. Steiner attended school in Great 
Britain for three years as a teenager and when she returned to the Bohemian Lands (after a 
trip to Palestine), she immediately became active in Zionist life. Steiner established and 
edited the Blätter der Jüdischen Frau (a supplement of the Zionist periodical Selbstwehr).  
Steiner also led the charge to turn the Zionist Women’s and Girls’ Club into a branch of the 
Women’s International Zionist Organization (WIZO) in the 1920s, serving as the first 
president.  Through her prodigious efforts on behalf of the Czechoslovak WIZO branch, 
Steiner was later elected to the World WIZO organization, and helped spread the 
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organization’s mission of offering agricultural and vocational training for women.11 
Schmolka, through all her contacts with non-Jewish Czechs, served as the link between 
WIZO and other Czechoslovak women’s group, and even served as the WIZO delegate to the 
National Council of Czechoslovak Women and the Women’s League for Peace and 
Freedom.12 
Both Schmolka and Steiner took leading roles in refugee relief during this period. The 
Czechoslovak WIZO worked closely with the American Joint Jewish Distribution Committee 
(AJDC or “Joint”) to distribute aid to poorer communities in Czechoslovakia, especially in 
Subcarpathian Ruthenia.13 The connections that Schmolka and Steiner established with the 
AJDC and WIZO would become essential in their later efforts to assist refugees. These 
organizations trusted Schmolka and Steiner to manage the funds they invested in social 
welfare projects in Czechoslovakia, to raise matching funds locally, and to operate in the 
interests of those they were assisting. Once the refugees from Nazi Germany began arriving 
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in the Bohemian Lands, Schmolka and Steiner had little time for Zionist activities, consumed 
as they were by refugee issues.14 
Schmolka and Steiner elevated WIZO to a position of prominence in both Jewish and 
non-Jewish circles in interwar Czechoslovakia, working with fellow WIZO member Irma 
Polak to connect WIZO to the National Council of Czechoslovak Women. At the National 
Council of Czechoslovak Women, Schmolka served as the representative of all national 
Jewish groups.15 The pair traveled extensively for WIZO and worked closely with the 
Bratislava WIZO group, led by Gisi Fleischmann (a key figure in organizing escape from 
Slovakia during World War II).16 In the 1930s, these women were instrumental in developing 
relief campaigns for the Jews in Subcarpathian Ruthenia, a region in eastern Czechoslovakia 
with a sizeable poor, Orthodox Jewish population and the strongest support for Zionism.17 By 
the spring of 1932, Schmolka and Steiner were spearheading the Aid Committee of Jewish 
Women for Subcarpathian Ruthenia, which supplied food for Jewish holiday celebrations, 
instituted hunger prevention measures, as well as offered milk and clothing distribution 
services.18 Their work in Subcarpathian Ruthenia attracted the attention of international 
Jewish aid groups.  Beginning in 1933, the AJDC worked closely with Schmolka to 
financially support these efforts by giving small amounts of money for programs to feed 
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hungry children or offer vocational training for Jews.19 In 1935, their efforts resulted in the 
creation of a domestic services school for girls and workshops for boys’ schools across the 
region, which offered agricultural and other vocational training. Typical of AJDC policies for 
that time, the local organization (in this case, the Hilfskomité Jüdischer Frauen in der ČSR, 
led by Schmolka and Steiner) managed the creation of these schools and ran a local 
fundraising drive (in 1935, the AJDC allocated $15,130 and the local organization raised 
$12,000).20 Between 1934 and 1936, the AJDC appropriated $1,080,000 for work in 
Czechoslovakia. The majority went to pay for feeding programs, child care, the opening of 
trade schools, girls’ training schools, and orphanages, but $30,000 was earmarked for 
“refugee aid and repatriation.”21 
After Hitler’s rise to power in 1933, Schmolka and Steiner were leading figures in the 
campaigns to provide relief and emigration aid to German refugees in the Bohemian Lands in 
the 1930s. The pair were well known, both in Czechoslovakia and internationally, as “the 
chief leaders in the work for Jewish refugees in Czechoslovakia” by the mid-1930s.22   
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German and Austrian Refugees in the First Czechoslovak Republic 
As refugees from Nazi Germany began fleeing in April and May 1933, various 
voluntary groups formed to assist refugees. By and large, the care of these refugees fell not to 
the Czechoslovak government, but to various refugee assistance organizations based largely 
in Prague (although local committees also formed, they did not have the resources and 
international connections that the Prague committees had acquired). By 1934, twenty-nine 
different refugee assistance organizations had formed across Czechoslovakia.23 These 
included: the Social Democratic Refugee Aid Committee, the Democratic Aid for Refugees, 
the Aid Committee for the Union of Private Employees, the Aid Committee for Germany 
Refugees (also commonly referred to as the Šalda Committee), the Committee for the 
Support of German Refugees (which had close connections to Solidarita and the Communist 
Party), and the Jewish Aid Committee.  
The Jewish Aid Committee (Jüdisches Hilfskomité/Židovský pomocný výbor, the long 
form of the name was the Pomocný výbor pro židovské uprchlíky a emigranty z Německa), 
was first formed in the spring of 1933,24 and led by Joseph Popper (chairman of the Supreme 
Council of the Jewish Communities and president of the Grand Lodge of the Czechoslovak 
B’nai B’rith)25 and an Executive Board. Two members of the Executive Board, Marie 
Schmolka and Hannah Steiner, were appointed vice-chairs of the committee. The Jewish 
Religious Community in Prague provided the new committee with office space in the Jewish 
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school building on Jáchymová 3. As vice-chairs, Schmolka and Steiner shouldered much of 
the work to reach the committees goals to secure housing and food for the refugees as well as 
to provide re-training for refugees in the hopes that they would be able to later support 
themselves.  Since the Ministry of Interior insisted that Jewish refugees be kept to a 
minimum, the Jewish Aid Committee also focused on encouraging the further migration of 
German Jewish refugees from its earliest days.26 The Jewish Aid Committee, and its 
successor organizations, were funded primarily through donations from local Jewish 
communities (the Jewish communal organizations notified their members of opportunities to 
donate to the Jewish Aid Committee) and the AJDC. WIZO supported the efforts of the 
Jewish Aid Committee by providing additional support programs for refugees relief.27 Marie 
Schmolka led the efforts to assist refugees to emigrate and to coordinate emigration 
assistance with government organizations (and thus familiarized herself with both the legal 
rules of refugees and emigrants locally and internationally), while Hannah Steiner, drawing 
on her WIZO work, supported refugees by offering retraining courses that would qualify 
them for entry into other countries.28 In their role as the vice-chairs, Schmolka and Steiner 
met regularly with other major Czechoslovak refugee aid groups to coordinate relief 
activities as well as with individual refugees to help them find emigration opportunities and 
plan how to realize that emigration attempt.29  
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When the numbers of German Jewish refugees increased in 1935 after the passage of 
the Nuremberg Race Laws, the Jewish Aid Committee split into two organizations: a 
Czechoslovak branch of the Jewish migration agency HICEM (founded in the spring of 1936 
to help refugees identify further emigration opportunities and to finance emigration attempts) 
and the local Jewish Social Institute of the Jewish Community of Greater Prague (the Social 
Institute was founded in April 1936 at the urging and with the support of the American Joint 
Jewish Distribution Committee to coordinate non-migration relief).30 Schmolka and Steiner 
led the work of the new HICEM branch. The international organization HICEM was founded 
in 1927 through the merger of three Jewish migration association (Hebrew Immigrant Aid 
Society, or HIAS, based in New York; the Jewish Colonization Association, or ICA, based in 
Paris; and EmigDirect, based in Berlin). HICEM, whose name was an amalgamation of the 
three member organizations, assisted European Jews to emigrate at all points of the 
emigration process and thus had offices throughout Europe, the Americas, and the Far East. 
Schmolka and Steiner supplied the energy and leadership of refugee relief and social 
work. Schmolka and Steiner were both present at the founding of the HICEM branch. At that 
meeting, Schmolka spoke to the other committee members about the “HICEM’s international 
significance and activities as well as HICEM’s special tasks in the Czechoslovak Republic: 
the legal protection of stateless individuals, the procurement of citizenship, the establishment 
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of connections with Ruthenians who emigrated to the United States with the help of HIAS, 
the procurement of travel documents for emigration, etc.”31 HICEM’s goal was to extend the 
tasks undertaken by the Jewish Aid Committee to provide more sustained and organized 
emigration support for refugees.  
Especially after the establishment of HICEM, Schmolka and Steiner had less time to 
devote to strictly Zionist-activism. Through Schmolka and Steiner’s leadership, HICEM 
developed a working (if at times tense) relationship with the Zionist-led Prague Palestine 
Office (which organized visas and transportation strictly to Palestine) and the Jewish 
Religious Community in Prague, which coordinated relief services for refugees while they 
remained in Czechoslovakia.32 WIZO, which had 104 groups and 12,000 members in 
Czechoslovakia by 1938, worked with the JRCs to provide social services and retraining 
courses to refugees.33 By April 1938, HICEM had been involved in the emigration of 3,960 
Jews from Czechoslovakia, half of whom were German refugees.34 
Although the Jewish Aid Committee, and later HICEM and the Social Institute, 
maintained close ties with Jewish religious organizations and local Jewish refugee assistance 
groups, the organization worked closely with other sectarian refugee aid groups. Schmolka, 
in particular, had close ties to the leadership of the Democratic Aid Committee. Prior to the 
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founding of the Jewish Aid Committee, Schmolka had joined the Democratic Aid 
Committee. After being elected the vice-chair of the Jewish Aid Committee, she discontinued 
her formal relationship with the Democratic Aid Committee, though she maintained a close 
working relationship with the chair, Kurt Grossmann. 35  
By the fall of 1933, various sectarian committees had formed to provide relief to 
subsets of the refugee population. To support their constituents, the refugee committees 
intervened with the Czechoslovak government to obtain information about refugee policies 
and to secure residence permits, work permits, temporary visas, and other documents. In 
some cases, refugees registered with multiple committees, resulting in multiple petitions to 
the government on behalf of one refugee. This caused a great deal of confusion and resulted 
in a great deal of overlapping work (and in some cases, resulted in government agencies 
having multiple, conflicting files on one refugee). To clear up some of the confusion, the 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs recommended that the individual committees form a coordinating 
committee for refugee affairs. The new committee formed in October 1933, and adopted the 
French name Comité National Tschéchoslovaque pour les Réfugiés provenant d’Allemagne 
(National Committee).36  
Marie Schmolka was intimately involved in the work of the National Committee. 
Schmolka served as the representative for the Jewish Aid Committee (and later, HICEM) to 
the National Committee. After the chair of the National Committee resigned for health 
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reasons, Schmolka was elected to chair the committee in April 1936.37 Schmolka left an 
indelible mark on the committee, often holding meetings in her own home, organizing 
conferences, drafting government reports, coordinating fundraising drives, and intervening 
on behalf of individual refugees threatened with arrest or deportation.38 In fact, Schmolka’s 
mark on the committee was so great, that her fellow committee members often remembered 
her as the only chair of the committee.39 Hannah Steiner also regularly attended the National 
Committee meetings, especially in 1936, after Schmolka was chair.40 
In her role as the chair of the National Committee, Schmolka met often with 
Czechoslovak government officials on issues related to refugee policy. Schmolka frequently 
visited the heads of the Czechoslovak Foreign Office, Ministry of the Interior, and Ministry 
of Social Welfare to discuss the “inadequate activities” of these groups on behalf of refugees 
in Czechoslovakia.41 These ministries regularly sought Schmolka’s opinion on refugee 
matters, inviting her to Inter-Ministerial meetings related to refugee issues. At these 
meetings, Schmolka proposed government programs to support the continued emigration of 
German refugees. The High Commission for Refugees Coming from Germany, for instance, 
required that countries demonstrate that they were preparing refugees for emigration before 
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the Commissioner would approve the funds. Schmolka proposed the creation of an 
agricultural camp on public lands to retrain German migrants in preparation for further 
migration to Ministries of Foreign Affairs, Agriculture, Finance, and Social Welfare.42 
Though ultimately unsuccessful in securing public lands (the government suggested 
approaching a wealthy landowner instead), the government did support the idea of any 
proposal to prepare refugees for continued migration. 
At another meeting, Schmolka intervened directly with the Minister of Foreign 
Affairs, the Minister of Welfare, and the Minister of Interior in an attempt to convince the 
government to ratify the High Commission for Refugees “Provisional Arrangement” to 
guarantee the rights for German refugees that had been afforded to Russian refugees in the 
1920s.43 Ultimately her attempt was unsuccessful, but the Provisional Arrangement did 
provide Schmolka with an international benchmark for refugee treatment. In July 1937, the 
Czechoslovak government issued measures to concentrate all German refugees in the 
Bohemian-Moravian Highlands near Jihlava for “security reasons,” Schmolka convened a 
meeting of the major refugee committees. Schmolka “emphasized that under the proposed 
conditions, further aid work would be made very difficult…and would violate the right of 
asylum” put forth in the Provisional Arrangement. Schmolka further recommended that the 
Committee send notification to all aid organizations about the Czechoslovak government’s 
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plans and agreed to lead a commission to prepare recommendations and notifications to the 
government and aid organizations.44 The plan failed—in large part due to the suspension of 
the secret Czechoslovak-German negotiations that summer and due to the pressure from 
voluntary organizations, the public, and from abroad.45  
The other purpose of the National Committee, and indeed its primary purpose, was to 
represent Czechoslovakia at the international level. The High Commission for Refugees 
Coming from Germany of the League of Nations required that each country be represented 
by one refugee committee (which would assist refugees without regard to their political or 
religious affiliations).46 The National Committee was intended to fill this role. 
The natural choice to be the international face of the National Committee was Marie 
Schmolka, who was “generally considered the most important figure in Czechoslovakian 
Zionism” by the mid-1930s.47 Already, she had demonstrated herself to be efficient at 
collecting funds on the international level, through her WIZO work with the AJDC on the 
Ruthenian rehabilitation project. For the National Committee, Schmolka continued her work 
with the AJDC to secure funds for refugees,48 and served as the representative of the National 
Committee at the High Commission for Refugees Coming from Germany. 
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Schmolka frequently travelled to Paris and London to attend refugee conferences 
hosted by the High Commission for Refugees Coming from Germany. Schmolka served as 
the representative of the National Committee for the High Commission’s Advisory Council, 
made up of various refugee relief organizations. Although the High Commission was limited 
in its ability to achieve its goals of resettling refugees and convince member states to afford 
German refugees certain rights, the Commission provided refugee workers an opportunity to 
form connections in the 1930s. In the High Commission meetings, Schmolka participated in 
discussions to create refugee settlements in South America, form relationships with refugee 
committees in other European countries (including Gertrude van Tijn, who represented 
HICEM in Amsterdam), and meet regularly with the leaders of important international 
refugee assistance organizations. The most influential international refugee aid organizations 
served on the Advisory Council—the AJDC, HICEM, the Jewish Agency for Palestine, and 
the Jewish Colonization Association—alongside representatives of national refugee 
committees from the twelve member states.49 At these meetings, Schmolka worked closely 
with the High Commissioner , as well as the top representatives of the major international 
refugee organizations and national refugee committees and was appointed to advisory 
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positions on refugee issues.50 In July 1938, Schmolka was elected to serve as the 
representative of Czechoslovak Jewish organizations at the Evian Refugee Conference.51  
Early in the National Committee’s discussions about refugee aid, the group decided 
that the “catastrophic situation of refugees in [Czechoslovakia]” was too immense for 
individual committees to adequately address using only private funds raised locally.52 As the 
first wave of refugees slowed in the fall of 1934, Schmolka feared that this would result in 
the withdrawal of international support for Czechoslovak refugee relief work. Schmolka 
continued to caution against removing all support for refugees. In a report to the Jewish 
Telegraphic Agency, she commented, “It is, nevertheless still impossible to think of 
liquidating the refugee aid work in Czechoslovakia in the near future…The future of a 
considerable number of refugees is still doubtful. The stream of new refugees from Germany 
has indeed been stemmed, but has by no means stopped.”53 Despite Schmolka’s warning, 
several Jewish Refugee aid groups did indeed withdraw their funding from Czechoslovakia 
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during this period. In October 1934, the Jewish Aid Committee had to cease their relief 
activities to support dependent refugees. Although the other members of the National 
Committee continued with their relief work, they also struggled to have access to enough 
funds.54 With a great deal of lobbying the AJDC and HIAS, Schmolka managed to procure 
over $30,000 for refugee aid and repatriation work from the AJDC between 1934-1936 and 
the promise of an additional $90,000 for 1937.55 AJDC funds did not only fund refugees 
supported by the Prague Jewish Aid Committee/HICEM. Schmolka, as the representative of 
the Jewish relief organization, was under a great deal of pressure from the Czechoslovak 
government to procure funds for refugee relief. At an interministry meeting hosted by the 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs to discuss the state of refugees in Czechoslovakia in May 1935, a 
delegate from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs confronted Schmolka about the AJDC. He 
“pointed out that the Czechoslovak Republic had always been very accommodating to 
emigration and that especially the AJDC, which had invested huge sums of Poland and 
Romania, needed to give greater support for emigration in the Czechoslovak Republic.”56 
The AJDC suspected government pressure to obtain more funds. The AJDC European 
director cabled the New York office, “We know for long time Czechoslovakian government 
anxious to get more money for Czechoslovakia. … Reported some time ago that government 
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officials called in Jews and told them to be as aggressive as Polish Jews in order to get more 
funds from [AJDC].”57 
Despite the unity presented by the National Committee on the international level, the 
National Committee never truly unified their efforts on the ground and support remained 
divided by religious and political differences. This was in part due to tensions between Social 
Democrats (who feared communist influence over the distribution of funding) and the 
Communists (who were loath to be too closely tied to other left-leaning political parties who 
might prevent the political revolution); and in part because Jewish donors hesitated to 
support Communist refugees (and the members of the Order of B’nai B’rith refused to donate 
funds to Communist refugees).58  
These activities were in addition to Schmolka’s actual face-to-face work assisting 
refugees, as did Steiner. Throughout the 1930s, Schmolka continued to meet with individual 
refugees and advise them about their futures in the Bohemian Lands or about the possibility 
of emigrating abroad. In October 1934, she met with a group of thirty refugees to advise 
them on emigrating to South America for the National Committee.59 In August 1936, both 
Schmolka and Steiner met with individual refugees living in Brno to discuss their cases about 
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further emigration.60 In December 1936, the National Committee formed a semi-independent 
subcommittee to address issues facing child refugees. Schmolka actively participated in these 
efforts, which focused primarily on establishing a home for refugee children to improve their 
standard of living and provide them with educational opportunities.61 
Although Schmolka was not the only aid worker in the First Czechoslovak Republic, 
she was, in many ways, the epicenter of a refugee network that was first constructed to assist 
German refugees fleeing Nazism. The Schmolka network later became the foundation for 
assisting refugees who fled the Bohemian Lands during the Nazi occupation. Without this 
long history of local and international connections already in place, flight from the 
Protectorate would have been even more difficult.   
 
The Munich Agreement and the Second Republic’s Response to the Refugee Crisis 
In mid-September 1938, the Regional Offices near the borderlands exchanged several 
urgent, classified reports with the Ministry of Interior, the Ministry of Social Welfare, the 
Ministry of National Defense, and the police organizations. The reports described a 
“spontaneous mass departure” of residents from the borderlands for reasons that were 
“factually unjustified.”62 All local and national police forces were ordered to prevent 
refugees from moving into the interior of the countries, especially the major cities such as 
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Prague, Brno, and Olomouc. The appearance of these refugees in the interior of the country 
was, according to one official, “causing concern and as concerns grew, this would lead to 
unrest and, in some cases, panic.”63  
 While the Czechoslovak ministries worried about panic and disorder in the interior of 
the country, many in the borderlands were convinced that they could no longer remain in 
their homes. Jewish parents pulled their children from German-speaking schools, preferring 
Czech-speaking or Jewish schools. Other families fled immediately. This was the case for 
Mimi Ormond, who remembered, “My parents were afraid [for] my life and took me out. So 
they had a Czech school there, so I went to Czech school, but I didn’t know how to speak 
Czech. I felt really bad.”64 On the day that the Nazis occupied her town, Ormond’s family 
fled the Sudetenland for Kolín. As another refugee reported after she fled the Sudetenland, 
“As a Jew, I couldn’t exist in Litoměřice.”65  
In the weeks leading up to the Munich Agreement, the representatives of the Ministry 
of the Interior and the Ministry of Social Welfare were shocked by the numbers of people 
voluntarily fleeing the borderlands. The District Office in Prague estimated that 
approximately 15,000 refugees had fled to the interior of the country as of September 23, 
1938, and they warned that the number of refugees would continue to “increase significantly 
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from hour to hour.”66 The civil and military authorities were caught off-guard by the number 
of people arriving and living temporarily at the Prague train stations. By September 20, the 
Ministry of Social Welfare estimated that approximately 2,000 refugees had made the 
journey to Prague. Hundreds had come to the Ministry of Social Welfare (MSP) seeking 
temporary housing and, as a stopgap measure, the MSP placed approximately 600 refugees in 
the Baxova domovina (later the Grebovka villa) in Prague, at train stations, and in the 
Strahov stadium. As refugees continued to arrive in Prague, the MSP lacked adequate 
housing resources. Thus, approximately six hundred additional “refugees waited for periods 
up to ten hours in the vestibule of the train station and on the steps in front of the station.”67 
Although worried about where it would house these individuals, the Ministry of 
Social Welfare was also deeply concerned about the effects the influx of citizens of the 
borderlands would have on the rest of the Czechoslovak population. The Ministry frequently 
discussed the “social danger” presented by an influx of refugees to the urban centers.68 The 
Ministry of Social Welfare and other government ministries cautioned that emigration away 
from the borderlands was causing panic both in the borderlands and in the rest of 
Czechoslovakia.69 Not only did refugees spread panic and unnecessary unrest, the ministries 
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warned, but they also carried infectious diseases especially smallpox, typhoid fever, and 
diphtheria.70 
The Czechoslovak government was frightened by what it deemed to be a 
“spontaneous” and “unwarranted” mass departure from the borderlands. Adolf Hitler claimed 
that the Sudetenland was populated primarily with German-speakers who both wanted and 
deserved to be reunified with Germany under the principles of Wilsonian self-determination. 
The Czechoslovak government feared that that this spontaneous departure from the 
borderlands would turn into a mass flight of all individuals loyal to the Czechoslovak state. If 
the borderlands were depopulated by loyal Czechoslovak citizens, the government feared that 
they would lose their last best defense against the Nazi incursion into the Sudetenland. The 
Ministry of the Interior was adamant that the flow of people away from the border region 
must be stopped. In a conversation with the Ministry of Social Welfare, the head of the 
Security Department of the Ministry of Interior stated that the Ministry of Interior “stands 
behind the position that the current spontaneous movement of residents away from the 
borderlands, as has been seen in the past few days, is not an evacuation and must not be 
classified as such.”71 Furthermore, the Ministry of Interior would “stand behind the position 
that it is necessary to adopt a restrictive position and work by all means to ensure that such 
movement is restricted to a minimum.”72 To this end, all local mayors had been given 
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instructions to “firmly but friendly” prevent borderland residents from “unreasonably 
abandoning their homes.”73 
 Although the government was apprehensive about accepting the September refugees, 
the general Czechoslovak population was more accepting. The number of refugees were 
relatively small, they were fleeing persecution from Henleinist agitators, and many believed 
that their exile was only temporary.74 The press portrayed the refugees in a relatively positive 
light, emphasizing the goodness of ordinary Czechs, who brought food, clothing, and other 
goods for the refugees.75 
The Czechoslovak perception of the refugees changed in October 1938. The illusion 
that their presence was only temporary was shattered with the Munich Agreement, and the 
occupation of the Sudetenland raised fears that German-speaking refugees in the rump state 
would give Germany the justification it sought to occupy the rest of country.76 The terms of 
the Munich Agreement stipulated that the German occupation of the portions of the 
Sudetenland with more than 50 percent German nationals in stages between October 1-10, 
1938. As per agreements signed by the German and Czecho-Slovak governments on 
November 20, 1938, a “German national” was any person (and their wives and children) born 
before January 1, 1910, and who had their primary residence in the in the ceded territories. 
There was additionally a provision to opt for a different citizenship, for those who felt caught 
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on the wrong side of the border. Individuals who had stated that they had German nationality 
and were living outside the territory ceded to Germany, could “opt” for German citizenship, 
as could Czech nationals, in the now-occupied Sudetenland, and then be resettled across the 
border to their country of choice.77 An international commission comprised of representatives 
from Germany, the UK, France, Italy, and Czechoslovakia would then be in charge of 
occupying and administering a plebiscite in areas with 50 percent of Czech-speakers.78 
Although many doubted the plebiscites would be held fairly and in the spirit of self-
determination (Winston Churchill said that it was “a fraud and a farce to invoke that 
name”79), the Czechoslovak border officials still attempted to prevent as many inhabitants of 
the borderlands from leaving the plebiscite regions as possible. Indeed, the Czechoslovak 
government argued that all refugees should return to the borderland for the plebiscite.80  
 
Border Policies   
In mid-October, it became clear that the plebiscite was not going to be held and the 
Czecho-Slovak government allowed greater numbers of refugees to enter the rump state. 
However, this was often not the case for Jewish refugees, who were often turned away at the 
border or forcibly expelled. In mid-November 1938, the Ministry of Interior instructed its 
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regional offices to prevent “the permeation of Jews” into the current territory of the Czecho-
Slovak Republic.81 The following day, the regional authorities in the town of Terezín 
reported the arrival of the “Jewish family” of Josef Metzger. The family, comprised of five 
members, had a certificate that demonstrated their citizenship in the new Czecho-Slovak 
territory and valid travel documents for all members of the family, except for the thirteen-
year-old daughter. “Since the daughter could not present any kind of travelling certificate” 
the family was returned across the demarcation line to the occupied Sudetenland. However, 
the Germans immediately sent the family back to the Czecho-Slovak border and notified the 
Czecho-Slovak regional authorities that trains would be arriving in the Bohemian Lands with 
additional deported Jews. With the regional authorities stymied, caught between the wishes 
of the Czecho-Slovak government and the power of the occupying German authorities, the 
family remained in limbo at the border station in Terezín until the authorities could decide 
how to proceed.82  
The Metzger case was not an isolated one. All along the demarcation line between the 
German-occupied Sudetenland and the rump state of Czecho-Slovakia, the local authorities 
prevented Jews from entering Czecho-Slovakia. In Louny, located northwest of Prague, a 
group of twelve refugees attempted to cross the border. When they were prevented by the 
border authorities from entering Czecho-Slovakia, they camped along the highway in the 
neutral no-man’s-land “completely without shelter.”83 Eventually the head of the 
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Czechoslovak Red Cross convinced the Ministry of the Interior to allow temporary shelter to 
the refugees as they tried to negotiate the return of the refugees to German-occupied 
territories. The regional governor’s efforts to “negotiate” with the German border authorities 
were “to no avail” as they informed him that not only would they not accept the return or 
care of these displaced Jews, but that another, larger transport would shortly be arriving in 
Louny.84 Elsewhere, Czecho-Slovak authorities learned that the German occupation forces 
were forcing Jews toward the demarcation line at bayonet point. When the central 
government authorities in Prague told the border guards to send the Jews back to German, the 
governors protested, arguing that “the Germans have a powerful occupation force at the 
demarcation line, so nothing escapes their notice. Our side of the demarcation line is covered 
by a weaker guard, so that crossing in our direction is easier, especially in the evening and at 
night.”85 Nevertheless, the authorities in Prague continued to remind the border patrols to 
send back these refugee Jews, even as mass transports attempted to flee in the aftermath of 
the Kristallnacht pogrom.  
Jewish refugees who managed to cross into the rump state were not guaranteed to be 
allowed to stay. On November 29, 1938, the Ministry of Social Welfare issued a press 
statement announcing that all refugees were required to register with the nearest district 
office for a refugee census. The government determined that a refugee was: a non-
Czechoslovak citizen “moving to Bohemia or Moravia-Silesia because of fear of economic or 
political persecution;” an individual with Czechoslovak citizenship but residence (domovské 
právě) in the occupied territories; or an individual who fled the territories now occupied by 










Germany, Hungary, or Poland after May 20, 1939. District offices were required submit a list 
of all refugees residing in the district to the Ministry of Social and the Regional Authorities 
in Prague, including details such as the refugee’s name, birthdate, citizenship, residency, 
nationality, and last residence. For illiterate refugees, this information could be given orally 
and then signed by the refugee with three “X’s.” Illiterate Jews, however, were to sign with 
three “O’s.”86 The regional and police offices were given six days to complete this daunting 
task (between November 30 and December 5, 1938).87 
Fearing forced deportation back to the occupied territories, Jewish refugees employed 
several strategies to avoid expulsion when it came to registering for the census. In 
registration forms, Jewish refugees often described in detail their plans to emigrate outside of 
Czechoslovakia (including visa registration dates, location of family members abroad, tickets 
purchased, etc.). In describing these firm emigration plans, Jewish refugees hoped to forestall 
expulsion by emphasizing that they had no intention to remain. A second strategy Jewish 
refugees employed was to describe their loyalty to the Czechoslovak state by stating their 
nationality as Czech or by explaining their involvement in Czech nationalist groups.88 A third 
strategy, indeed the most common, was to avoid registering for the refugee census altogether.  
Although the relief organizations estimated that nearly all the 24,000 Jewish 
inhabitants of the Sudetenland had fled the occupied territories, only 7,325 registered during 
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the December refugee census. In total, 152,000 refugees registered in the census (114,557 of 
Czech nationality; 11,647 of German nationality, 7,325 Jewish refugees, and 307 of Polish 
nationality).89 In early January 1939, the Ministry of Interior requested information on the 
nationality of Czechoslovak citizens, specifically the number of individuals of Jewish 
nationality in each region of the country. The State Statistical Office replied by sending a 
table listing the number of individuals who could be identified as Jewish in any way (religion 
or nationality) on the 1930 census, but noting that these numbers were “very approximated, 
because “it was impossible to determine the number of Jewish individuals chose a nationality 
other than Jewish.”90 Furthermore, the State Statistical Office noted, it was impossible to 
accurately ascertain how many “members of the Jewish tribe” had fled into the Bohemian 
Lands after the German occupation.91 The actual number of Jews in the Bohemian Lands, 
estimated to be 82,175, could be as much as twice as high as the number of people who 
claimed to be Jewish on their 1930 census forms. 
After Kristallnacht, nearly all Jewish inhabitants of the now-occupied Sudetenland 
either fled or were forced to leave. After being detained in “protective custody” for two days, 
local Nazis drove Jewish inhabitants from Karlovy Vary to a forest on the Czech border, 
which they were forced to cross at gunpoint. A group of forty managed to find refuge with a 
Jewish shopkeeper in Malešice near Prague, where they received food and shelter from the 
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local Jewish relief committee. After resting for one night, the group reported to the Prague 
police authorities to register as refugees. “But to the indescribable horror they were arrested 
and told they would immediately be sent back to Germany as they had entered the country 
without permission or identification papers.” After spending a night in Czech prison, they 
were sent by train back to German territory, but were returned by the German border guards. 
For the next three days, the group was sent back and forth across the border, “the poor people 
being driven half mad with terror and fatigue…But no intervention with local or the Prague 
authorities was of any avail.”92  
Marie Schmolka criticized these government policies, arguing that expulsions created 
a sense of panic among Jewish populations that made the work of voluntary organizations 
nearly impossible. In November, Schmolka sent a memo to the Czecho-Slovak government 
on behalf of HICEM, which she shared with a AJDC representative: 
The Jewish population is disturbed by the unclear attitudes of the authorities, 
especially as concerns the expulsion of the Jewish refugees from the occupied 
territories. There is, among all classes of the local Jewish population, a desire to 
emigrate, which creates an unwholesome atmosphere of fear, but which could be 
great relieved if a systematic solution of this problem was found. At present 
emigration is not a problem of those who wish to emigrate or those who are 
compelled by the authorities to emigrate, but of those who are able to fulfill the 
requirements of the country of immigration. Mass expulsions achieve no purpose, the 
frontiers being hermetically closed.93 
Schmolka openly opposed the Czecho-Slovak government’s treatment of Jewish refugees, 
including expulsion back to the Sudetenland, high taxes for emigration, the inability to find 
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employment for refugees, and expulsion from universities. In sharing the memo with 
representatives of foreign voluntary organizations such as the AJDC or the Lord Mayor’s 
Fund, Schmolka increased the pressure on the Czecho-Slovak government to provide some 
assurance of assistance to Jewish and German refugees. As negotiations for the British Loan 
progressed, the AJDC requested that the British officials use the loan as leverage to ensure 
halt the expulsions and anti-Jewish practices. 
 
Caring for Refugees 
While the Ministry of Interior dictated border policies, the Ministry of Social Welfare 
was responsible for the care of refugees who found asylum in the interior of the country. 
Even before the Munich Agreement was finalized, the Ministry of Social Welfare argued that 
the matter called for the creation of an interministry committee because the refugee issue fell 
under the jurisdiction of so many different government organizations. On September 20, 
1938, the MSP requested input from the Ministries of National Defense, Public Defense and 
Physical Education, and Public Work, as well as the Council of Ministers.94 Although the 
ministries acknowledged the necessity of their involvement in the refugee situation, they 
distanced themselves from the actual care of refugees. For this, the ministries “invited” 
voluntary organizations to form local assistance committees, which would be responsible 
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managing and raising funds for the care of refugees.95 The district and regional offices then 
worked closely with the charitable organizations to provide care.96 
International pressure—particularly the promise of a British financial assistance—to 
solve the refugee crisis prompted the Czecho-Slovak government to take a direct role in the 
refugee issue. In response to the expulsion of Jewish and German-speaking political refugees 
and the Second Republic’s refusal to acknowledge citizenship rights of Jewish refugees, the 
British government offered a ten-million-pound advance to Czecho-Slovakia in early October 
1938 to assuage their guilt over the Munich Agreement and to tie Second Republic more 
strongly to the liberal democracies in the face of Nazi pressure.97 Four-million-pounds were 
gifted for the purposes of refugee resettlement and relief.  
In November 1938, the Council of German Jewry submitted a memorandum to the 
British government about the treatment of Jewish refugees in Czecho-Slovakia. The report 
noted that “Czechoslovakia is not disposed to treat [Jewish refugees] as Czech citizens, even 
though at the time of the transfer their citizenship was unquestionable, and even though by 
immediately leaving the ceded areas, they have demonstrated their desire to retain it.” The 
report continued, “those who have fled into Czechoslovakia are in an almost equally 
desperate position” as those who remained in the Sudetenland. “They enjoy no personal 
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security, since they may at any moment be served with expulsion orders; they can take up no 
occupation as a means of livelihood; they have no access to any monies which they may have 
deposited in Czech banks and no prospect of receiving any compensation for such property 
as they may have been compelled to leave behind. The report concluded by requesting that 
His Majesty’s Government require the Czech government to recognize the Czech citizenship 
(and right to opt for Czech citizenship) of Jewish refugees and to recognize these refugees’ 
rights to both moveable and immoveable property.98 The Secretary General of the Keren 
Hayesod in Jerusalem, Leo Hermann,99 visited Prague in the fall at the request of the Jewish 
leadership, including Schmolka. After his visit, Hermann informed the Council of German 
Jewry that “he felt that it was essential that foreign intervention should be obtained so that 
the Jews have the right to opt for Czechoslovakia.”100 Hermann continued to negotiate with 
the British regarding the Czech Gift Fund and managed to convince both sides to agree to 
reserve £500,000 for 2,500 Jews to emigrate to Palestine with their assets.101 The agreement, 
known as the “Czech Transfer,” became part of the broader Haavara Agreement. 
As part of the negotiations with the Czecho-Slovak government about the Loan 
Agreement, the British government stipulated that the expulsions of refugees needed to cease 
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and that the funds be distributed to refugees based on need and not on discrimination on 
religious, ethnic, or political grounds. To ensure that these stipulations were fulfilled, the 
British government tied disbursement of further funds to the Czecho-Slovak government’s 
ability to fulfill these promises.102 Ultimately, the British Loan did give the voluntary 
organizations some leverage against planned expulsions of refugees. Although the Second 
Republic government did reach an agreement with the German government to extradite 
certain leftist activist refugees, the Czecho-Slovak government never gave these refugees 
back to Germany. Instead, the administrator of the British Loan, R.J. Stopford, negotiated for 
the names of these people to be given to the BCRC, who promised to assist in the migration 
of these individuals. Despite the difficulties in securing visas for these individuals, Doreen 
Warriner took the initiative to arrange for transports of these men through Poland to Great 
Britain.103 
Faced with British pressure to address the refugee problem, the Czecho-Slovak Inter-
Ministerial committee met again in late October to create a government agency for refugee 
relief. Ostensibly, the government understood its primary goal to be providing relief and 
resettlement services to Czech refugees, as well as preventing their further migration out of 
the Bohemian Lands by offering employment and housing services. In regard to German-
speaking and Jewish refugees, the government had two goals: first, to accelerate the 
migration of these refugees; and second, to not pay for the migration of these refugees out of 
the Czecho-Slovak budget.104 At first, the Ministry of Social Welfare recommended that the 
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voluntary organizations (primarily those providing relief services to Czech refugees) form a 
new coordinating committee. coordinating committee to distribute funds to committees doing 
refugee work.  But, considering British pressure, the Ministry of Social Welfare soon deemed 
the care provided by voluntary organizations too fractured and partisan to be adequate. 105 To 
provide refugee services with the appearance of following British nondiscriminatory 
guidelines, the government created the Institute for Refugee Welfare (or Refugee Institute) 
on November 11, 1938. The Refugee Institute’s primary responsibilities were: to manage the 
British loan; negotiate with charitable organizations and District Offices to provide refugee 
relief and resettlement services for Czech-speaking refugees; negotiate with Social Democrat 
and Jewish voluntary organizations to direct German-speaking and Jewish refugees to 
emigrate; and use diplomatic pressure to convince foreign governments to offer immigration 
opportunities for refugees in Czechoslovakia.106 
Although the Refugee Institute was a division of the Ministry of Social Welfare it was 
officially a separate legal body with broad powers that overlapped with those of other 
ministries. As Jan Benda has demonstrated, the power of the Refugee Institute was 
remarkable. The decisions passed by the Refugee Institute were binding for all institutions, 
entities and business in the Second Republic. No government agency had ever held such 
sweeping authority. But given the political, economic, and social impact of the refugee crisis, 
the government felt that such sweeping powers was necessary for decisive and speedy 
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action.107 Although British pressure resulted in the creation of a centralized government 
agency to provide care for refugees, and the gradual cessation of expulsions of refugees, this 
pressure did not counteract antisemitism and anti-German sentiments in Second Republic 
policies. In fact, British officials “expressed considerable sympathy with Czech reluctance to 
accept [Jewish refugees] within the country’s reduced and overcrowded boundaries, even 
agreeing that Czech Jews were not ‘real’ Czechs.”108 Although officially British policy 
encouraged the Second Republic to accept Jewish refugees, in fact, British officials were 
willing to settled for not expelling them.  
 
Migration Assistance 
For the first time, the Czechoslovak state was now involved in offering unified care 
for refugees.109 Even as the Refugee Institute criticized the care of refugees offered by 
voluntary organizations, it depended on the voluntary organizations to offer in migration 
assistance. Migration support was not offered for Czech-speaking and Slovak-speaking 
refugees, as the Refugee Institute considered the emigration of such individuals to run 
counter to the national interest of rebuilding the nation.110 The Refugee Institute issued press 
requests announcing that it would not respond to individual requests made by refugees. This 
task was delegated to regional offices, since “the numbers of people were very large and 
scattered throughout all regions of our republic . . . Of course, one could imagine what it 
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would mean for so many thousands of people to be relocated, all needing to receive 
something from a single place.”111 Instead, refugees were instructed to turn to voluntary 
organizations for both social aid and emigration assistance. 
Still, the Refugee Institute discussed ways to encourage Jewish and German-speaking 
refugees to emigrate as quickly as possible. In the meetings of the Refugee Institute’s 
Emigration Division, government officials advocated for mass migration schemes. Indeed, 
the Government offered to assist Social Democratic and Jewish voluntary organizations to 
obtain power of attorney to arrange mass migration schemes on behalf of their clients.112 The 
government additionally provided refugees with provisional passports in order to expedite 
migration, as stateless refugees faced extreme difficulty in finding migration opportunities.113 
Such schemes were easier to organize for German-speaking refugees, who fit the mold of 
traditional “political refugees.” The Refugee Institute worked with the leader of the German 
Social Democrat Party, Wenzel Jaksch, the British government, and Canada to finance the 
migration, landing fees, and settlement costs for several thousand Sudeten German Social 
Democrats to help build Canadian railroads.114 
Mass migration schemes were much more difficult to organize for Jewish refugees 
and the Refugee Institute devised increasingly fantastical colonialization schemes to 
encourage migration. The Refugee Institute’s Emigration Division, on which Marie 
Schmolka served, discussed various migration schemes in January 1939, including New 
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Caledonia, Bolivia, and Madagascar. A commission led by a professor at the Masaryk 
University in Olomouc—Jan Kabelík—and accompanied by Refugee Institute officials and 
representatives of the Bat’a Shoe Manufacturer went to Rhodesia to discuss the possibility of 
resettling 300 refugees (and eventually as many as 10-100,000) in February 1939.115 In 
regard to the Rhodesia scheme, Schmolka advised against the Rhodesia scheme as 
impractical and pushed the Refugee Institute to consider abandoning it.116 Furthermore, 
Schmolka mentioned that she had recently learned of dubious emigration agencies 
convincing refugees to pay in advance for the agency to organize a mass migration scheme. 
Schmolka and representatives of the National Bank were concerned that Prague had become 
overrun with “emigration agencies, which exploit emigrants for their own gain and to the 
detriment of the emigrant . . . Prague has become the center of numerous fraudsters.”117 By 
offering mass migration schemes these fraudulent travel agencies could convince large 
numbers of refugees to sign up for the scheme, and then abscond with the money. 
Most of the mass emigration schemes devised by the Refugee Institute for Jewish 
refugees failed, especially when there were few penalties for receiving countries to back out 
of the agreement. For instance, several representatives supported sending the refugees to 
Nicaragua. Schmolka pointed out that a group from Brno had already attempted a group 
transport to Nicaragua, but when the Nicaraguan governments failed to produce the 
necessary entrance certificates, the transport was cancelled. After Schmolka brought the 
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matter to the attention of the Refugee Institute, all discussion of migration to Nicaragua 
ceased.118 
Mass emigration schemes were successful when both the receiving country and the 
Bohemian Lands had an incentive for ensuring that the migrants arrived. One such scheme, 
known as the Zbrojovka akce, (Zbrojovka, or Arms Factory, Action) involved an agreement 
between the Czechoslovak Armament Company (Českoslovenká Zbrojovka), the Second 
Republic government, and the Ecuadorian government. Schmolka herself became invested in 
this migration scheme, advising members of the group through the HICEM office. In late fall 
1938, the Ecuadorian government was unable to repay Československá Zbrojovka 
approximately Kč 2,500,000 for weapons it had previously purchased. With the Refugee 
Institute, Československá Zbrojovka negotiated to waive the Ecuadorian debt, in exchange 
for the admittance of fifty families from Czecho-Slovakia to Ecuador, who would have 
access to a bank account in Quito with the remainder of the debt owed to Československá 
Zbrojovka. The migrants deposited funds in Prague, and upon arrival in Quito would receive 
half the amount deposited, while the Ecuadorian government retained the other half.119 
Československá Zbrojovka then had access to the funds deposited by migrants in Prague. The 
Ecuadorian government further pledged to support these “colonist” families by giving them 
plots of land as well as agricultural tools upon their arrival. In the agreement signed on 
February 2, 1939, the Refugee Institute estimated that it would be able to organize migrants 
to leave in group transports (comprised mostly of farmers), with 60 families arriving in 
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Ecuador in 1939, and an additional three hundred families over the subsequent years.120 The 
first group of seventeen families (primarily Slovak Jews living in the Protectorate) left for 
Ecuador at the end of March 1939.121  
During the Protectorate period, the Refugee Institute attempted to continue work on 
the Zbrojovka Scheme. After the occupation of the Protectorate, the Ecuadorian government 
began to slowly change the terms of the agreement, stating that it was no longer able to 
accept all the families that it had previously agreed to admit into the country. Fearing that the 
Ecuadorian government would back out of the agreement entirely, the Ministry of Social 
Welfare agreed to only send forty-nine families.122 Of the forty-nine families participating in 
the Zbrojovka scheme, only thirty-three had received their Ecuadorian visas by July 7, 
1939.123 Citing “financial difficulties,” the Ecuadorian government claimed that now only 
twenty-four families total could be sustained in Ecuador.124 However, the Ministry of Social 
Welfare and the Protectorate government had approved thirteen Protectorate Jewish families 
for the Zbrojovka scheme, and these families left in July 1939. To satisfy the Ecuadorian 
government, the Ministry of Social Welfare and the German authorities claimed that three 
families from the “Slovak group” had received funding from the Stopford Fund for needy 
refugees and that this kind of “double-dipping” was forbidden. These three families were 
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removed from the Zbrojovka scheme.125 By the time the families were ready to leave, the 
Refugee Institute required approval from the Gestapo in order to purchase the ship berths for 
the migrant families. The second group managed to leave the Protectorate in early August 
1939, just before the outbreak of war.126  
When mass emigration schemes were effective, they allowed for larger numbers of 
people to leave quickly; when the plans fell through, hundreds of individuals lost valuable 
time and financial resources. One such case was the “Kulka Action,” named after the leader 
of the group, Bruno Kulka, which sought to bring Jewish refugees from Moravská Ostrava to 
the Dominican Republic. At the Evian Conference in July 1938, the Dominican Republic had 
repeated its 1935 offer to allow 100,000 Jewish refugees to settle on the Caribbean Island.127 
In the fall 1938, Bruno Kulka approached the consulate of the Dominican Republic about the 
possibility for a group of 1,000 Jewish craftsmen and industrialists (450 from Ostrava, 300 
refugees from the occupied territories, and 250 stateless) to purchase land and settle in San 
Domingo with their machines and tools. The cost of the Kulka scheme was enormous: the 
group needed to each pay $110 for visa taxes, $130 for transportation, and proof of $200, (Kč 
13,200 per person) plus an additional deposit of Kč 7,000 in the Dominican Republic. In 
total, the Refugee Institute estimated that this would necessitate about twenty million crowns 
in foreign currency, which it worried would destabilize the Czech crown.128 Still, the wealthy 
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members of the group raised approximately twenty million crowns and deposited the sum in 
a bank account for the “Dominican Emigration Action” and the Czechoslovak government 
agree to release the foreign currency necessary (after a 30 percent tax deduction, the group 
had approximately $440,000).  
During the negotiations “both the Czech Government and the [Czechoslovak] 
organizations thought that in view of the extremely precarious situation of the Austrian and 
German refugees in Czechoslovakia that a group of 200 of them should be included in the 
original group.” The Dominican representative agreed to allow the additional 200 refugees 
and the Kulka group agreed to allow the additional 200 refugees, but were unwilling to 
assume the costs of the migration. The Dominican Republic, while it had not yet issued final 
approval for the entire project, had agreed for an advance group of ten had already secured 
visas for the trip. Thus, in late January 1939, Marie Schmolka accompanied the Ostrava 
representatives to Paris to meet with the European AJDC Director, Morris Troper. Troper 
expressed hesitation with the entire Kulka project, noting that “all negotiations were 
conducted independently by the representatives of the group and brought to conclusion 
without support or advice from any [international] organization.”129 He informed the Kulka 
group that “the J.D.C. can have nothing to do in any way with this project,” as they had not 
been included in the negotiations. Still, the AJDC had already pledged funding to Czecho-
Slovakia to cover emigration expenses of refugees. Troper agreed that these already allocated 
AJDC funds could be used to provide some travel expenses for the 200 Austrian and German 
refugees on the condition that the international HICEM reviewed and approved of the entire 
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operation and other organizations, specifically the Council for German Jewry and the ICA, 
offer financial support. 130 Schmolka then accompanied the Ostrava delegation to London to 
meet with the High Commissioner for Refugees. The High Commissioner also wished to 
send an independent representative to assess the price of the land and conditions in the San 
Domingo colony.131 
Anticipating a quick departure once the international organizations became involved 
in the project, the members of the group deposited significant sums of money in a bank 
account reserved for the migration attempt. But, the effort stalled in early March.  First, the 
Dominican Legation in Washington informed the Czecho-Slovak Legation that the 
Dominican Foreign Office had “not given instructions to any of its representatives abroad to 
carry out negotiations on Jewish immigration to the Dominican Republic.”132 Then came the 
Nazi occupation of the Bohemian Lands, Marie Schmolka’s arrest, the temporary halt to all 
emigration, and changes in emigration law from the Protectorate. After Schmolka’s release, 
several in the group, including Kulka, purchased train and ship tickets for a June departure 
date, but those tickets went unused. Ultimately the effort disintegrated. Kulka did not leave in 
June and the money he, and others from the group, had deposited for the effort was returned 
at the end of October 1939, just as the deportations from Ostrava to Nisko began.133  
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Marie Schmolka, HICEM, and other Voluntary Organizations 
Indeed, the government was dependent on the voluntary organizations to solve the 
refugee question, both in terms of resettling Czech refugees and in terms of the emigration of 
German and Jewish refugees. Lacking the infrastructure and resources to provide food and 
housing for the refugee population, the government turned to a variety of charitable 
organizations, including the Czechoslovak Red Cross, České srdce (Bohemian Heart) to 
provide relief services. These charities additionally agreed to follow the MSP’s 
recommendation to create an advisory committee (at first the Komitét pro pomoc uprchlíkům, 
later the Výbor pro pomoc uprchlíkům) to collect and distribute funds to aid refugees.134 
The work of supporting Jewish refugees fell almost entirely to Jewish committees. 
The funding for these programs came almost exclusively from funds raised within the Jewish 
community; from local voluntary organizations (especially HICEM, the Social Institute, and 
the Palestine Office); and from grants given by the AJDC as well as a small amount from the 
News Chronicle Fund.135 As of November 21, 1938, only 70 Jewish refugees received aid 
from the Czecho-Slovak state ( 0.3 percent of all Czecho-Slovak state aid to refugees went to 
supporting Jewish refugees).136 To finance the rising costs of social aid to refugees, Jewish 
Religious Communities dramatically raised the taxes on their members.137  
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Migration assistance was similarly the responsibility of three local Jewish voluntary 
organizations: the Social Institute of the JRC Prague, the Palestine Office, and HICEM. The 
Social Institute primarily continued to offer local services: housing, food, and retraining 
courses. The Palestine Office, under the leadership of Jakob Edelstein, had assisted 3,762 
people to immigrate to Palestine (714 of whom were German refugees) between 1933 and 
mid-1938.138 Then, as part of the British Loan agreement, £500,000 was set aside for Jewish 
immigration to Palestine, for which the British Mandate authorities had approved 2,500 
certificates. The Palestine Office organized mass transports, which were to leave in late 
March or early April. With the Nazi invasion on March 15, the Palestine Office closed for 
two weeks. But on March 29, Edelstein was allowed to resume his operations—under Nazi 
supervision—and the first Youth Aliyah transport organized by the Palestine Office in the 
Protectorate left soon after with a Gestapo approved group exit permit.139  
Whereas the Palestine Office solely organized mass transports to Palestine (both 
certificate and Aliyah Bet transports), Schmolka and HICEM focused their efforts on 
individual migration case work. As of November 15, 1938, HICEM had a case load of at 
least 2,400 individuals and had helped 199 people to emigrate since the beginning of 
November. In December 1938, HICEM assisted 101 individuals (mostly German and 
Austrian refugees) to emigrate from Bohemia and Moravia, excluding refugees from the 
Sudetenland, and the Social Institute provided relief to 1,408 individuals.140 Between mid-
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January and mid-February, HICEM assisted an additional 86 individuals.141 An AJDC 
representative noted, “It is difficult to imagine the situation of the HICEM in Prague. It is 
besieged by desperate people who have been expelled, by women whose husbands have been 
arrested following expulsion. There are perpetual calls for information and advice from the 
provinces.”142Further complicating matters for Schmolka and the other refugee workers was 
the sense of panic. In November 1938, rumors swirled that the major Czechoslovak 
employers like the Bat’a shoe factory would fire their Jewish workers, Kristallnacht had 
sparked anti-Jewish riots in Prague and Brno, and newspapers regularly printed antisemitic 
articles. Between January and October 1938, more than 2,000 Prague Jews were baptized, 
with 300 baptisms in October alone. Schmolka, Hannah Steiner, and the other HICEM 
workers “[carried] on the registration of refugees, [helped] them with their preparation for 
emigration, such as the securing of visas and other formalities.”143   
During this period, Maria Schmolka took the lead in representing the needs of Jewish 
refugees to the various private aid groups, so much so that the British administrator and 
refugee expert John Hope Simpson considered her “head of the Jewish organizations in 
Czechoslovakia.”144 In early October, Schmolka and Steiner traveled to London to meet with 
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Simpson about creating refugee camps for in England and other countries and were able to 
secure from London and Paris promises to provide 250 British and 250 French visas for 
German and Austrian refugees currently in Czechoslovakia.145 While in Paris, Schmolka and 
Steiner additionally spoke directly with the European Director of the AJDC in Paris to lobby 
for additional financial support for refugees, securing an immediate one-time grant of 
$10,000 for refugee relief. 
In late January 1939, Schmolka again travelled to Paris, for an appointment with the 
AJDC, and to London, where she met with the High Commissioner for Refugees, 
representatives of the British government, WIZO London, and the international HICEM 
officials on general emigration matters. While in London, she negotiated for the British 
government to issue 1,300 visas (500 for German and Austrian refugees of which 150 were 
for Jews, and 700 for Sudeten refugees of which 100 were designated for Jews); twenty 
permits for Jewish girls to come to England as domestic servants with a promise for 
additional domestic service training from the London WIZO office; and promises from the 
High Commissioner to investigate the San Domingo settlement project of the Ostrava 
refugees.146 Although the High Commissioner was optimistic about solving “the non-Jewish 
refugee problem in Czecho-Slovakia very quickly,” he emphasized that “Jewish emigration 
will depend on the ability to obtain visas. He mentioned the countries which are closed to 
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Jewish emigrants and stated that in his opinion, it is up to the Jewish organizations to work to 
obtain visas,” further confirming Schmolka’s insistence on individual case work.147 
Schmolka also tried to uncover ways to finance the migration of both wealthy and 
poor Jews alike. In February 1939, she proposed a scheme to the Paris AJDC office in which 
wealthy migrants would deposit a certain amount in an emigration account in Czech crowns 
and be reimbursed from organizations like the AJDC upon leaving the Bohemian Lands and 
“be satisfied with only 20-25% of their money” given the difficulty in exporting money.148 
Such transfers were violations of currency laws, and the AJDC feared that participating 
would jeopardize their broader European work.149 
 
The Nazi Occupation of the Protectorate of Bohemia and Moravia 
Gestapo agents arrested Hannah Steiner and Marie Schmolka on March 16 for their 
work with HICEM. At the time of their arrest, HICEM had 1500 active cases. Schmolka, 
Steiner, and their colleagues anticipated their arrest and ensured that “all confidential 
documents had been destroyed before the occupation or put in safe places.” The Gestapo 
agents confiscated the remaining HICEM documents.150 In addition, all forty-seven of the 
other workers in the HICEM were also arrested. Schmolka’s home was ransacked, “the glass 
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panels of her door had been smashed,” and “the flat had been wrecked.”151 The Nazis 
believed that Schmolka controlled large amounts of foreign money that had been given to her 
for refugee relief by the British and international Jewish organizations. By arresting 
Schmolka, they hoped to gain access to those funds. With Schmolka’s arrest and the closure 
of the migration office of HICEM one relief worker noted, “there is no one to help the 
Jews.”152 Fellow refugee aid worker, Kurt Grossmann, wrote in the Manchester Guardian on 
March 27, 1939, that Schmolka was “one of the best and purest people, who has devoted 
herself unselfishly to the work for German and Austrian refugees for more than six years. 
With Marie Schmolka’s arrest, all of the refugee organizations [in the Bohemian Lands] have 
lost their leader.”153An American relief worker wrote of Schmolka’s arrest: “She has been 
active in helping Jewish emigration and was supposed to have had the power [to] call upon 
certain foreign sums of money for emigration purposes. The Germans wanted that foreign 
exchange and imprisoned her to force her assent. She was stronger than they – and refused to 
give in.”154 Given Schmolka’s international prominence, multiple “powerful friends 
concerned about her welfare” inquired about her well-being with German and Protectorate 
authorities, including Jan Masaryk and Senator Františka Plamínková.155 On June 6, after six 
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weeks in prison, Schmolka was released “with the understanding that she would have nothing 
further to do with Hicem or any Emigration projects.”156 Steiner had been released three 
weeks earlier.157 
On June 16, Schmolka approached the Ministry of Social Welfare to ask for a 
meeting with the minister Dr. Klumpar. Schmolka wished to verify some secondhand 
information that she had learned from Lord Creighton (who had heard from the head of the 
Prague Gestapo Bömelberg), that the Gestapo no longer objected to her working on Jewish 
migration issues, so long as she cooperated with the Ministry of Social Welfare. Minister 
Klumpar informed Schmolka that the decision was up to the Refugee Institute, and she 
needed to wait for further notice about what her role would be. Schmolka then informed the 
minister that “she is one of the main Jewish social workers [in the Bohemian Lands] and that 
this work had received funding from an American international Jewish aid organization 
based in Paris,” the AJDC. The AJDC had ceased allocating funds after the German 
occupation, but she firmly believed that if she could travel to Paris, she could convince the 
AJDC to resume allocation of funds.158 Dr. Emil Kafka was approved on June 28 to visit the 
AJDC officials in France and other organizations in London about resuming financial 
assistance for social care and migration abroad.159 
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In addition, the occupation created difficulties with the British loan to 
Czechoslovakia, and the use of the loan funds was suspended for a period. On April 12, the 
Refugee Institute wrote a letter to R.J. Stopford, imploring him to press the British 
government to decide quickly. The letter cited refugees who had recently received 
notification that their visas to the United States had been approved, but without the financial 
assistance from the British loan, “there is the danger that they will expire before the applicant 
may be able to leave this country.”160  
Because of German regulations and British indecision about how to proceed with the 
Loan Agreement, the Refugee Institute had very little to do with Jewish migration after 
March 15, 1939. Although the Refugee Institute continued its operations throughout the 
Protectorate period, it stopped attempting to organize group transports with the creation of 
the Protectorate and focused instead on confiscating Jewish property and transferring houses 
and business to Czech refugees.161 Still, by July 1939, the Refugee Institute had facilitated 
the emigration or resettlement of 26,222 refugees, 7,000 of which were Jewish individuals 
(the vast majority were German refugees).162 According to official statistics—those compiled 
by the Refugee Institute and the Jewish organizations—9,186 Jews fled the Protectorate 
between March 15 and July 1939 (primarily to other European countries and on the group 
transports to Palestine organized by the Palestine), in addition to the several thousand that 
fled illegally over the border to Poland and Slovakia.163 Dr. František (Fritz) Ullmann of the 
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JRC Prague later estimated that 6,800 Jews had crossed the “green” border to Poland.164After 
six weeks in prison, Marie Schmolka was finally released and resumed her work with 
refugees and the international organizations involved in coordinating migration attempts. 
However, Schmolka’s time in prison weakened her health and she was unable to resume her 
full duties helping coordinate migration. Still, she continued to travel and advocate for 
individual refugees and the importance of the case work that HICEM had advocated. In early 
July 1939, Schmolka went to Paris with the head of the JRC Prague, Emil Kafka, to attend 
the AJDC Convention in Paris. While in Paris, Schmolka continued her work with the 
International HICEM organization. On July 13, Schmolka wrote to the Refugee Institute to 
ask if they would be willing to assist in the migration of individuals from the Prague area. 
The Social Institute of the JRC Prague was no longer able to continue their work with 
HICEM, yet Schmolka wrote, “We receive a great number of requests from Prague on a daily 
basis, but without a means of direct correspondence with the applicants and a committee to 
verify the requests, we must to our great regret, leave these letters unanswered.” Some of 
these refugees had approved American visas and only needed assistance paying the twenty-
dollar visa tax.165 
Schmolka returned to Paris at the end of August for a conference convened by the 
AJDC and HICEM. As the representative for the Bohemian Lands, Schmolka met with 
Morris Troper (AJDC European Director), Joseph Hyman (AJDC Vice-Chair), Saly Mayer 
(Switzerland), Gertrude van Tijn (Netherlands), Max Gottschalk (Belgium), Yitzhak 
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Giterman (Poland), and Otto Hirsch (Germany) to transfer an additional, large funding 
package to Poland in case war did break out.166 When World War II began on September 1, 
Schmolka was still in Paris. She remained in Paris for a short time before moving to London, 
where influential members of the former Czechoslovak government had established a 
sizeable émigré community.167 In London, Schmolka helped to found the National 
Committee of Czechoslovakian Jewry.168 She also tried to find an emigration opportunity for 
Hannah Steiner—who was now the head of the Emigration Department of the JRC Prague—
and was scheduled to meet Chaim Weizmann (president of the World Zionist Organization 
and the Jewish Agency) and the Queen of England on March 30 to discuss options for 
Steiner’s migration.169 The day before the meeting, on March 29, 1940, Marie Schmolka 
passed away of a heart attack, her already poor health significantly damaged from the time 
spent in Gestapo custody. Upon her passing, the honorary European chairman of the 
American Jewish Joint Distribution Committee, Bernhard Kahn, remarked that, “the passing 
away of this great Jewess will be a great loss for all Jewish organizations.”170 
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CHAPTER 3: THE PRAGUE KINDERTRANSPORTS REEXAMINED 
 
Introduction 
An often-told example of escape from the Bohemian Lands is the daring rescue of 
669 children from the Protectorate of Bohemia and Moravia between January and August 
1939.1 Typically, this story of rescue unfolds in the following manner: In December 1938, a 
young British stockbroker named Nicholas Winton was preparing to go on a skiing holiday in 
Switzerland. After receiving an urgent telegram from a friend in Prague, Winton abruptly 
changed his holiday plans and went instead to the capital of Czecho-Slovakia. The telegram 
stressed that children in Czechoslovakia were in grave danger and would need to be 
evacuated as quickly as possible. Wasting no time, Winton arrived in Prague in late 
December. Only a few days into what would become a three-week stay in Prague, Winton 
resolved to cooperate with the refugee workers already in Prague to help the children of 
Jews, Communists, and Social Democrats who had fled the Nazi occupation of the 
Sudetenland after the Munich Agreement in September 1938. In late January 1939, Winton 
returned to England, and singlehandedly brought Czech refugee children to England with 
efficiency before World War II began on 1 September 1939. He then returned to his very 
ordinary life, married, had children – and for fifty years never mentioned the Czech children 
he had saved again.  
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Although stories of individual rescue are compelling, this version of the story of the 
669 child refugees nevertheless obscures the messy and complex nature of relief and refugee 
work in Europe during this period. Even a cursory glance through Winton’s scrapbook, 
which details his activities in the Prague Kindertransports reveals that Winton corresponded 
with a wide variety of voluntary organizations to bring these children out of Prague. Pasted 
into the pages of the scrapbook are the letterheads of dozens of organizations and the calling 
cards of dozens of individuals. How do these groups and individuals fit into the story of the 
rescue of the 669 children? What tied each of them to the Bohemian Lands? How was the 
task of “rescue” accomplished? To answer these questions, I will retell the story of the rescue 
of these 669 children focusing not on Winton, but on the important web of connections that 
were crucial to bringing these children out of Central Europe. Half a century later, his half-
forgotten experiences were resurrected and presented back to him in a very unexpected way.2 
In 1988, a scrapbook detailing Winton’s wartime activities resurfaced after his wife 
Grete found it in a trunk in their attic. The family decided to show the scrapbook to historian 
Elisabeth Maxwell, who passed the details along to Esther Rantzen, the host of the BBC 
program “That’s Life.”3 Winton was invited to come to an episode of the program in which 
Rantzen would show the scrapbook and tell the story of the Czech Kindertransports on live 
television. Unbeknown to Winton, some of the former children he had helped to bring to 
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England surrounded him in the studio audience. In a dramatic and moving scene, Rantzen 
introduced Winton to the now adult children that he had helped to save. Until that moment, 
the children had not known who had been responsible for bringing them to England, and as 
result, saving them from the Holocaust.  
In recent years, Nicholas Winton has been widely and publicly praised for his 
extensive work in “rescuing” 669 children from Czechoslovakia in a Prague-based 
Kindertransport that worked in parallel to the larger child migration schemes from Germany 
and Austria that brought around 10,000 unaccompanied children to Britain. Since his public 
introduction to the individuals he had saved, Winton has become well known as the “British 
Schindler.”4 Before his death on July 1, 2015, at the age of 106, and in subsequent 
testimonials and obituaries, Winton made a good hero. He was genuinely modest, 
unassuming, and repeatedly sought to share his accolades with his former colleagues. In his 
later life, as he accepted a knighthood, turned 106, was repeatedly nominated for a Nobel 
Peace Prize, and received the Czech Republic’s highest honors, his personal reluctance to 
accept praise became irrelevant.5 Although Winton was unquestionably an admirable 
individual, the myth is now bigger than the man. 
In an ironic turn, it is the former Kinder themselves who have been instrumental in 
propagating the myth of their “rescue.” For fifty years, the children from Czechoslovakia did 
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not know whom to thank for saving their lives. There was never a British nor Czech state 
organization managing the Kindertransports, and the network of voluntary organizations that 
had organized the migration was difficult to reconstruct.  Once Winton’s story had been 
brought to public attention in the late 1980s, these now adult “children” began to recount 
Winton’s story as part of their memoirs to understand their own experience and to express 
their understandable gratitude toward their “rescuer.” A version of the Prague 
Kindertransports began to spread and, with the production of documentary films and 
significant memorialization efforts by the British and Czech governments, became 
entrenched in the literature.6 Winton’s story is used as an exemplar of moral goodness and as 
evidence that one good man can make a difference in a world of evil. It suits us societally to 
tell simplified stories of the “power of good.”7 
By looking at the messy, overlapping organizations and the many individuals 
involved in the Kindertransports, I tell the history of the transports as Winton himself 
indicated that he wanted. In interviews, Winton insisted that he was not the only individual 
involved in organizing the transports. Although stories of individual rescue are compelling, 
this version of the story of the 669 child refugees nevertheless obscures the messy and 
complex nature of relief and refugee work in Europe during this period. How do the other 
voluntary organizations and individuals fit into the story of the rescue of the 669 children? 
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What tied each of them to the Bohemian Lands? How was the task of “rescue” 
accomplished? To answer these questions, I will retell the story of the rescue of these 669 
children focusing not on Winton, but on the important web of connections that were crucial 
to bringing these children out of Central Europe. In retelling this story, I provide a case study 
that details how the organizations came together to assist refugees. 
 
Limited Assistance: The Response of the British and French Governments 
 The British government responded to the refugee crisis in the Bohemian Lands with 
concern, caution, and hesitancy. Much of Czechoslovakia’s economic resources were in the 
now occupied Sudetenland; and the Second Republic was now faced with an expensive 
refugee problem. British Secretary of Foreign Affairs, Lord Halifax commented with concern 
about Czecho-Slovakia’s “inevitable Germanophile trend” as the Second Republic 
government increased communication with Nazi officials.8 The British government was 
determined to prop up an independent Czecho-Slovak as a bulwark against Nazi Germany in 
the interest of maintaining peace in Europe. Furthermore, the British government assumed 
some responsibility for ensuring that the terms of the Munich Agreement were properly 
administered, and this meant that ensuring rights to property, citizenship, and the right to 
choose Czechoslovak nationality (which was frequently denied to German-speaking Jewish 
refugees). To support the Second Republic, the British government offered financial 
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assistance to fund refugee relief and resettlement—something that it had refused to refugees 
from Germany and Austria in the preceding years.9  
Thus, many British citizens felt the British Government was morally bound to assist 
Czechoslovakia resolve the refugee crisis caused by the Munich Agreement.10 For its part, 
the British government felt obligated to respond to the refugee crisis to stabilize 
Czechoslovakia and maintain peace in Central Europe. On October 3, a group of 
approximately fifty prominent British politicians (including Philip Noel-Baker, Eleanor 
Rathbone, and Ellen Wilkinson) submitted a letter to The Times protesting the “lasting 
dishonour” of the Munich Agreement, which sacrificed “a civilized, brave, and tolerant 
people whose steadfastness and dignity have evoked the admiration of the whole world.”11 
That same day, the Mayor of Southall launched a fundraising drive for Czechoslovakia.12 On 
October 4, the Foreign Secretary Lord Halifax addressed the House of Lords to announce an 
Anglo-French loan to Czechoslovakia, which the British felt “morally bound” to offer, in 
light of Czechoslovakia’s sacrifice.13 
Aware of the tense international situation, the Czechoslovak Foreign Minister in 
London Jan Masaryk asked the British government for financial assistance to handle the 
refugee situation on October 1.14 Just two days later, Neville Chamberlain addressed the 
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House of Commons regarding the Czechoslovak situation. In this meeting, MPs continually 
interrupted Chamberlain to express their displeasure with the Munich Agreement. When 
Chamberlain conceded that, “the relief that our escape from this great peril of war has, I think 
everywhere been mingled in this country with a profound feeling of sympathy,” several 
members of parliament interjected that the instead, the country should profoundly feel a 
sense of “shame.”15 Chamberlain recovered, and then proceeded to explain that the new 
Czechoslovak state submitted an appeal for assistance with raising a £30,000,000 loan 
guaranteed by the British Government. After reminding the House of Commons that, “We 
must recognise that [Czechoslovakia] has been put in a position where she has got to 
reconstruct her whole economy, and that in doing that she must encounter difficulties, which 
it would be practically impossible for her to solve alone,” Chamberlain announced that the 
British government was prepared to offer Czechoslovak a £10,000,000 advance.16 
The £10,000,000 British Loan (often referred to as the “Stopford Fund,” in the 
Bohemian Lands, after the Prague administrator, R.J. Stopford) was advanced to the Second 
Republic in two installments in November and December 1938. The Second Republic and 
British continued negotiations through the fall and early winter. As evidence of the Second 
Republic’s expulsions of Jewish and some German-speaking refugees reached Britain, the 
British government stipulated that the expulsions would have to cease, for the loan 
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negotiations to proceed.17 Eventually, the British government gave an additional £4,000,000 
designated as the “Czech Gift Fund” specifically for migration assistance.18 
 On January 27, 1939, the British, French (who had agreed to underwrite the loan), 
and Czechoslovak governments formally agreed to the terms of the Loan and Czech Gift 
Fund to the Czecho-Slovak Republic.19 After lobbying from Leo Hermann on behalf of 
Zionist organizations, the Czech Gift Fund earmarked £500,000 specifically for Jewish 
migration to Palestine, for which the British government promised to provide 2,500 
certificates.20 Fearing that the funds would be misused or that they would fall into Nazi 
hands, the Bank of England maintained control of the Czech Gift Fund in a special account in 
the name of the National Bank of Czechoslovakia. Accessing the funds required a joint 
request from the Refugee Institute and a representative from the British Legation in Prague.21 
The Czecho-Slovak government, for its part, agreed to not discriminate against any 
refugees “on account of his religious belief, political opinion or racial origin,” nor to compel 
any refugee to leave Czecho-Slovakia “if they would thereby run the risk of danger to health, 
liberty, or life.”22 The Refugee Institute was to be responsible for providing migrants, 
regardless of financial situation, with the costs of transportation as well as £200 (per family) 
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to be used for resettlement purposes prior to emigration.23 If migrants had funds available in 
Czecho-Slovak currency, the individual was allowed to transfer up to 50,000 Czech crowns, 
at a taxed rate of thirty percent. The funds collected through the tax were to “be applied for 
the benefit of the refugees.”24 
Beyond financial assistance, however, the British and French governments were 
hesitant to accept refugees for multiple reasons: antisemitism, fear of refugees bringing 
disease, and fear of refugees being Nazi spies. Many in both Britain and France increasingly 
feared that refugees were Nazi spies. In France, the French Jews and the refugees already in 
France were vocal anti-Nazis. Their stance prompted the France government to respond to 
refugees after the Munich Agreement with “a note of defensiveness, paranoia, and even overt 
racism . . . and reinforced administrative resolve to stand by the hard-line approach.”25 As 
tensions in France rose, so too the France’s already restrictive visa policies, including 
attempts to identify and deny Jewish visa applications from Central Europe.26 
 The French government responded to the Munich Agreement with particularly 
exclusionary policies directed at Czech, especially Czech Jewish, refugees. Although Czech 
diplomats and the World Jewish Congress appealed to the French government to grant 
temporary visas to the Czechoslovak Jews from the Sudetenland, the French government 
agreed to grant only 310 visas to Czech refugees. By early 1939, France had issued only 100 
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of those promised visas.27 Czech Jews were almost entirely excluded from entry into France. 
The Czech consul in Paris reported that of the 2,000 Czech refugees who had crossed into 
France illegally, 1,200 were Jewish. French visas, the AJDC confirmed, were issued to 
political refugees, not Jewish refugees.28 In addition to increasingly restrictive visa policies, 
the French police began rounding up and deporting illegal refugees in October 1938.29 
 The British government was similarly hesitant to accept refugees. British refugee 
policy in the 1930s was based on “the principle that Britain itself was not a country of 
immigration” and on the “principle that no refugee would be allowed entry into Britain 
unless a voluntary organization accepted financial responsibility for” the refugees.30 For a 
refugee to come to Britain, the individual not only needed to have a British visa, but also 
needed to have been pre-selected by a voluntary organization, which provided the necessary 
guarantee that the individual would not become a burden on the state.31 Through the end of 
October 1938, the British government agreed to issue only 350 special visas to refugees from 
the Bohemian Lands, and these were allocated to Sudeten German refugees and the “Old 
Reich refugees” who had previously fled Germany and Austria.32 As of November 12, 1938, 
the British government had granted 1,103 Czechoslovaks permission to arrive in Britain and 
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refused visas to twenty-five individuals.33 Visas were granted on the basis of the “danger” of 
an individual being deported to Nazi-occupied territory and then arrested, with degree of 
persecution of political refugees considered as more life-threatening than the persecution 
faced by “racial” or “religious” (Jewish) refugees.34 
The British government felt a moral obligation to help Sudeten German (especially 
Social Democrats) and the remaining Austrian and German refugees to leave the Bohemian 
Lands and found it easier to secure migration opportunities for these “political” refugees. 
Social Democrat refugees also fit British understandings of refugees as those forced into 
exile for their political beliefs.35 Communist refugees, on the other hand, were treated with 
greater suspicion and admitted in fewer numbers.36 Furthermore, the leader of the Sudeten 
German Social Democrats, Wenzel Jaksch, appealed directly to British and French 
ambassadors and to the British public through articles in the Daily Telegraph. On October 6, 
Jaksch and the president of the Socialist Youth Union, Willy Wanka, met in London with the 
dominion governments, the Lord Mayor Sir Harry Twyford and Walter Layton. The 
Canadian government, in desperate need of skilled labor, agreed to accept several thousand 
Social Democrats as immigrants.37 
Although reluctant to accept any refugees, the British government was particularly 
hesitant to accept Jewish refugees, who did not fit the mold of refugees as individuals fleeing 
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persecution for political beliefs. As “racial” or “economic” refugees, Jewish refugees were 
perceived to face lower levels of threat than political opponents; furthermore, far fewer 
countries were willing to accept Jewish refugees.38 Canada sought to limit the number of 
Jewish refugees participating in the Jaksch-negotiated migration to Canada for Social 
Democrats; multiple South American countries explicitly prohibited Jewish immigration; and 
France specifically excluded Jewish refugees from receiving one of the limited visas it had 
allocated for Czechoslovak refugees.39 
The limited response of the international community to the refugee crisis in the 
Czechoslovak borderlands meant, in effect, that no government was willing to take on the 
project of accepting refugees in any sustained way, and certainly not for Jewish refugees. 
This motivated several private individuals and small voluntary organizations to action, first 
from the United Kingdom and later from the United States, who had representatives in 
Czecho-Slovakia. The nature of this rescue and assistance work required that these voluntary 
organizations maintained close ties with the government agencies related to immigration.  
 
Filling the Void: British Voluntary Workers in Prague 
The aftermath of the Munich Agreement caused a great deal of concern for some 
British citizens. While the British and French governments both contributed financial support 
to the Czecho-Slovak Republic, only British (and later American, which will be discussed in 
the following chapter) representatives came to Prague to respond to the situation on the 
ground. While these representatives arrived in Prague with contacts in the government, they 
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were themselves private citizens. Because of the limited governmental response, the task of 
assisting these refugees fell largely to an assortment of individuals with an interest in 
Czechoslovakia, who, after their arrival in Prague, met frequently at the British Embassy in 
Prague, coalesced into small network of voluntary workers. They held recurring meetings 
with one another, appealed to the same M.P.s in London for assistance procuring visa 
applications, and connected over their shared interest in assisting the refugees they 
considered to be most in danger of Nazi persecution. In British case, organized efforts at 
refugee relief followed individual presence on the ground.  
On October 5, the Lord Mayor of London Harry Twyford launched a public appeal 
for the newly established Lord Mayor’s Fund for Czechoslovak Refugees. Within twenty-
four hours, the Lord Mayor’s Fund had raised £20,000. Less than a week later, on October 
10, Twyford travelled to Prague to formally establish the fund. In a meeting with 
Czechoslovak government officials and voluntary organizations, Twyford appointed John 
Hope Simpson (formerly the vice president of the Greek Refugee Settlement Commission in 
the 1920s) to be the chairman of the Lord Mayor’s Fund and meet regularly with an advisory 
committee to coordinate the Fund’s work with Czechoslovak government and charitable 
organizations. The new Lord Mayor’s Fund committee included the Czechoslovak Minister 
of Social Welfare Petr Zenkl, Alice Masaryk (Czechoslovak Red Cross), Marie Schmolka 
(HICEM and the successor organization to the National Committee), Wenzel Jaksch 
(Sudeten German Social Democrat Party), and social welfare experts Dr. Hynek Pelč and 
Růžena Pelantová, among others. The work of the Lord Mayor’s Fund began slowly, as 
chairman John Hope Simpson was unable to come to Prague. Eventually, former Prague 
Ambassador James Ronald Macleay agreed to become the local representative of the Fund. 





To distribute funds to refugees living in camps and hostels, Macleay worked closely with the 
Czechoslovak voluntary organizations on the advisory committee, and later the Refugee 
Institute as well as the newly established British Committee for Refugees from 
Czechoslovakia, or BCRC.40 
The British Committee for Refugees from Czechoslovakia [BCRC] quickly became 
the primary international refugee organization in Prague. Funded in large part by the Lord 
Mayor’s Fund and two smaller left wing sources (the News Chronicle Fund, which 
eventually raised £44,500,41 and the National Labour Council’s International Solidarity 
Fund), the BCRC relied on the expertise and local connections of the few British 
humanitarian workers already based in Prague. The BCRC drew upon the contacts and 
knowledge of its patrons (Mary Omerod, the Honorary Secretary of the British Co-
Ordinating Committee, Lord Mayor Harry Twyford, and Margaret Layton) and its member 
organizations (the Society of Friends, the German-Jewish Aid Committee, Catholic 
Committee for Refugees from Germany, the National Labor Council, and others) to assist 
refugees who were not allowed residence in Czecho-Slovakia, but faced life-threatening 
persecution if they returned to Germany.42 Of particular importance was the experience of 
Quaker relief workers, who had financially supported German and Austrian refugees in 
Prague since 1936. Mary Penman, a Quaker relief worker and sister of the Labour MP Philip 
Noel-Baker, had arrived in Prague in the early fall of 1938 to provide relief and migration 
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assistance to Sudeten Social Democrats. Penman connected with other relief workers, but her 
efforts were slow to yield results.43  
When Doreen Warriner arrived in Prague on October 14, 1938, British voluntary 
work began in earnest. A staunch feminist and internationalist with an interest in 
Communism, Warriner worked as a lecturer in economics at University College London.44 
Outspoken about her left-wing political sympathies, she was not afraid to publicly criticize 
government policy.45 Warriner turned down a prestigious Rockefeller scholarship in order to 
go to Prague to do something to help the refugees.46 She had £150 from Save the Children 
International Union, £300 raised from colleagues and friends, and the intention of helping 
250 prominent Social Democrats leave the country.47 Warriner arrived with “a vague 
commission from the Save the Children Fund” to “organize soup kitchens, like those in 
Vienna after the war.”48  
On arrival, Warriner introduced herself to Mary Penman, and the two women began 
working together.49 Penman provided the contacts, while Warriner approached the refugee 
problem with energy and creativity. As a Labour Party member, Warriner formed a good 
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working partnership with William Gillies (the Labour Party’s Secretary for International 
Development) in London as well as with David Wills and David Grenfell MP, who were in 
Prague administering the Labour Party and News Chronicle funds for Czech relief. With little 
money and fewer instructions on how to proceed from the Save the Children Fund, Warriner 
instead began the work of organizing transports of Sudeten German Social Democrats to 
London because the international Labour movement, at the very least “had a rescue plan” and 
“was achieving something.”50 It is worth noting here that, at this early stage, all the British 
voluntary work in Czechoslovakia was being carried out by leftist organizations, which 
worked closely together on the ground. From her arrival until she left on April 24, 1939, 
Doreen Warriner was the BCRC’s sole official representative in Prague, at which point 
Beatrice Wellington, who held the post until August 1939, replaced her. The priority of the 
Prague workers was on supporting left-wing men, particularly those from the Sudeten area, 
as it was felt that they were in danger of imprisonment or deportation. The next priority were 
the wives and children of those men, and aiding people trapped in no-man’s land and refugee 
camps. 
Private donations constituted the most significant source of funding for migration 
assistance work in the 1930s. Indeed, the British firmly believed that public funds should not 
be used to support refugees. After some British M.P.’s requested that the Foreign Office 
increase the number of Czechoslovak refugees admitted, beyond the original 350 already 
promised, the Foreign Office responded with a resounding “no.” In a brief prepared to 
answer to these M.P.’s entreaties, the Foreign Office stated that  while H.M. Government 
was responding “sympathetically” to the situation, “it is the policy of H.M. Government that 
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public funds should not be appropriated for the relief and settlement of aliens, and that this 
aspect of the refugee problem is one for charitable organisations.” The report further noted 
that if the M.P.’s continued to challenge the Foreign Office’s position, officials should 
reference the recommendations made at the Evian Conference in July 1938, which the 
Foreign Office argued “said that countries of refugee and settlement should not pursue any 
responsibility for the financing of involuntary emigration.”51 
Thus, private individuals interested in migration assistance donated funds to 
voluntary organizations to distribute to Czechoslovak refugees in Prague. The Lord Mayor’s 
Appeal largely funded the BCRC, giving £80,000 to the BCRC from the public appeal during 
the winter of 1938/39. The BCRC received additional financial support from the News 
Chronicle newspaper (£30,500) and the National Labour Council's International Solidarity 
Fund (£4,500). Between October 1938 and March 1939 (when the BCRC exhausted its 
funds), the organization supported 3,500 refugees in leaving Czechoslovakia.52   
All the British refugee workers who arrived in the fall and winter of 1938/39 worked 
closely with the Refugee Institute. Beatrice Wellington received an official certification from 
the Ministry of Social Welfare certifying that as of January 5, 1939, she was “acting in close 
cooperation with the emigration division of the Refugee Institute.53 After being asked 
repeatedly to host an “informal meeting of those who came from different countries to help 
in solving the refugee problem,” the Refugee Institute finally agreed to host the meeting on 
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January 31 about “how to make the help for refugees more efficient through coordination of 
the different efforts.”54 Those invited included Alice Masaryk, H.W.H. Sams (the 
administrator of the Save the Children’s Fund and a representative of the Lord Mayor’s 
Fund), Doreen Warriner, E. Rosalind Lee, Tessa Rowntree, Beatrice Wellington, Mary 
Vojáčková, Jean Brant, Miss Roberts, and Mrs. Hindle. 
However, this close cooperation with the Refugee Institute did not prevent British 
voluntary workers from criticizing the assistance provided by the Czecho-Slovak 
government, especially in regard to the refugee camps. Warriner quickly connected with 
Czechoslovak voluntary workers, who provided contacts among the refugees. Indeed, 
Prague-based Jewish social workers Marie Schmolka and her colleague Hannah Steiner 
served as guides to the refugee camps and the refugee problem in Czechoslovakia to the 
British and American voluntary workers who came to Prague to assist the refugees. “The real 
nature of the refugee problem,” Warriner soon found out, was the desperate situation 
unfolding in the refugee camps. The conditions in the refugee camps were deplorable. In late 
November, H.W.H. Sams, a representative the International Save the Children’s Fund and of 
the Lord Mayor’s Fund, spent a long day visiting the refugee camps outside of Prague.55 
Sams tour of the camps allowed the Lord Mayor’s Fund to accurately count the number of 
individuals in the refugee camps, compile lists of items needed by the camp occupants, and 
to assess the conditions of each camp. The social worker who accompanied Sams on the tour 
of the camps commented about the conditions in two camps in Světlá nad Sázavou, one in 
the Chateau Salm and the other in the town’s cultural center. Those refugees staying in the 
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chateau accused the city officials of not caring appropriate for them. Specifically, they 
pointed to the strictly controlled menu and the unheated castle, which caused illness to run 
rampant in the refugee “colony.” Those staying in the culture house were forced to vacate the 
building every Sunday afternoon for the weekly dances held in the hall. The refugees then 
spent the entire afternoon waiting along the roadside and returned in the evening to a “smoky 
and unventilated room which had filled all afternoon with dust and cigarette smoke.” While 
the refugees in the chateau feared the cold that would permeate the castle in the winter, those 
in the culture housed worried that they would be forced to spend longer and more frequent 
hours waiting outside as the local townspeople used their “camp” for indoor entertainment.56  
After visiting the refugee camps, Doreen Warriner criticized the Czecho-Slovak’s 
treatment of non-Czech refugees, and the British resistance to accepting refugees. Warriner 
was particularly critical of the assistance provided by the Refugee Institute in the refugee 
camps. In a letter to the editors of The Manchester Guardian and the Daily Telegraph in 
December 1938, Warriner lambasted the Czecho-Slovak’s care of German-speaking 
Czechoslovak refugees from the Sudetenland, which she characterized as being “the worst” 
treatment of any refugee group.57 Warriner commented on the overcrowding in the refugee 
camps, attributing this to the Refugee Institute’s mismanagement of the British Loan funds 
and procrastination on behalf of the Lord Mayor's Fund.  Warriner chastised the British 
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public for sending the destitute refugees bars of chocolate and cigarettes, when they 
desperately needed “visas, not chocolate.”58  
News of Warriner's letter reached the Czecho-Slovak press almost a week later. 
Published under the title “Chocolate instead of Saving Lives” in the Prager Tagblatt on 
December 15 and in Denní noviny the following day as “Chocolate does not dispel misery,” 
the response to Warriner's article in the Bohemian Lands focused on the living conditions of 
the four thousand Sudeten German Social Democrats.59 Warriner further accused the 
managers of the refugee camps for underfeeding the refugees and placing them in 
overcrowded camps where Czechoslovak officials treated them poorly. In its response to 
Warriner’s article, the Refugee Institute asserted that the reason German-speaking refugees 
felt tha the Czecho-Slovak government was mistreating them was simply because these 
refugees were not Czech enough to feel comfortable living in Czechoslovakia. Furthermore, 
German-speaking refugees and was further exacerbated by their lack of Czech friends or 
relatives. The fact that these German-speaking, often Jewish, and often Social Democrat 
refugees lived in refugee camps further demonstrated that these individuals could not be 
Czechoslovak and therefore could not remain in Czecho-Slovakia.60 
Czechoslovak government officials had long felt that the British voluntary 
organizations prioritized the needs of “non-Czech” refugees, and leaving Czecho-Slovakia to 
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care for Czech and Slovak refugees without the benefit of foreign assistance.61 The Refugee 
Institute did not respond immediately, waiting instead until December 21 to release a 
statement to the press. The Refugee Institute criticized the Czecho-Slovak press and Warriner 
for characterizing the “care of German social democrats from the occupied territories as 
being worse than the majority of other refugees, when (in fact) these refugees were cared in 
the same manner as refugees of Czech nationality (and on top of that, they receive various 
improvements, which are offered to them by the former poslanci (parliamentary 
representatives) of the German Social Democratic Workers’ Party from private donations.” 
The Refugee Institute further defended the refugee camps, by arguing that the “concentration 
of refugees of German nationality in collective housing it was (in fact) easier and faster to 
deliver care packages to these refugees than others, who were divided amongst private 
households and family members.” The overcrowding of the camps was not due to 
mismanagement of funds, but instead, could be attributed to “the hasty evacuation after the 
Munich Agreement and uncertainty about the extent of the occupation.”62 
The Refugee Institute sought to mitigate the potential damage the Warriner’s letter 
could cause by defending not only their own actions, but the management of British funds. 
Dr. František Schönborn, in a letter to the Daily Telegraph, argued against most of 
Warriner’s claims based on his own visits to refugee camps. In addition to refuting 
Warriner’s assertions that “the state of German refugees is hopeless, that officials treat them 
badly, that they are seriously underfed, that they are established in shockingly overcrowded 
camps, that the Lord Mayor's Fund is handled in a most incompetent manner and that, 
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similarly, the granting of British visa is mismanaged.” Instead, Schönborn praised “the 
Czecho-Slovak Govt., the Lord Mayor and various Czecho-Slovak organizations” for 
providing more food to refugees than Czecho-Slovak soldiers were given and for working to 
efficiently empty the camp of refugees. Schönborn took issue with Warriner's criticism of Sir 
Ronald Macleay, who administered the Lord Mayor's Fund. Schönborn stated that “it was 
only a short while ago, when, at the meeting of the central committee of voluntary 
organizations it was unanimously stated, that while of course the financial assistance of the 
Lord Mayors fund was of greatest importance, the personal aid of Sir Ronald was at least just 
as much appreciated.”63 
The refugee crisis in the Bohemian Lands motivated several British citizens from left-
leaning political circles to action. Supported by publicly raised funds, these voluntary 
workers focused their efforts improving the living conditions in refugee camps and 
uncovering migration opportunities for politically active men in danger of being expelled 
back to German-occupied territory. Although the Prague voluntary workers were loosely 
connected by their previous interest in refugee issues, by December 1938, there were 
significant connections between the British voluntary workers, the Czechoslovak 
government, and Czechoslovak voluntary workers. While the funds, like the BCRC and the 
Lord Mayor’s Fund, were administered by men with diplomatic experience, British women 
served as the public face of the voluntary organizations. They visited refugee camps, worked 
directly with refugees, and met frequently with Czechoslovak voluntary workers. 
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The Children’s Transports 
The efforts of the BCRC brought attention to the plight of refugee children, which 
would begin a series of events that would eventually lead Winton to Prague. British 
newspapers often contained descriptions of the deplorable conditions of the refugee camps, 
especially for children. Then, on November 9-10, the Kristallnacht pogrom convinced British 
Jewish leaders to press for greater action on behalf of German and Austrian children. On 
November 21, 1938, the British government announced that it would allow ten thousand 
unaccompanied children temporary refuge. Quota limits did not apply to unaccompanied 
children and therefore official quotas did not apply to the number of unaccompanied child 
refugees.64  
In response to this, Margaret Layton, the secretary of the BCRC, began 
correspondence with the Inter-Aid Committee and the Movement for the Care of Children 
from Germany and Austria [two organizations that would merge to become the Refugee 
Children’s Movement, or RCM]. Layton had become interested in the RCM’s plans for 
organized mass immigration of unaccompanied children from Germany and Austria to 
Britain, and she wrote to Warriner in Prague suggesting a similar plan.65 Warriner was 
positive about the idea and, given her own massive workload, delegated the fledgling scheme 
to Martin Blake.66 Blake, who had visited the refugee camps with Marie Schmolka and 
Hannah Steiner, telegrammed a friend to ask for his assistance. 
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In December 1938, a young British stockbroker named Nicholas Winton received an 
urgent telegram from a friend in Prague. Winton abruptly changed his holiday plans and went 
instead to the capital of Czechoslovakia. The telegram read, “600 children in Prague and 
elsewhere in Czechoslovakia urgently require migration to England. 300 originally from 
Germany and Austria, 300 Sudetens and No Mans Land. Please stress seriousness of position 
to Council for German Jewry. Real danger expulsion necessitates equal treatment with 
German and Austrian Children.”67  Two representatives of the Jewish community in Prague, 
Maria Schmolka and Hannah Steiner, as well as by Winton’s left-leaning friend, Martin 
Blake, signed the telegram.  
Blake and Winton proved to be passionate and dynamic additions to the team. Winton 
and Blake’s quick assumption of leadership over the task impressed Doreen Warriner, who 
wrote to Margaret Layton, “Winton is doing really splendid work for the children, and I have 
asked his employer to let him stay for another two weeks.” She also wrote on December 28, 
“Blake has taken over the completion of the lists [of children] and will inform you.”68 
Winton and Blake set up the official children’s section as an official subsidiary section fully 
financed by the BCRC. Under the auspices of the BCRC, Winton (and later, Trevor 
Chadwick, the Prague coordinator of the transports) took ownership of the project to 
evacuate children, in the same way that other relief workers had responsibility for specific 
                                                 
67 Telegram from Maria Schmolka, Hannah Steiner, and Martin Blake, 22 December 1938, Nicholas Winton’s 
Scrapbook, Yad Vashem Archive (hereafter YVA), O.7.cz/118, pg 10. 
 
68 Doreen Warriner to Margaret Layton, January 12, 1939, and December 28, 1938, NA Kew, BCRC Files, HO 
296/53 and 294/53. 
 





schemes or lists, but he was always acting under the auspices and with the funding of the 
BCRC.69 
Winton spent three weeks and Prague before he returned to his job on the London 
Stock Exchange. He departed for Britain with a list of names of children compiled by the five 
Czechoslovak refugee Committees (HICEM, the Democratic Refugee Relief Committee 
(DRRC), the Social Democratic Relief Committee, the Communist Central Association to 
Aid Refugees, the Union of White Collar Employees, and Šalda Committee for Intellectuals). 
Following the BCRC’s lead, Winton intended to prioritize the children of Social Democrats – 
the children of the men the BCRC considered most in danger. Although Winton had agreed 
to find foster homes, guarantees, and permits for the children to come to Great Britain, the 
operation still required a Prague administrator. While in Prague, Winton had met with Trevor 
Chadwick, a British schoolmaster who had gone to the Bohemian Lands to select two refugee 
children to attend his school. When Winton returned to England, Chadwick offered his 
services as the Prague coordinator of the children’s transports, if Winton could get the 
necessary permits.70 Chadwick stayed in Prague between February and June 1939, when he 
left rather rapidly, with the implication the Gestapo were interested in him for forging travel 
documents.71 
By early February 1939, those in Prague responsible for the transportation of children 
had determined some protocols for selecting the Jewish children. The children were divided 
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into two groups: Jewish refugee children from Germany and Austria would register with the 
Šalda Refugee Committee and Jewish refugee children from the Sudetenland with another 
committee.  Per the notes of other voluntary workers, all children under the age of sixteen 
should be referred to Trevor Chadwick, at Rubešova 17, the BCRC’s Prague office. 72 
Meanwhile, children between the ages of sixteen and eighteen were to be referred to Beatrice 
Wellington, who was working out of the offices of the Refugee Institute.73  
To be considered for a transport, the children were required to submit their names, 
birthdates, last residence, nationality, a certificate of health, three passport photographs, the 
relevant information about the parents as well as an attestation from their parents that they 
had no objection to sending their child to England on a Kindertransport. For those in Prague, 
the parents could do this in person, while children in other cities with large Jewish 
communities (Brno, Ostrava, Prostějov, Bratislava, Plzeň, Jihlava, and Olomouc) could 
register with their local Jewish Religious Community, which would pass along their 
information to the refugee committees in Prague. Children who did not live in either of these 
areas could apply by mail. As far as the major Jewish organizations were concerned at the 
time, the most important individuals for organizing the Kindertransports were Doreen 
Warriner, Rev. E. Rosalind Lee, Tessa Rowntree, and Beatrice Wellington.74 
In London, Nicholas Winton’s mother played a crucial role in the arrangement of the 
logistics on the British side. While Winton himself was busy negotiating with the British 
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Home and Foreign Offices, placing specific children on specific transports, and arranging the 
arrival of each of the transports, his mother met with the individual sponsors. Mrs. Winton 
found guarantors, met with them, answered any of their questions, and ensured that all the 
necessary paperwork had been completed before passing the documents off to her son for the 
final approval.75 
The Prague representatives of the BCRC sensed the urgency of the refugee situation 
and pressed for large-scale evacuations to begin immediately. The danger faced by those they 
were trying to help was clear to the BCRC, as a January 1939 letter from the Independent 
MP, humanitarian campaigner and advisor to the BCRC Eleanor Rathbone shows. Rathbone, 
who was in Prague as part of a British government delegation wrote, “I have just returned 
from a six-day visit to Prague. The situation is extremely menacing.”76 Rathbone, whose 
work for refugees during this period was influential, recommended immediate evacuation of 
politically endangered men.77  
At noon on March 14, 1939, the twenty Y.W.C.A. children left Prague on a KLM 
plane bound for England – the first of the 669 unaccompanied children to leave the 
Bohemian Lands.78 Trevor Chadwick escorted the first transport. Parents reassured their 
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children that they would soon join them and gave them “wrapped treasures, a photograph, a 
ring, a watch, and made last minute treasures.” Martha Sharp, an American voluntary worker 
who helped see the first transport off, offered to take final pictures of the children with their 
parents. As the children walked onto the airfield, they “waved to [their] parents, ran across 
the snow covered field, waved again and climbed aboard the plane. The parents’ self control 
was marvelous. Smiling brightly, eyes brimming with tears, they waved back. Chadwick was 
the last to board. Then, the door of the plane was shut with a sound of finality which rocked 
the little group. Suddenly we were all one large and bereft family.”79 
The rest of the children would be sent to Britain between 19 April 1939 and 2 August 
1939 on trains. The scenes on the railway platforms were just as full of emotion as the ones 
on the airfield on March 14. A total of seven groups of children left Prague on trains in 
groups of between 36 and 241, escorted by adult volunteers, who were mostly the British 
volunteers already working in Prague (these were preferred as it was felt a British passport 
holder provided some security when passing through hostile border controls).80  
 
Flight from the Protectorate: Selecting the Children 
Not until after the Nazi occupation of the Bohemian Lands on March 15, did the 
priorities of BCRC Children’s Section shift from German-speaking children to Jewish 
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children. One week after the occupation of the Bohemian Lands, the various refugee 
organizations each sent a representative to form a group comprised of all the various foreign 
relief groups. The Sharps attended this meeting, as did Trevor Chadwick as the representative 
of the Save the Children Fund (of which Doreen Warriner was also a representative), while 
Doreen Warriner went on behalf of the BCRC.81 Under the guise of a social gathering, the 
various committees met regularly without the oversight of either the Czech or Nazi 
government officials in order to prevent arousing the interest of the Nazi officials, who likely 
would have tried to send a representative to the meeting.82 Although no voluntary worker 
present at the meeting kept notes, the voluntary workers certainly discussed the coordination 
of illegal flight attempts of political refugees. The lack of a record was the standard 
procedure for voluntary workers in the early days of the Protectorate, lest sensitive 
information about refugees from falling into Nazi hands. 
Although the Lord Mayor’s Fund and the News Chronicle Fund had both largely 
completed their operations by March 1939, the British Quakers and Unitarians as well as the 
British Committee for Refugees from Czecho-Slovakia and the Children’s Section were all 
still in operation. Per the notes of the American voluntary workers, Warriner and Chadwick 
jointly ran the “Save the Children” operation. In addition to the British groups, the Barbican 
Mission (run by Scotch Presbyterians), Nansen Relief, the League of Nations, and an 
organization offering relief to Russian refuges.83 
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The situation in Prague became even more fraught and dangerous after the Nazi 
invasion. The voluntary workers in Prague associated with the BCRC began to work with 
increasing urgency. Doreen Warriner and Beatrice Wellington were both questioned by the 
Gestapo, and Warriner had to return to Britain in April 1939 after R.J. Stopford informed her 
that he had seen a card in her name signed by the Consul in Katowice, implying she was next 
in line to be arrested by the Gestapo.84 Beatrice Wellington, who was originally an 
independent Canadian aid worker working with Sudeten Social Democrats but had become 
officially associated with first the Quakers and then the BCRC, organized her relief work 
strictly in priority order of the Gestapo lists she had managed to obtain.85 Wellington became 
the BCRC’s sole official representative in Prague when Doreen Warriner returned to London 
in April 1939.86  The stress suffered by Wellington was clearly immense: she faced a huge 
workload and was additionally questioned several times by the Gestapo.87 Colleagues noted 
that Wellington became increasingly strained by her efforts to assist refugees with the BCRC. 
“We work with Beatrice Wellington,” one American refugee worker noted in May 1939, 
“whenever her nearly-deranged nerves allow her to. But she is pretty nearly a case herself.”88 
Whether their work could continue became increasingly uncertain. One voluntary remarked 
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on this, commenting “B.W. [Beatrice Wellington] is still here – not going to Amsterdam as I 
thought – but says we are all washed up. I must see her to see the extent.”89 
As the threat level changed for voluntary workers, their priorities shifted. The process 
by which the lists of children to be evacuated were compiled is significant, as it indicates the 
level of co-operation between the voluntary agencies on the ground in Prague. The five small 
Czech refugee committees, which been working together and with the Czechoslovak 
government to assist German refugees since 1935, and had compiled lists of refugees in 
desperate need of migration assistance recommended most of the children placed on the 
British children’s transports. At least 250 of these children were German and Austrian 
refugees who were based in and around Prague, and whose names were submitted to Winton 
by Jewish social worker Marie Schmolka, as part of her work with the Kindercomité.90 The 
“Save the Children” representative in Prague drew up a list of approximately 20 Sudeten 
children who had previously been supported by the organization and passed it to Doreen 
Warriner. The “Wallner” list comprised about 50 names of Jewish children from no-man’s 
land that were to be financially supported and cared for in England by the East London 
Mission to the Jews.91 Blake and Winton’s first list of 500 priority refugee children living 
precariously in the Second Czecho-Slovak Republic was thus created on the recommendation 
of the Czech committees. It was the list taken by the men when they returned to London in 
late January 1939 to begin organizing transports and accommodation for the children, twenty 
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of whom were being housed temporarily in the Y.W.C.A. in Prague (a hospitality scheme 
organized by Warriner) until they could be evacuated.92    
Meanwhile, workers in Prague continued to draw up lists of children to add to the 
original 500. Fifty-two of the children who came to England were in fact Unitarians – 
brought to England through the efforts of the American representative, Martha Sharp, who 
maintained close ties with the Unitarian congregations in Prague and Britain, and who 
referred cases she was working with to Chadwick.93 Reverend Rosalind Lee and the 
Unitarians in England were able to find foster homes for the children that the Sharp 
recommended.94 In the end, the 669 children who arrived in Britain were not all part of the 
original list of five hundred. 
The number of children threatened by Nazi persecution rose dramatically after March 
15, and relief workers in Prague faced the pressure of making decisions on which children to 
support. Czechoslovaks who applied for a place on a transport after the Nazi occupation of 
the Bohemian Lands often relied on other organizations, and on Trevor Chadwick, to become 
one of the 669 unaccompanied children who reached Britain. In the Sharps’ estimation, 
Trevor Chadwick was the most knowledgeable individual about the organization of 
children’s transports. At the end of April, Waitstill Sharp wrote that Chadwick’s opinion on 
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the matter of children’s transports was “the very best we could obtain from any authority in 
Bohemia and Moravia.”95  
Indeed, Chadwick was largely responsible for the shift in the focus of the 
Kinderaction away from Sudeten refugees to any child of non-Aryan background.  By April 
1939, it was clear to Chadwick that it was Jewishness that posed the greatest problem for 
children in the Bohemian Lands. If any children were to leave the Bohemian Lands, those of 
“non-Aryan race” should be considered first.96 Accordingly, Trevor Chadwick worked 
closely with the BCRC and with František/Fritz (Ully) Ullmann a prominent Czechoslovak 
Zionist (and later the JRC Prague after it was reformed in the summer of 1939). Ullmann had 
cooperated with the BCRC in the past. In January 1939, Ullmann went to London with Leo 
Hermann (of Keren Hayesod, the Palestine Foundation Fund) to lobby for the British Loan to 
include a provision for Jewish refugees to immigrate to Palestine.97 While there, Ullmann 
had attempted to secure temporary residence permits for Czechoslovak Jewish children as 
domestic servants, but the effort proceeded slowly. Upon returning to the Bohemian Lands, 
Ullmann took “charge of the Children’s Emigration for the Jewish organizations of Bohemia 
and Moravia.” Ullmann not only worked with Chadwick, but also with the Palestine Office to 
ensure that 1,100 children left the Bohemian Lands for England and Palestine on Youth 
Aliyah transports between March and July 1939. With his prominent position in the Jewish 
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community, the Nazis allowed him limited permission to travel, particularly to events like the 
1939 Zionist Congress to try to persuade representatives of various countries to take on 
greater numbers of Jews (specifically children). Ullmann remained in Geneva throughout the 
war, serving as a point of contact between the Protectorate and the rest of the world.98 
The shift away from Winton’s original list, comprised mostly of refugees from the 
Sudetenland, to assisting primarily Jewish children, then, can be attributed to the work of 
Chadwick and Ullmann. After the British voluntary workers left Prague in July 1939, 
Ullmann was the sole coordinator of the children’s transports. He oversaw the departure of 
the August 2 transport, which brought sixty-eight children to Great Britain. Ullmann also 
“responsible for a great share of [the] work” for the largest transport, scheduled to leave with 
several hundred children on September 1, 1939.99 Sadly, this transport never left. With the 
outbreak of war on September 1, the Protectorate borders closed for legal migration. 
 
Conclusion 
Once in Britain, the children were dispersed into the care of family or friends, private 
foster homes, refugee hostels run by the Czech Refugee Trust Fund, or Zionist training farms 
run by Youth Aliyah. As they grew into adulthood, the Kinder scattered across the country 
and, after the war’s end, across the globe. Approximately 60 percent of the Kinder lost at 
least one of their parents in the Holocaust.100 Once the war had begun, Winton had almost no 
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contact or interaction with the children from Czechoslovakia. The only exception was a letter 
he wrote to the Czechoslovak Foreign Minister in Exile, Jan Masaryk, stating that he 
believed that his work as the Honourary Secretary of the Children’s Section of the BCRC 
was not complete until he ‘[saw] these children back ‘at home’ once more’ after the war.101 
Neither Winton nor the other Prague refugee workers ever spoke much about their efforts to 
bring children from the Bohemian Lands to Britain. The majority of the Prague refugee 
workers, including Warriner and Chadwick, died in the 1970s and 1980s. For their part, the 
now grown-up children also rarely discussed their refugee pasts – anxious, as many of them 
were to move on with their lives, join the work force, and start families.  
British voluntary organizations came to Prague in the absence of a firm government 
commitment to assist the Czecho-Slovak refugees, firmly believing that Great Britain had a 
moral obligation to assist the country that had been sacrificed to maintain peace in Europe. 
To assist the refugees they considered most in need to leave the Bohemian Lands– 
particularly Sudeten German Social Democrats – British voluntary workers formed close 
connections with one another, with Czechoslovak voluntary workers, and with the Refugee 
Institute. As efforts to assist refugee children from Germany and Austria got underway after 
Kristallnacht, British voluntary workers were determined to provide a similar service to 
refugee children in the Bohemian Lands. At first, this effort focused on the children of 
political refugees; but with the Nazi occupation of the Bohemian Lands, the focus shifted to 
Jewish children. This effort was collaborative, responding to the changing political 
circumstances of the Bohemian Lands. 
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CHAPTER 4: THE AMERICAN COMMISSION FOR SERVICE IN 
CZECHOSLOVAKIA: AMERICAN EFFORTS TO ASSIST MIGRANTS FROM 
THE BOHEMIAN LANDS 
 
"Why Czechoslovakia? That is a fair question, but the answer involves a good deal of 
explanation, and some history." - Robert Cloutman Dexter1 
Introduction 
While the Czechoslovak government scrambled to cope with the massive numbers of 
refugees flooding into the country, news of the refugee crisis spread internationally. Whereas 
the previous chapter discussed the British individuals and organizations involved in 
organizing migration after the Munich Agreement, this chapter describes American responses 
to the refugee crisis in the Bohemian Lands. The American workers in Prague help close the 
circle on the network, demonstrating the interconnectedness of Czechoslovak, British, and 
American efforts. Thus, these organizations give insight into what kinds of escape was 
possible at various points in the war.  
When the American Commissioners of the newly formed Unitarian-Quaker 
Committee for Service in Czechoslovakia left for Prague on February 4, 1939, they were 
given firm instructions to investigate the needs of the refugee population and to “favor 
projects of constructive re-training, education, and re-settlement as soon as the most urgent 
needs of food and housing have probably been met already from other sources.” 
Furthermore, they were expected to work in close cooperation with “other relief and 
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coordinating bodies operating in Czecho-Slovakia” and to not get involved in the “field [of] 
disbursing monies to individual applicants” for migration or other purposes.2 Soon after the 
newly appointed commissioners arrived in Prague, however, the Nazis occupied the 
remainder of the Bohemian Lands, and the needs of the refugee population changed. To meet 
those needs, the American Commissioners acted against the instructions given to them by the 
Committee for Service in Czechoslovakia, and focused their attention on migration 
assistance.  
This chapter asks the following questions: What led American organizations to come 
to Prague? How did these organizations become established and make the necessary 
connections to create a network of escape? What was the result of their efforts? I will focus 
primarily on the relief provided by voluntary organizations from the United States, especially 
on the effort of the American Committee for Service in Czechoslovakia, led by the American 
Unitarian Association with support from the American Friends Service Committee (AFSC). 
In November 1938, the AUA and the AFSC sent representatives to the Bohemian Lands to 
assess the refugee situation, and by February 1939 had sent two commissioners to Prague to 
serve as the only American voluntary organizations in the Bohemian Lands.  
I will first give an overview of American organizations and individuals interested in 
the refugee crisis in Prague, their motivations for going to Prague, and the kinds of work with 
which they were involved. Then, I will turn to the actual organization of rescue and the kinds 
of social, economic, and political connections these groups forged to overcome the barriers to 
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emigration. Finally, I will turn to the ways in which these connections persisted even after 
most of the international refugee workers left the Bohemian Lands in July and August 1939. 
 
“Why Czechoslovakia?:” Americans Consider the Refugee Crisis  
In the aftermath of the Munich Agreement, the Prague American Consulate General’s 
primary concern was the economic devastation wrought by the Munich Agreement, including 
the loss of railways, the lost industries, and the rising numbers of unemployed who had to 
flee the Sudetenland. Meanwhile, a rumor circulated that it was possible for demobilized 
Czechoslovak soldiers to register for the US Army and thereby secure a visa to come to the 
United States. In the months following the Munich Agreement, hundreds of young Czech 
men wrote to the US Consulate in Prague. Hugo Kann of Uherské Hradiště was one such 
letter writer. Kann wrote on December 30, 1938 that he was “single, healthy, abstinent [from 
alcohol], morally impeccable, and had never been politically active.” The American Consul 
Kennett Potter responded the following day to notify Kann that “the U.S. does not maintain 
recruiting stations in Europe and only US citizens were eligible to join the United States 
Army.”3 Kann, as well as the letter writers like him, were told that they “could only apply for 
entry into the U.S. army after arriving in the United States.”4 
Despite the hundreds of requests like Kann’s, the U.S. government’s response was 
muted. The public response to the plight of refugees was somewhat greater, though few were 
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moved to action. In the early days of the Nazi occupation, The New York Times printed 
multiple reports per day about the numbers of refugees fleeing the border region. Under the 
headline “International Help Needed,” the newspaper appealed for help on October 2 for the 
5,000 Jews who had fled Teplice-Šanov, “Something must be done about it. We call on 
international action for these unfortunate people.”5 However, the United States government 
remained firmly in the grasp of isolationist sentiments. Few were eager to become involved 
in European affairs, especially with the threat of war looming ever larger. While many felt 
that Britain and France, who had signed the Munich Agreement, should accept the burden of 
refugees from Czecho-Slovakia as a sort of repayment for Czechoslovakia's sacrifice, very 
few considered raising immigration quotas in the United States.6 Upon arriving in the 
London, one of the American Commissions of the Committee for Service in Czechoslovakia 
remarked, “the Lord Mayor’s Fund had been so enthusiastically oversubscribed that it alone 
had collected more money for Czech relief than all our U.S. efforts combined. Average 
English citizens seemed to be more aware and more emotionally involved in Czechoslovakia 
than their counterparts in America.”7 
In contrast to British voluntary organizations in Prague, which did have some support 
from the British government, American relief was almost entirely privately funded. In late 
October 1938, Nicholas Murray Butler, the President of Columbia University and President 
                                                 
5 Emil Vadnay, "Sudeten Germans Join Czech Flight," The New York Times, 2 October 1938: 43. 
 
6 See: Letters to the Editor, "Opinions on the Munich Agreement: Feeling of Relief That Peace Has Been 
Preserved Tempered by Sympathy for Czechoslovakia," The New York Times, 2 October 1938: 82. 
 
7 Martha Cogan Sharp Memoir, USHMM, RG-67.017, Martha and Waitstill Sharp Collection, Series 4, Box 30, 
Folder 2, 25-26. 
 





of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace8, announced the establishment of the 
American Committee for Relief in Czechoslovakia, of which he was the chairman. The 
“Butler Committee,” as it was often called, quickly launched a fundraising campaign to 
respond to “an immediate need to supply food and shelter, clothes and shoes to homeless 
people, to aid in health and sanitary measures, and a longer need for progressive relief in a 
period of re-education, re-employment and resettlement.”9 Furthermore, the Butler 
Committee promised not to spend the money raised on any kinds of administrative costs. All 
funds would be spent directly on relief to refugees.10 Rather than sending American 
representatives to Prague, the Butler Committee sent money to Alice Masaryk, the head of 
the Czechoslovak Red Cross, until her resignation in December 1938. 
While the Butler Committee proposed to send money for relief directly to 
Czechoslovakia, the American Unitarian Association considered sending Americans to 
administer relief. Having never attempted an overseas relief and rescue operation, the 
Unitarians proceeded cautiously. First, they contacted another organization that had 
considerable experience in administering relief abroad, the American Friends (Quakers) 
Service Committee. Next, the Unitarians and the Friends sent two committee members to 
Prague to assess the situation on the ground. Based on the report on Czecho-Slovakia, the 
group agreed to send representatives to Prague to administer a relief and rescue program. 
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Why would American Unitarians have any interest in a small country in the heart of 
central Europe? Robert Dexter, who led the effort to create an Unitarian relief committee in 
Czecho-Slovakia, argued that Unitarians should be compelled to respond to be refugee crisis 
because Czechoslovakia had a liberal Protestant tradition with strong connections to the 
United States. First, Charlotte Garrigue Masaryk—wife of the first Czechoslovak President 
Tomáš Garrigue Masaryk—was an American Unitarian. Second, Dexter pointed to the 
religious ties between Unitarians and the liberal Protestants in the Bohemian Lands, 
particularly the small Czechoslovak Unitaria congregation and the Czechoslovak Hussite 
Church.11 
In the interwar period, the Unitarian Church in Czechoslovakia was founded and 
grew into a sizeable congregation with the financial support of the American Unitarian 
Association. The church’s leader, Rev. Norbert Čapek, had spent several years in the United 
States during World War I and maintained close connections with the American Unitarian 
Association (AUA) when he returned to Czechoslovakia.12 Indeed, the AUA invested a great 
deal of money in Čapek’s new church.13 In 1937, the Czechoslovak Unitarians and the 
Czechoslovak Hussite Church organized for Robert Dexter (then the AUA’s director of 
social relations) to visit their growing congregations.14 Dexter travelled throughout the 
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country, becoming “very fond of the Czechoslovak people.”15 In fact, he was so enamored 
with the country, that he returned the following August with his wife, historian Elizabeth 
Anthony Dexter. The couple took great “delight in the country and appreciation of [the] 
hospitable welcome” they had received during their two-week trip, but those feelings were 
tempered by “the anguish of fear” of the increasing tension in the borderlands.16 
Shortly after the Dexters returned to the United States, Hitler, Mussolini, 
Chamberlain, and Daladier signed the Munich Agreement that would cede the Sudetenland to 
Nazi Germany. The connection between the Unitarian congregations in the United States and 
Czechoslovakia proved to be essential in shaping the nature of American humanitarian 
activity for refugees during World War II. Because of this connection, Robert Dexter was 
aware of the growing refugee crisis in the Bohemian Lands following the Munich 
Agreement. Furthermore, Dexter commented, “I knew that refugees from the Sudetenland 
would press into the rest of the country and that there would be much suffering, and the idea 
came to me that we Unitarians had a special obligation to help.”17 
With the occupation of the Sudetenland, news about the growing refugee crisis in the 
Bohemian Lands spread quickly in the United States. Major American newspapers published 
detailed descriptions of the plight of the refugees fleeing the region. Collier’s correspondent 
Martha Gellhorn described the flight from the Sudetenland in her article “Obituary of a 
Democracy,” writing: 
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In the north you got a feeling that the whole country was moving, lost, fleeing. On the 
road you passed a peasant’s cart with a blue enamel pail hanging from it, with a 
funeral wreath of dead flowers sitting up on top of mattresses. Four people walked 
beside it—an old man and an old woman and a younger couple. The women were 
eating dry bread: they had two slices apiece in their pocketbooks. They did not speak 
to each other and they walked with great weariness. They had been walking since 
before dawn and now it was late afternoon; they wanted to go as far from the frontier 
as they could before they stopped.18 
Even after covering the Spanish Civil War for two years, Gellhorn’s time in the Bohemian 
Lands left such an impression that she wrote her first full-length novel on the Sudetenland 
refugee crisis.19 In a letter to her editor, Gellhorn commented, “. . . I am writing you a picture 
of a destroyed state…practically naming the refugees who are homeless and desperate 
danger. It is the grimmest and most complicated story I ever saw…”20 
While Gellhorn was writing “Obituary of a Democracy,” the Executive Committee of 
the AUA met on October 5 to discuss the preservation of Czechoslovak democracy. Robert 
Dexter began the meeting with a description of the efforts of the American Friends Service 
Committee in Austria.  Although Dexter described the situation there as “difficult” and 
“desperate,” he praised the AFSC’s work to assist refugees. Dexter quickly turned to a “more 
extensive and wilder” topic: the refugee crisis created by the Nazi occupation of the 
Sudetenland. Dexter proposed a “wilder gamble” than had previously been undertaken by 
any other American organization assisting refugees. He estimated that some 500,000 anti-
Nazi Germans, Czechs, and Jews needed to leave the Sudetenland for Czechoslovakia, which 
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was “obviously inadequately equipped to deal with the sudden flood of refugees.”21 To 
convince the Executive Board that the AUA was compelled to act, Dexter pointed to the 
strength of the organizational connections between the AUA and  the church groups in 
Czechoslovakia, the fact that the AUA was a larger group than the American Friends 
(Quakers), and that the Unitarians were “at least as wealthy as the Quakers” who had 
“pioneered in this field of dealing with people in distress.” Dexter proposed that the 
Unitarians “organize, establish, and raise sufficient funds inside and outside our own group 
to really do a creditable piece of work in dealing with these refugees.” Dexter assured the 
Board of Directors that he had access to contacts who could report on the exact nature of the 
refugee situation and proposed to work in cooperation with the AFSC for the Unitarians’ first 
overseas relief effort. The Board voted to appoint a three-member committee to “explore the 
possibilities of a joint Unitarian-Quaker enterprise for relief of refugees in Czechoslovakia.22 
On October 21, the three-member committee convened to lay out its 
recommendations for the Unitarian Board of Directors. The Board of Directors approved a 
relief mission under two conditions: first, that the American Unitarian Association formally 
invite the American Friends Service Committee to participate in a joint refugee relief project 
in Czecho-Slovakia; and second, that a Unitarian Service Unit be established in 
Czechoslovakia as quickly as possible, with the goals of promoting Unitarianism, 
maintaining contact with Czechoslovakia, and assisting Czecho-Slovakia “in making 
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adjustments to the new order in their land.”23 For this, the Committee proposed fund-raising 
to send a representative to assess the needs in Czecho-Slovakia and begin implementing 
relief strategies. 
For their part, the American Friends felt that they were already overstretched in their 
European endeavors. Still, the AFSC had worked on several domestic projects with the 
Unitarians, and were willing to provide advice and support the Unitarian efforts in Czecho-
Slovakia. The AFSC agreed to participate in an exploratory committee to assess the situation 
in Czecho-Slovakia and serve an advisory role. Dexter reached out to the chairman of the 
AFSC, Clarence Pickett. Pickett supported the Unitarians' decision to first assess the situation 
in Czechoslovakia (this had been the modus operandi of the AFSC and the Unitarians had 
explicitly modeled their proposed commission on the AFSC relief work). Pickett 
recommended that Dexter, who had been chosen to go to Czecho-Slovakia, meet up with an 
AFSC representative when he landed in London, and the two men could then travel from 
Britain to Czechoslovakia together.24 
After accepting the appointment to return to Czechoslovakia, Dexter began preparing 
to leave for Europe. His priority was to establish connections within the American 
government to provide the operation legitimacy. In the United States, Dexter met with the 
Czecho-Slovak consul and the U.S. State Department, ultimately receiving a letter of 
introduction from Secretary of State Cordell Hull. Additionally, Dexter arranged a meeting 
with a representative of the Butler Commission, Malcolm Davis. The two men had met 
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previously and remained in contact when Davis returned to Europe in 1935 as the 
representative for the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace and the American 
representative for the League of Red Cross Societies.25 Davis explained that the Butler 
Commission, which had already launched its fundraising campaign for relief in 
Czechoslovakia, hoped to raise $100,000, which it would then hand over to the director of 
the Czechoslovak Red Cross (Alice Masaryk, daughter of the first president). The 
organization was formed specifically to “alleviate the suffering of the 200,000 citizens of 
[Czechoslovakia] who fled their homes in the annexed areas,” to contribute to “prevent great 
suffering this winter and to rehabilitate the economic life of the Republic,” with a primary 
emphasis on “the physical needs of children and the aged, on education programs in refugee 
camps, vocation training and provision of opportunity for re-employment” and not to supply 
migration assistance.26 In that spirit, Davis gave Dexter a small sum of money to deliver to 
Alice Masaryk to use as she saw fit. After their meeting, Dexter promised to provide Butler 
with a full report on the situation in Czechoslovakia.27 
Once in England, Dexter continued to establish connections. In the several days he 
spent in London in early November 1938, Dexter met with the British Unitarians, the former 
Czechoslovak ambassador to Great Britain, Jan Masaryk, other Czechoslovak officials and 
refugees, and the leaders of the Lord Mayor's Fund, which had been raising money for 
Czechoslovak refugees. Jan Masaryk wrote letters of introduction for Dexter to take with him 
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to Prague, addressed to high officials in the Czechoslovak government and to his sister (and 
head of the Czecho-Slovak Red Cross) Alice Masaryk. Finally, Dexter met the AFSC 
representative Richard Wood, and together the two men travelled by plane to 
Czechoslovakia.28 
Dexter and Wood spent a total of two weeks in Prague. In that time, they managed 
four full days of consultations with the Czecho-Slovak government and church officials, the 
American ambassador and his staff, representatives of the British Treasury of the Lord 
Mayor's Fund, and the British Quakers. The two men additionally visited four refugee camps. 
Dexter and Wood concluded that "existing agencies were caring for the immediate problem, 
but that they would soon need help in carrying the burden, which was increasing on all the 
time."29 At the time of the Americans' visit, the Lord Mayors' Fund had approximately $1.5 
million to give for relief programs and the London News-Chronicle Fund had a small amount 
for migration activities.30 Dexter and Wood also noted: 
One point had been strongly impressed on us: it was imperative to send American 
personnel, and personal experience underlined this. I had brought over a sum of 
money (which I will explain later) to be given to Miss Masaryk. I duly delivered it, 
but the following day she returned it to me, saying that she could not administer it 
without danger to herself and to others—it must be administered by Americans. 
Everyone with whom I talked felt the same—Czechoslovak citizens would be under 
too much pressure from the Nazis, who were everywhere to be able to administer 
such funds.31 
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Back in the United States, Dexter reported his findings to the Butler Commission and 
to the joint Unitarian-Friends Committee, which had already launched a fundraising 
campaign. The new Unitarian-Friends Committee now had three tasks: determine the form 
their relief work would take, raise sufficient funds, and find American representatives to 
administer those funds. The Unitarian-Friends Committee worried that they would not be 
able to launch a large enough fundraising drive, but support came from an unlikely place: the 
Butler Commission. Because of the insistence of Alice Masaryk and the British relief 
workers, the Butler Commission began to rethink their strategy of having Czechs administer 
the funds they had raised. As their fundraising campaign had launched with the promise of 
spending the money raised on relief purposes only (no money had been earmarked for paying 
for American administrators), they turned to the Unitarian-Friends Committee. Although the 
Butler Commission was convinced that having American representatives in Prague to work 
with the local organizations was now necessary, representatives were only to be sent if their 
service could “be secured without deducting administrative expenses from donations for 
relief purposes.”32 The Butler Commission agreed to provide most of the financial support 
for relief work, while the Unitarians raised money for the personnel, overhead, emigration 
expenses, and any aid to be provided to affiliated Czechoslovak churches. In addition, the 
Unitarians agreed to find a suitable couple (following the precedent set by the American 
Friends Service Committee) to serve as administrators.33 
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As the American Unitarian Association considered what their shrinking religious 
organization could do to help refugees in Czechoslovakia, one member remarked, “I should 
hope that we might [find] . . . a couple, man and wife, who would deal mainly with the 
details of the emigration problems in cooperation with whatever the international refugee 
committee might be doing . . . Also, such a couple could be of real service in our own 
cooperative [sic] endeavors with our own people in Czechoslovakia . . . There will probably 
have to be one or two Czechs attached to the mission, but I am sure that we could find such a 
competent man and woman without the slightest difficulty and at a very reasonable 
expense.”34 The director for the Commission for Service in Czechoslovakia needed to: be 
dedicated to the Unitarian and refugee causes, a knowledge of Europe, have familiarity with 
at least French and German, have some experience with social work, be of good health, and 
be able to start nearly immediately. This proved to be a difficult bill to fill. After pursuing 
various options, the new commission selected Waitstill and Martha Sharp. Robert Dexter 
commented, “they were ideally qualified,” while his wife Elisabeth said, “it would have been 
hard to find better commissioners.”35 
Waitstill Hastings Sharp, born in 1902, graduated from Harvard Law School in 1926, 
after which he had taken a position as the secretary of the AUA Department of Religious 
Education. Martha Ingham Dickie, born in 1905, was an experienced social worker. She 
studied social work at Northwestern University’s Recreation Training School, directing the 
Girl’s Work at Chicago Commons (aiding over five hundred girls in this position) after her 
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graduation. Martha and Waitstill were introduced by mutual friends in 1927, married a year 
later, and after their honeymoon, Waitstill enrolled in a master’s program in philosophy at 
Harvard, while Martha pursued a master’s degree in comparative literature. Following his 
graduation, Waitstill was ordained as a Unitarian minister in 1933 and assigned his own 
congregation. Martha remained active in international affairs, serving as president of the 
local Peace Fellowship and discussing the League of Nations with her neighbors. After 
Robert Dexter returned from his November 1938 exploratory trip to Czecho-Slovakia, the 
Sharps attended Dexter’s presentation on his Czecho-Slovak refugee crisis. 
In January 1939, Waitstill H. Sharp was appointed the Field Director of the 
Commission for Service in Czechoslovakia, “a Unitarian-Quaker refugee relief and 
emigration program in Czechoslovakia.”36 The Unitarians would provide all the funding and 
manpower for the Commission, the American Quakers, who were already helping refugees in 
a separate effort, served as joint sponsors and provided advice, and the Butler Commission 
provided a large portion of the funds for the relief work. Waitstill Sharp and his wife Martha 
worked closely with the American Ambassador to Czechoslovakia (Wilbur M. Carr), the 
American Consul-General in Prague (Irving R. Linnell), British Unitarians, and other 
contacts in Paris, Geneva, and London for support in their efforts in Prague. By the time the 
commissioners left for Europe, the AUA had raised approximately $12,000 in private 
donations; the Butler Commission raised an additional $29,000 for resettlement and relief 
projects for Sudeten refugees.37 This effort was the first overseas Unitarian service endeavor 
and would form the basis of the Unitarian Service Committee, which would operate 
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throughout the war to organize child feeding programs and migration schemes for 
endangered intellectuals.  
In total, the Butler Commission, together with the American Unitarians, raised 
$94,595 for the American Committee for Relief in Czechoslovakia. Of that total, $37,397 
was sent directly to the Czecho-Slovak Red Cross and the Youth Welfare Office in Prague; 
$42,960.88 was spent by the Sharps; $3,499.50 was distributed to Czechoslovak exiles in 
Poland and the United States; and $10,000 was disbursed by the Minister of Czecho-Slovakia 
in accordance to specifications on spending made by donors to help immigrants to the United 
States establish themselves. Administrative expenses were indeed low ($7,378.84 or 7.8%) 
and the Sharps were entirely supported by the Unitarian-Quaker Commission (an additional 
expense of $4,000).38 
These various, loosely related groups had now converged on a common cause: to 
“reduce the feeling of Czechs and Slovaks that after standing firm for human ideals they have 
been deserted by their friends abroad,” by offering badly needed assistance in the refugee 
crisis.  Unlike British relief, which had focused primarily on those refugees deemed “most in 
need”—that is, migration assistance for Sudeten German refugees—Unitarian efforts were to 
maintain “impartiality [from] organizations working on relief and to make sure that 
American funds go to the most needy cases in consonance with the racial proportions in the 
whole number of refugees.”39 
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Creating Connections: The Organization of Rescue 
 The Sharps’ strategy in Czecho-Slovakia would become the founding principle of all 
Unitarian service work during World War II. In a report from 1940, Waitstill Sharp wrote:  
A principle of great significance is involved here: the basic strategy of arriving in a 
foreign land prepared to do at least in part what the authorities of that land wish done 
for the welfare of their population. That had been the policy of your Commissioners 
in Czechoslovakia in 1939 when they were privileged to spend $74,000 for social 
service operations in Bohemia and Moravia, being enabled thereby to carry on even 
more significant emigration work.40 
The tension between the relief work the Sharps had been sent to conduct in Czecho-Slovakia 
and the emigration work they considered to be their most important contribution shaped not 
only the Sharps’ efforts in the Bohemian Lands, but also the work of the Unitarian Service 
Committee after 1939. Knowing how this tension arose—and how the Sharps handled their 
often-competing tasks—proves essential to understanding relief and rescue work during 
World War II. Relief (providing food, shelter, medical supplies, etc.) and rescue (migration 
assistance) both required connections, money, and political support. And how the Sharps 
arranged these dual programs tells us much about how migration from the Bohemian Lands 
occurred.  
Two short weeks after agreeing to serve as the Commissioners of the American 
Commission for Service in Czechoslovakia, the Sharps sailed to Southampton on the 
Aquitania on February 4, 1938, with the intention of providing relief to refugees, particularly 
to members of the Czechoslovak National Church (who were closely connected with 
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Unitarianism).41 A secretary, Virginia Waistcoat, accompanied them, as did $6,000 in cash. 
The remainder of the AUA and Butler Commission funds were wired to banks in Prague.42 
After arriving at midnight on February 10, the Sharps spent three days in London meeting 
with members of British voluntary organizations.  
By the time the Sharps left London, they had an extensive network of contacts to 
assist in their refugee work, essential for understanding the refugee situation in Prague and 
for finding positions for refugees—a requirement for many to receive entrance visas. The 
Sharps’s schedule in London was grueling. They arrived at midnight on 10 February and met 
with British Unitarians and Quakers, the Lord Mayor of London (who organized a fund-
raising drive to benefit Czechoslovak refugees, the Lord Mayor’s Fund), members of 
Parliament, and representatives of other committees interested in Czechoslovakia.43 In 
particular, the couple consulted with individuals who had spent time in Prague, British 
Unitarians Rev. E. Rosalind Lee, and Margaret Stevenson, president of the British Unitarian 
Women’s Organization, who described their experiences working with refugees from 
Czechoslovakia. The couple stayed several more days, introducing themselves to British 
M.P. Eleanor Rathbone (an outspoken critic of appeasement policy), who had formed the 
Parliamentary Committee for Refugees, Beatrice Wellington, and members of the 
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Czechoslovak government in exile.44 They also connected with Gertrud Baer, President of 
the Women’s International League of Peace and Freedom, who explained that international 
refugee workers were often spied upon and gave Martha some tips on how to keep notes that 
were useful and not easily deciphered as well as methods for destroying “incriminating 
papers.”45 
 Before travelling to Prague, the Sharps stopped first in Paris for several days before 
leaving for Prague on 22 February. While in Paris, the Sharps contacted Malcolm Davis, the 
European Director of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.46 Davis was 
instrumental in the creation of the Butler fundraising effort for the American Committee for 
Relief in Czechoslovakia. Davis gave the Sharps a “priceless background briefing. And 
evidence of that was visiting cards, which he gave [the Sharps] to be presented to men and 
women, but principally men, in Czechoslovakia, with their names . . . written on the back.”47 
The Sharps credited Davis’s connections as being “priceless to the accomplishment of [their] 
work” in Prague because Davis shared how each of the individuals in Prague could assist 
with what the Sharps were setting out to accomplish.48 Since the 1920s, Davis had been 
working on European refugee issues and had extensive contacts in Berlin, Paris, London, 
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Prague, and Moscow.49 Davis gave the Sharps contacts in Paris on the Czechoslovak refugee 
crisis: the Czech Ambassador Štefan Osuský50; the Czech secretary of the League of Nations 
International Committee on Intellectual Cooperation, Jiří Vránek; French governmental 
leaders; the P.E.N Club; and Donald and Helen Lowrie of the YMCA. The Lowries were also 
well connected in the Bohemian Lands; Donald Lowrie had written a biography of Tomáš 
Garrigue Masaryk in 1930.51 The Lowries agreed to be the Sharps’s Paris correspondents, 
beginning what would be a long friendship and cooperation on refugee issues.52 These 
meetings, as well as the Unitarian commitment to preserving Czechoslovak culture, 
influenced the Sharps’s later decision to prioritize the needs of intellectuals in their refugee 
work.53   
The Sharps arrived in Prague on February 23. Representatives of the Czechoslovak 
Refugee Institute, the National Czechoslovak Church, the Czechoslovak Unitarian Church, 
and the American Czech Society greeted them at the main train station.54 They were also 
greeted by Karel Haspl, Norbert Čapek’s son-in-law, whom the Sharps had known for years, 
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when Haspl at visited the United States as a student. Haspl would prove to be indispensable 
to the Sharps as they navigated Prague, helping them to arrange meetings, get around the 
city, and contact those involved in refugee issues.55 
 In their first few weeks in Prague, the Sharps stayed at the Hotel Atlantic, chosen for 
its proximity to the Ministry of Social Welfare and the city center as well as for its 
affordability.56 The Sharps spent their first few weeks in Prague meeting with officials 
working with refugees and assessing areas where their work could be most effective. On 
February 27, they Sharps met first with the American Ambassador, Wilbur Carr and the 
Consul-General, Irving Linnell. Martha Sharp remembered the meeting in her memoir: 
“‘Relieved’ would be a better word to describe Ambassador Carr’s response and that of the 
other officials he introduced to us who had been carrying the responsibility for American 
Relief since January. In fact, they had taken over the temporary disbursement of funds. Their 
regular duties had become some complicated and swollen at the Embassy and Consulates 
since Hitler’s seizure of the Sudetenland, that they were delighted someone else was 
available to take over a segment of the refugee burden.”57  
That afternoon they attended a gathering of leading Czecho-Slovak officials: the 
Foreign Minister, the Ministry of Social Welfare, the Refugee Institute, and the Organization 
for the Protection of Youth (Zemské ústředí péče o mládež). The Organization for the 
Protection of Youth had provided indispensable relief to refugee children in the refugee 
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camps.58 Of particular importance was their introduction to Dr. Antonín Sum, the former 
Czechoslovak consul in Washington, who outlined the Czechoslovak response to the refugee 
crisis.59 Sum was long considered an expert in refugee issues; he met regularly with the 
British embassy and had negotiated the terms of the Lord Mayor’s Fund operation with the 
Lord Mayor Sir Harry Twyford. Sum was considered an expert on refugee relief and the care 
of refugee children, in particular.60 Sum provided the Sharps with a list of projects that the 
Czechoslovak refugee agencies felt addressed the greatest needs of the refugee populations. 
He also invited them to attend the weekly meetings of the Czechoslovak Coordinating 
Committee for Refugees (the successor organization to the National Committee, hosted in 
Dr. Josef Kotek’s office (the head of the Emigration Division of the Refugee Institute) at the 
Ministry of Social Welfare, the first of which the Sharps attended on February 28.61  
When the Sharps received their instructions from the American Committee for Relief 
in Czechoslovakia, they were given the task of: determining the best method for transferring 
American funds to the Second Republic and consulting with Czecho-Slovak organizations 
for the disbursement of funds (and not release funds to individuals), which they would do 
only after receiving requests to fund specific relief projects. They also assigned funds for 
relief to specific nationality groups based on the proportion of registered refugees of that 
nationality and after immediate needs were met, prioritized re-training, education, and re-
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settlement programs. Finally, they were to only administer individual relief to registered 
refugees.62 “American Relief policy required consultation on all disbursements,” so the 
Sharps met frequently with individuals working with refugees.63 Using the Butler 
Commission funds, the Sharps worked closely with the Czechoslovak Red Cross to fund a 
program of medical aid for refugees.  
The Sharps’s spent their first few weeks in the Bohemian Lands setting up an office 
and touring the Prague surroundings, typically accompanied by someone interested in 
refugee affairs. Their first office, on Vyšehradská, was open from eight in the morning until 
six at night, with an hour break for lunch at one.64 The Sharps also attended the Monday 
meetings of the Czechoslovak Coordinating Committee for Refugees. Finally, the Sharps had 
been provided with funds earmarked for aid to certain groups:  Russians who had fled the 
Bolshevik Revolution, Jewish refugees from the Sudetenland and Austria, and members of 
the liberal Protestant churches.65 Růžena Pelántová, Deputy Mayor and Director of Social 
Welfare in Prague, led the Sharps on one of their first trips to the countryside. Pelántová also 
served on the advisory committee for the Lord Mayor’s Fund, along with Alice Masaryk and 
Marie Schmolka.66 Pelántová invited the the Sharps to Lysa nad Labem on March 3, where 
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she proposed to the Sharps to use the American funds to help convert an abandoned castle 
into temporary housing for over two hundred refugee families.67 Alice Masaryk took the 
Sharps to another refugee camp south of Prague, near České Budějovice. 
Several groups in Britain and the United States asked the Sharps to assist with their 
projects. For instance, Rev. Rosalind Lee, who represented the British Unitarians, requested 
that the Sharps to handle individual cases in their attempts to emigrate to Great Britain. 
Martha Sharp later recalled that “Some of the people concerned took as much of our time as 
the big programs did, and they were harder to please. Some would turn up at our office or 
hotel at any time of the day or night, or in the middle of a meal, whenever they thought they 
could intercept us. Others would lie in wait to see us when it was announced in the News that 
we were to be at certain meetings. Some took a belligerent attitude that we were sent over to 
help them alone and they intended to get everything they were entitled to. Fortunately, this 
was not the usual habit of most refugees,” yet it certainly left the most enduring impression 
of individual casework.68 The Czechoslovak National Church requested funding from the 
Sharps to pay for the mortgages on their church buildings and support church members and 
ministers who had fled the Sudetenland, a project that the Sharps felt was a worthy use of the 
AUA’s limited funds. 
As rumors about a Nazi invasion and the Czechoslovak military mobilizing swirled 
on March 13 and 14, the Sharps’s work began to change. On March 14, “a flood of refugee 
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begging for any kind of visa to get out of the country” appeared at the Sharps’s office.69 
Martha spent the day answering questions and tried to “convince the applicant that [they] 
were not a U.S. Government office and could not change the quota for Czechs which was full 
for the next 35 years, and that [their] mission was to provide and administer mass relief.”70 
The experiences of that day made it “increasingly obvious that [they] ought to have some 
idea as to what countries, other than the U.S., were actually available for immigration and on 
what terms so that [they could give help to individuals.”71 That same morning, Martha Sharp 
met Trevor Chadwick (with whom she had already shared several meals) at the Prague 
Ružýně airport. Chadwick was escorting the first of eight Czech Kindertransport transports 
to London, and had agreed to take with him some outgoing, sensitive mail, including 
Waitstill Sharp’s first report to the AUA.72 
The occupation caused chaos and confusion among those working with refugees. The 
Sharps heard reports that refugees living in the refugee camps ran into the woods, so that 
there were over six hundred people, homeless and without food, “who [dared] not sleep in 
the same place twice” in the Prague vicinity.73 On the morning of March 15, the Gestapo 
overtook the offices of the Red Cross and the other organizations with international 
                                                 
69 Martha Cogan Sharp Memoir, USHMM, RG-67.017, Martha and Waitstill Sharp Collection, Series 4, Box 
30, Folder 2, 70. 
 
70 Martha Cogan Sharp Memoir, USHMM, RG-67.017, Martha and Waitstill Sharp Collection, Series 4, Box 
30, Folder 2, 70. 
 
71 Martha Cogan Sharp Memoir, USHMM, RG-67.017, Martha and Waitstill Sharp Collection, Series 4, Box 
30, Folder 2, 70. 
 
72 Martha Cogan Sharp Memoir, USHMM, RG-67.017, Martha and Waitstill Sharp Collection, Series 4, Box 
30, Folder 2, 69. 
 
73 Letter from Martha Sharp to Brackett Lewis, 31 March 1939, USHMM, RG-67.017, Martha and Waitstill 
Sharp Collection, Series 1, Box 2, Folder 14, 15. 





connections (including the YMCA and the YWCA) were closely supervised. The Gestapo 
also closed the Jewish emigration agency HICEM and arrested HICEM’s leadership, 
including Marie Schmolka. Martha Sharp noted that with HICEM closed and Schmolka 
arrested, “there is no one to help the Jews.”74 Gestapo agents followed the leaders of the non-
Jewish organizations, including the Sharps’s colleagues Antonín Sum and Jaroslav Kosé.75 
The Sharps also found their office surrounded by a crowd of people and police, who were 
attempting to control the crowd. After meeting with their staff, Waitstill reminded the crowd 
that they were in Prague “to give medical and material help to Czechoslovak refugees. We 
are not a visa agency. We are not an emigration agency.”76 Meanwhile, Martha was 
confronted by a man who felt threatened by the Gestapo and, if he couldn’t get migration 
help, saw suicide as his only option. Martha agreed to help, and that sparked her interest in 
changing the shape of the work that the American Commission for Refugees from 
Czechoslovakia. She recalled thinking, “Might this be the solution? All these people wanted 
to talk over their problems with someone they felt they could trust. Perhaps we could help 
some of them, if I could find out what countries might be open to them and under what terms. 
The emergency demands aid of a different kind, maybe, my old social case work training 
could be of help?”77  
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Within a period of a few weeks, the Sharps had established and cultivated the 
connections necessary to offer migration assistance to refugees. They realized the value of 
the network early, as they needed guides to understand the local refugee situation. The 
desperate circumstances of the refugees in the Bohemian Lands prompted them to move 
quickly. The Sharps’ instructions required them to work with local, established aid groups to 
distribute funds to groups most in need. Furthermore, when their mission began, the Sharps 
were the only American representatives in Prague. They represented multiple different 
groups, with complementary interests. When the Nazis occupied the remainder of the 
Bohemian Lands, they drew upon their preexisting connections and shifted their focus from 
relief to migration assistance.  
 
Divided Roles: The Rogue Diplomat and the Caring Case-Worker 
The events of March 15, 1939, convinced both Martha and Waitstill Sharp that 
migration assistance was now the most pressing issue in the Bohemian Lands. On that day, 
the Sharps met with officials of the British refugee committees, where they received news 
that the Gestapo had been arresting Czechoslovak relief workers, well-known refugees, and 
members of the Social Democratic party. The Sharps and the other international aid workers 
“agreed in principle to present a united front, keep working as long as possible and to pool 
[their] efforts and information for each other’s benefit.”78 In that spirit, the Sharps assisted 
Tessa Rowntree of the Lord Mayor’s Fund to locate the most prominent political refugees 
and escort them to safety of the British Embassy. Both Sharps escorted prominent political 
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opponents on the night of the occupation, delivering them to the sanctuary of the embassy. 
From the British Embassy, these refugees would be smuggled out of the Bohemian Lands 
through Poland and to Great Britain. 79 
Refugee assistance presented two problems: first, tickets to leave the country had to 
be purchased with foreign currency.80 Second, many of the most urgent cases were political 
opponents of the Nazi regime, slated for arrest if the Gestapo learned of their whereabouts. 
Assisting these refugees placed refugee workers in conflict with the Nazi authorities and 
jeopardized their other clients. Thus, the Sharps divided their refugee work: while Martha 
took on individual migration case work, Waitstill assumed responsibility for the financial 
side of the operation as well as the larger relief projects that the Sharps had initially agreed to 
take on. The notion that a man and a woman should be sent to Europe represents a peculiarly 
American interpretation about the gendered nature of refugee service work. Unlike Czech or 
British refugee work, American relief was often provided by married couples. While the 
husband typically served in a business and diplomatic capacity, American women took the 
lead in case work. This was certainly true of Waitstill and Martha Sharp.  
Martha Sharp reported being followed by Gestapo agents and discovering that their 
hotel bedspring had been wired for sound. In early April, the Sharps had to move to the Hotel 
Paříž, where they found that their rooms were bugged. They then picked up the habit of 
checking their room every time they left and covering any telephones in a room with a jacket 
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to protect their clients.81 The couple’s room was also searched for documentation that they 
had been assisting refugees who were wanted by the Gestapo.82 Aware that the Gestapo had 
performed similar searches on other refugee workers, the Sharps memorized and destroyed 
any information that would reveal the identity of the refugees they were helping.83 Watistill 
recalled, “I used all the pneumonic skills that I possessed to put that humpty dumpty together 
again, and it took more than all the king’s horses and all the kings’ men.”84 As Waitstill and 
Martha Sharp assumed complementary duties in the organization of migration, they largely 
kept the details of their work secret even from one another in case of a Gestapo 
investigation.85 
The Sharps maintained an office in Prague, where refugees could apply for migration 
assistance. Soon after the Sharps resolved to provide refugee relief, the couple were offered 
to an office in the Refugee Institute.86  Between the AUA and Butler Commission funds, the 
Sharps undertook a variety of relief and migration programs, ranging from providing homes 
for refugees, feeding and medical programs, and assisting Social Democrats escape to 
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Poland, finding placements in the US and elsewhere for writers and other individuals, and 
running an migration bureau.87  
Martha Sharp took primary responsibility for the office and was supported by four 
couples—Jewish refugees from the Sudetenland—who helped Martha interview the hopeful 
migrants who came to the office. News of the Sharps’ office spread quickly, with the lines of 
people stretching “three or four blocks” away from the office and “crowding the sidewalks 
four and six abreast.”88 The refugees that the Sharps and the office workers agreed to help 
fell into particular categories: “young intellectuals, Kulturträgers [or culture-carriers, that is, 
individuals who transmit cultural ideas from generation to generation], young lawyers, young 
doctors…clergymen…, students at all levels of the humanities.”89 Through the efforts of this 
migration office, which worked with the Czechoslovak Refugee Institute, the Sharps and 
their office staff eventually assisted over 3,500 families emigrate.90 
The Sharps employed several refugees in their casework “because of their facility 
with languages and in handling their compatriots.”91 Employing refugees also had the benefit 
of allowing these individuals with enough funds to avoid living in the refugee camps run by 
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the Czechoslovak relief groups and the Refugee Institute.92 Martha Sharp praised the heads 
of the Refuge Institute, Dr. Lev Zavřel and Dr. Václav Šatava for their continued work with 
refugees during this period. Yet, the Czechoslovak Refugee Institute seemed to be primarily 
concerned with providing “personal direct assistance to refugees who are just becoming 
established in new positions,” that is, primarily refugees of Czech nationality who were not 
looking to emigrate further.93 Those who did wish to emigrate had to look elsewhere for 
information. The travel agency Čedok was an essential stop for any migrant hoping to leave. 
Waitstill Sharp remembered that Čedok was the place “which everybody used to learn all 
kinds of things and to buy travel tickets.”94 
The Sharps quickly formalized their approach to help their refugee clients. First, each 
refugee was asked to fill out a questionnaire to assist in advising refugees about the countries 
they should seek to emigrate to. Next, they were interviewed by a member of the Sharps’ 
staff.95 The Sharps then collected the resumes of hopeful migrants, which one of them (often 
Waitstill) would take in briefcases on trips to Paris and Geneva to help locate jobs for their 
clients outside of the Bohemian Lands.96  
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Much of the Sharps’s work was with intellectuals: Martha took several days to escort 
the founder and Vice-President of the Women’s Party of Czechoslovakia, Františka 
Plamínková, when she returned to Prague from a trip to Switzerland for the International 
Congress of Women.97 Martha also spent a good deal of time assisting intellectuals find 
positions in other countries as well as helping them to secure the necessary German exit visas 
for politically active individuals. Martha later recalled, “we used the ‘human touch’ to rescue 
world renowned theologians, scientists, writers. Every life had its own drama . . . But a series 
of miracles can happen when many powerful people became concerned and are willing to act 
at the right time. We became catalysts. The Nazis were still courting the United States. They 
didn’t want us to go to war yet, and this factor was the reason, I believe, that the lesser fry 
among the Nazi officialdom were unwilling to go out on a limb to make enemies of us as 
American citizens. This made our task a little bit easier, a little bit safer, than that of the 
British refugee worker, temporarily.”98  
Money was a constant issue for the Sharps, as it was for all refugee workers. As the 
Sharps committed to migration assistance work, the amount of money necessary grew 
exponentially. Furthermore, both British and American voluntary organizations had firm 
policies of keeping relief funds well out of Nazi hands. Thus, Martha and Waitstill Sharp 
operated only in cash while in the Bohemian Lands, keeping most of the Committee’s 
funding in banks in London, Paris, or Geneva, managed by their contacts in each city. Martha 
Sharp outlined their plan in a letter to the AUA on March 31, on her first trip outside of the 
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Protectorate: “We beg you to redouble your efforts in trying to raise money for the needs 
which I have outlined above. Mr. Davis and I think that committees can be formed; one in 
London with the cooperation of Miss Rosalind Lee [of the British Unitarian organization], 
and one in Paris under the protecting eye of Mr. [Malcolm] Davis, to help on the outside. We 
think that perhaps we might be able to get the Quakers groups in each city to organize the 
interviewing and the practical end of the work. Mr. Sharp and I will take turns, coming out of 
Prague, to keep in touch and inform Mr. Davis of what is going on.”99 
After Martha’s first trip outside of Protectorate at the end of March, Waitstill took 
over responsibility for with issues related to money: traveling to the European capitals to visit 
various banks and, as he would later put it “corrupting the currency,” which were, in effect, 
efforts to assist refugees to transfer money out of the Bohemian Lands.100 After the Nazi 
occupation of the Bohemian Lands, the Czechoslovak crown was instantly devalued. Many 
Czechoslovak refugees and others who were eager to leave met with Waitstill to exchange 
their Czechoslovak crowns for American dollars. Waitstill would bargain with these 
individuals, trying to get as high as a rate of exchange for dollars to crowns as he possibly 
could, charging wealthier migrants with higher exchange rates. After the refugees gave him 
their Czechoslovak crowns, Waitstill would write the amount in American dollars that he had 
promised the individual twice on the back of his calling card, tear it in half, and give one half 
to the hopeful migrant. After leaving the Bohemian Lands, the individual could retrieve the 
promised amount at one of the banks with which Waitstill had arranged the calling card 
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agreements. The refugees could move some of their wealth outside of the Bohemian Lands 
and prevent the Nazis from taxing all their money. In return, the Sharps now had 
Czechoslovak crowns to use for their relief work. After amassing a large amount of 
Czechoslovak crowns, Waitstill arranged to deposit the crowns with the American consul, 
Irving Linnell, who agreed to keep the currency in his personal safe and allow the Sharps 
access to the funds whenever they required them.101 
 In a letter to Robert Dexter on 13 June, Waitstill noted that he had been unable to 
keep detailed financial records of his transactions: “it would imperil the life and liberty of 
myself and every Czech with whom we do business.”102 Instead, he made mental notes and 
recorded more detailed notes on his trips outside of the Protectorate. Since the Sharps were 
unable to establish a bank account, “all of [their] dealings have to be on the basis of Czech 
crowns actually received by [Waitstill] from intending emigrants, and paid over by 
[Waitstill] to the responsible heads of the Czech Social Service agencies.”103 Despite the lack 
of records, the Sharps managed to account for almost every cent of their expenditures, 
according to the AUA and Butler Commission documents drawn up after the Sharps return to 
the United States. 
Waitstill Sharp used the funds he had raised through “corrupting the currency” to 
supply escaping students and other young intellectuals with ten thousand Czechoslovak 
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crowns each. They would then “beat their way to Moravská Ostrava…as economically as 
they could…They hitchhiked…There was no office to which they could get any valid 
clearance and they knew that.”104 Once in Ostrava, these individuals sought out the entrances 
to the coal mines, where miners would give them instructions to pass through the mines and 
cross the border into Poland. In Poland, these young intellectuals would then meet up with 
members of the resistance, who gave them clothes to pass as Polish railway or postal 
workers, and guide them to Gdynia. In Gdynia, these individuals met up with members of the 
British Navy, who helped the Czech refugees to cross to Great Britain.105 
 Much of the Sharps’s work was dependent on the fact that they had American 
passports and their possession of an exit visa from the Protectorate. These two documents 
allowed the Sharps a degree of free passage in and out of the Protectorate, with little 
harassment from the border officials. The Sharps’ work often blurred the lines of legality in 
the name of practicality, especially after the creation of the Protectorate of Bohemia and 
Moravia. For instance, the Sharps had brought with them two $5,000 checks to be given to 
the head of the Czechoslovak Red Cross, Alice Masaryk. Masaryk, though, had refused the 
checks, as she feared that the money would make her a target and would eventually fall into 
Nazi hands.106 Thus, the Sharps retained the checks and further requested the Committee in 
the United States not send any more checks to the Sharps in Prague.107 In what would 
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become a pattern for Waitstill Sharp, he left Prague on March 22 for Switzerland with the 
two checks intended for Alice Masaryk. In Geneva, Waitstill once again showed his 
American passport at one of the Swiss banks “without which you can do absolutely nothing 
in Europe, and credentials, which up to that time [he] had not shown anybody.”108  
Signed by high authorities in the United States, American passports and letters of 
introduction from the U.S. Secretary of State and Ambassador gave the Sharps a degree of 
legitimacy in European capitals that they likely otherwise would not have enjoyed. After 
showing his credentials at the Swiss banks, Waitstill asked to deposit the two checks, stating: 
 I want to deposit these with special arrangements for drawing on them as persons 
entitled to draw upon them who will not be accompanied by me or anybody 
representing me present what you and I agree will be indubitable credentials…They 
will be visiting cards—a half of a visiting card with a sum written in pencil on the 
back—and this will authorize anybody holding one of these visiting cards . . . to draw 
a sum that is indicated in American money.109 
Meanwhile, the Commission for Service in Czechoslovakia had sent further money to the 
Sharps via Malcolm Davis, who was in Paris. Waitstill departed Geneva for Paris and later to 
Belgium and London. Once in Paris, he gathered the money that had been sent to Malcolm 
Davis and created similar accounts with similar conditions in both Paris, Belgium, and 
London.110  
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 For individual migrants, Waitstill Sharp’s methods might have seemed extortionist 
and exploitative. In his postwar testimony, Watistill expressed some remorse for the high 
prices he charged the migrants, referring to his work as “skullduggery,” and 
“unconscionable.”111 However, Waitstill drew upon these funds to help agencies who were 
primarily assisting groups of refugees that the Unitarians were most invested in: Social 
Democratic men who were in danger of arrest, the children of refugees, and Czech 
Unitarians. Waitstill distributed funds to the Salvation Army (who were working to feed 
Sudetenland refugees in Prague), the Zemská péče o mládež (who cared for sick children and 
especially refugee children), and the Unitarian Church in Prague (whose mortgage the Sharps 
paid off using the funds as well as some building improvements).112  
 
Connections with British and Czechoslovak Voluntary Organizations 
Following the Nazi occupation, the Sharps began in earnest to connect with other 
refugee assistance organizations to coordinate migration attempts. Individuals and 
organizations worked together closely. In some cases, the Sharps provided organizations 
without representatives in Prague the names, resumes, and personal information of 
individuals attempting to leave. In other instances, the Sharps assisted other voluntary 
organizations in Prague to bring their migration schemes to fruition.  
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Shortly after the occupation of the Bohemian Lands, the Sharps called a meeting of 
“all Czech, Jewish, and foreign refugee workers to co-ordinate the work and prevent 
overlapping.”113 Under the guise of a social gathering, the various committees met without 
the permission of oversight of either the Czech or Nazi government officials, in order to 
prevent arousing the interest of the Nazi officials, who likely would have tried to send a 
representative to the meeting.114 This meeting established lines of cooperation between the 
various refugee assistance organizations, which would last throughout the Sharps’s time in 
Prague. Given the strict censorship in the Protectorate, the Sharps met daily with other 
voluntary workers, a “time-consuming, but necessary” appointment to share news about the 
refugee situation and the new reality of life in a Nazi-occupied territory.115 The head of the 
JRC Prague, Emil Kafka, was also included in these meetings. Indeed, the Sharps worked 
closely with the JRC Prague, meeting with Kafka regularly.116  
Among the Sharps’s closest connections in the Bohemian Lands were the 
representatives of the British Committee for Refugees from Czechoslovakia. Both Sharps 
worked frequently with several BCRC representatives, including Beatrice Wellington, Trevor 
Chadwick, and Tessa Rowntree.117 On March 23, Tessa Rowntree asked Martha to 
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accompany a group of political refugees who had household employee visas and German exit 
visas on their journey to Britain the next day.118 Rowntree felt that Martha’s status as an 
American and the wife of a clergyman would not only allow her to get the necessary exit and 
reentry permits from the Protectorate authorities, but also provide some protection for the 
political refugees she would be escorting.119 Tessa herself was taking a group of fifty, and 
Martha followed with an additional thirty-five. Martha agreed, noting that she could use the 
opportunity to bring sensitive documents and mail to London without having to pass through 
the Nazi censors. After a train journey through Germany to the Netherlands, Martha escorted 
the refugees by steamship to the port of Harwich.120  
Once in London, Martha met with the leaders of the Lord Mayor’s Fund, the BCRC, 
British Unitarians, and the former Czechoslovak Ambassador to England, Jan Masaryk. Rev. 
Rosalind Lee travelled from Wales to meet with Martha and discuss the status of Lee’s 
“Prague cases.” After Martha’s departure, Lee sent a letter back to the American Unitarians, 
notifying Robert Dexter that the Sharps “were working in close cooperation with Miss 
[Beatrice] Wellington who has been for some months collaborating with the [British 
Committee for Refugees from Czechoslovakia]. She is a very capable woman who has been 
released from work with the I.L.O. at Geneva in order to do this refugee work.”121 Martha 
also deposited a sum of money from her Committee at the Lloyds bank in London after 
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escorting the BCRC transport, and gave Rosalind Lee the power to draw upon it when the 
Sharps’ work required that money be spent in London quickly to support their refugee cases. 
Martha also took a Letter of Credit for $3,000 back with her to Prague to use it as 
necessary.122 
Martha returned to Prague via Paris, where she stopped to meet with Malcolm Davis, 
members of the French refugee committees, the former Czechoslovak ambassador to France, 
and Donald and Helen Lowrie.123 While in Paris in early April, Martha spoke to the 
American Women’s Club and at the Friend’s Center about the situation in Czechoslovakia.124 
Her presentation convinced one Paris Committee to find employment for Czech intellectuals 
who needed to flee.125 After returning to Prague, Martha and Waitstill agreed that they would 
identify individuals that the Paris Committee could assist and then Waitstill would use his 
exit visa to give the Paris Committee the details about individual refugees, including their 
resumes and other documents necessary for arranging visas and entry permits.126 Martha also 
met with Štefan Osuský, the former Czechoslovak Consul in Paris, who had refused to resign 
his post. Martha noted that the refusal of the Czechoslovak consuls, in Paris and in the United 
States, was of great help to refugees, as they continued to advocate for their needs. Still, 
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Martha commented “The plucky Czech Legations are holding out but soon the individuals 
will have no resources to support them; most of them have the bulk of their money in 
Czechoslovakia and since their salaries have stopped, they are in an embarrassing 
position.”127 
The Sharps also negotiated agreements with other refugee aid organizations in Paris, 
London, and Geneva. One such agreement was with the International Committee to Secure 
Employment for Refugee Professional Workers, based in Geneva and represented by Marie 
Ginsberg. The Sharps agreed to help Ginsberg’s committee with individual case work by 
forwarding individual cases of professional workers who needed to leave Prague. Ginsberg’s 
committee provided the Sharps with questionnaires and the representatives in Geneva would 
provide the Sharps with any job postings that refugees could potentially fill.128 Waitstill 
coordinated similar arrangements spent much of his with the High Commissioner for 
Refugees, the International Labor Office, the YMCA, and the Carnegie Endowment of 
International Peace.129 The Sharps also cooperated with the representatives of the American 
Jewish Joint Distribution Committee and HICEM, who were based in Paris, to assist Jewish 
refugees on their registers.130 
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In addition, some organizations like the International Federation of University 
Women had local branches throughout the world, which could supply the refugee workers in 
Czechoslovakia as well as other branches of the organizations with up to date information 
about the local immigration policies. For instance, the International Federation of University 
Women delegated the primary work of its Refugee Committee to Erna Hollitscher, who also 
served as the secretary of the British branch of the organization. In her role for the Refugee 
Committee, Hollitscher was responsible for migration to the British Colonies and Dominions 
as well as to England. Thus, the New Zealand Branch of the organization communicated to 
Hollitscher that they would be willing to sponsor six women to New Zealand, if only the 
Refugee Committee could send them the names of sixteen potential applicants. In response, 
the Refugee Committee sent a letter to all suitable individuals, asking them if they would be 
willing to go to New Zealand, and in the case that they were, sent them a questionnaire along 
with the application form required by the New Zealand government. Once they had received 
these forms, the Refugee Committee required that each potential refugee participate in an 
interview. But for this, the Refugee Committee needed to have a representative in 
Czechoslovakia to conduct the interviews. For this, Erna Hollitscher wrote to Martha Sharp 
(whom she had met through E. Rosalind Lee, who had worked with the International 
Federation of University Women for the Australian immigration cases), asking if she would 
be willing to interview the five or six Czechoslovakian women who could potentially be 
selected to go New Zealand. As often happened, Hollitscher included some personal business 
with this otherwise very down-to-business request. Hollitscher’s brother, his Aryan wife, and 
their fifteen-year-old daughter were living in Prague and were “quite at a loss what to do and 
where to go to.” Hollitscher requested that Martha Sharp meet with them and if she could 





make any helpful suggestions about how they could leave, as, “it seems so utterly hopeless, 
but he is in despair and I cannot, after all, tell him that there is no way out for him.” She 
continued, describing the refugee situation perfectly, “People are so glad if they see that one 
is at least trying to think of some way to help them.”131 
Not all interactions between the various committees were pleasant. Martha recalled 
that British refugee workers scoffed at the Sharps’s system of requiring refugees to complete 
questionnaires and other paperwork. After describing their system to a British colleague, 
Martha recalled that he commented on their “formalized” approach to migration: “In a 
superior manner he continued, ‘We Britons prefer to treat persons as individuals. All you 
Americans are alike. You waste your time making graphs and putting things away in files! 
Questionnaires, bosh! We keep facts in our heads!’” Martha had her own criticism for the 
British voluntary workers, which she considered too haphazard: “I could have replied with 
specific instances where they had forgotten the facts and had exposed people by asking them 
to come to see them, and while they were kept waiting in line for days, they were arrested by 
the Gestapo. And the reason they kept them waiting so long was that they had misplaced 
their passports or other vital documents, and as each “individual” was received he had to 
recite the facts of his case anew every time he came. But, one had to say “Vive la difference” 
and let the British go on operating in the glow of their own superiority.”132 
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Despite operational differences, the Sharps and the British voluntary workers 
maintained relationships for the duration of their time in the Bohemian Lands ended. The 
area of their closest cooperation (and indeed, another source of tension), was on the Czech 
Kindertransports, which brought the 669 unaccompanied children from Prague to London in 
the spring and summer of 1939. 
 
Making Connections: The Sharps and the Czech Kindertransports 
Martha and Waitstill Sharp were aware of the Kindertransport operation since before 
their initial arrival in Prague. The Sharps arrived in London in early February just after 
Winton had returned from his own visit to Prague. While in London, the Sharps saw Rev. 
Rosalind Lee, who had been in contact with Winton about the children’s transports.133 
During their meetings in London, the Sharps compiled a list of important figures in migration 
assistance working in the Bohemian Lands. Each individual represented an organization that 
focused on a particular group of people: medical professionals, other professionals, domestic 
servants, children, and children between sixteen and eighteen years of age. Per the Sharps’ 
notes, all children under the age of sixteen should be referred to Trevor Chadwick, at the 
BCRC’s office at Rubešova 17. Meanwhile, children between the ages of 16 and 18 were to 
be referred to Beatrice Wellington, who was working out of the offices of the Refugee 
Institute.134  
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Soon after arriving in Prague, Martha Sharp shared meals with both Doreen Warriner 
(of the BCRC) and Trevor Chadwick on multiple occasions. Martha Sharp and Trevor 
Chadwick discussed the state of the “Kinderaction” on March 13; the first Kindertransport 
was scheduled to leave Prague the next day.135 Martha accompanied Chadwick at the airfield 
on the day of the transport, to help the children board the plane. She also escorted the now 
childless parents back to the city center, impressed by their stoic resignation to the loss of 
their children. 
This transport—as well as the separation from her own two children—seems to have 
inspired Martha Sharp to contribute to the organization of the children’s transports to 
London. Martha frequently “helped arrange transports of children to Great Britain because of 
our co-operation with the British Kinderaction.”136 On March 31, 1939, Martha Sharp wrote 
to Brackett Lewis, asking for his approval of depositing a sum of $1,500 in London with 
Rosalind Lee, “to be used as a guarantee for bringing children out. As soon as Foster homes 
are found for them, other children can be brought out with the same money.137 Among the 
Sharps list of activities while in Czechoslovakia was the establishment of a revolving fund of 
£300 to care for Czech refugee children in England.138 In Martha Sharp’s report to the 
Commission for Service in Czechoslovakia after she returned to the United States, she 
recounted how she and her husband had “cooperated with the British Committee for Refugee 
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from Czechoslovakia” as well as other committees in order to help the 72,000 Czechs who 
had registered for the U.S. quota to reach some other country.  
Once Martha Sharp took over the duties of managing the casework for migration 
attempts, she referred several families to Trevor Chadwick and the children’s transports. 
Martha Sharp worked closely on the case of Jacques and his son Henry Gruen, who were 
friends of Cyrus Ashton Rollins Sanborn and his wife Agnes. On the morning of July 26, 
1939, Jacques Gruen appeared at Martha’s office to explain their situation. Martha 
subsequently wrote to Waitstill about the Gruen’s case, noting their friendship with the 
Sanborns. At that time, Cyrus Sanborn was the curator of the Boston Museum of Fine Arts, 
which gave the Gruen case a certain level of importance. The Sanborns wrote to the Gruens, 
suggesting a plan to get the family out: the son, Henry, would be sent to England, where he 
would stay at the home of an English professor, who had promised a guarantee for Henry. 
Martha Sharp asked her husband “Please ask this Prof. to get in touch with Winton and make 
the arrangement for Henry to come. All Emigration offices here but the Kultusgemeinde 
[JRC Prague] are closed so I can’t see [Walter] Creighton about next transport. But it out to 
be put through from that end. Henry is only 13 so he can’t go to America as a Student. 
Students must be 15. Unless Wagner bill is passed he can’t go to Sanborns until his quota 
term is reached in 2 years. They registered March 1939.”139 Walter Creighton, R.J. 
Stopford’s deputy, was the remaining representative of the British Committee for Refugees 
in Czechoslovakia and had been appointed to approve cases of individuals who could 
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potentially go to England.140 For Henry Gruen to be placed on the British children’s 
transport, Martha Sharp needed his approval. 141 
The professor in question, was Wilfred P. Barrett and his wife Dorothy in London. 
After contacting the Sanborns for the name of the family willing to provide a guarantee for 
Henry Gruen, Waitstill Sharp contacted the Barrett family. On August 3, Dorothy Barrett 
wrote to Waitstill Sharp explaining the details of their arrangement. The Sanborns sent a 
notarized letter to the Barretts, promising to wire them money four times a year to cover 
Henry Gruen’s living expenses. Dorothy Barrett had already been to see Mrs. Winton, 
Nicholas’ mother, several times about their arrangement, who had instructed her that to go to 
the bank and prove that they had enough funds to provide for Henry while in England. The 
guarantees that the Sanborns would provide for the child would not be sufficient, because 
“the bank has to consider all the American letters at its central office . . . because . . . they 
won’t accept someone in America as guarantor.” The Barretts had two young children of 
their own. Until the bank agreed to prove that the Barretts could bring Henry Gruen up on the 
funds promised by the American Sanborn family, the Barretts were unable to prove to 
Nicholas Winton that they had the guarantee to provide for Henry, all the families involved 
would have to play a waiting game.142 
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On August 15, Jacques Gruen wrote to Martha Sharp, thanking her for her work on 
Henry’s behalf.143 Gruen also included a note that he had received from Ashton Sanborn on 
August 10. Sanborn reassured Gruen that the Sanborn family was hopeful that Henry could 
eventually come to the United States, and that they had already provided the Barrett family 
with the 50-pound remigration guarantee as well as his living expenses for three months in 
England. The Sharps seemingly played a very significant role in Henry’s migration attempt, 
as both the Sanborns and the Gruens expressed that they were “exceedingly grateful…for 
they help which they have given.”144 But in contrast to the other case files in the Sharps’ 
Prague files, the Gruen file only contained the letter from Gruen (and the attached letter from 
Sanborn) – lacking the typical registration/information sheet that the Sharps required others 
to fill out. That could be because Henry was not intending to go to the US first, or because 
the Sharps hoped to get him registered with the children’s transports, or because his case file 
was opened just over two weeks before the Sharps intended to leave Prague for good. 
Whatever the reason, the document trail suggests that the Sharps had been less involved in 
Henry Gruen’s case then they were in other cases.  
By the spring of 1939, it was clear that far more children were registered for the 
British children’s transports than Britain would grant entry visas to. On February 9, 1939, 
two American legislators—Senator Robert F. Wagner of New York and Representative Edith 
Nourse Rogers of Massachusetts—introduce a joint resolution to permit 20,000 German 
children under the age of 14 to come to United States. The resolution proposed that these 
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children would be granted entry to the United States in excess of the U.S. quota regulations. 
Responses to the proposed legislation was mixed. Although prominent figures such as 
Eleanor Roosevelt and Secretary of Labor Frances Perkins were sympathetic to the bill, most 
in the Roosevelt administration and Congress were not as receptive to the proposed influx of 
child refugees. And while some refugee and relief organizations lobbied for the bill’s passage 
(including the American Friends Service Committee), some Jewish organizations opposed 
the bill, fearing increased antisemitism in the U.S.  
Martha Sharp was so convinced of the importance of the Kindertransports, that she 
became involved in Senate debates over the Wagner-Rogers Bill, which would allow for 
children to come to the United States. When anyone asked for the Sharps’s advice on the 
Wagner-Rogers bill, the couple always referred them to Trevor Chadwick for specific 
information.145 In a memo sent from Waitstill Sharp to Brackett Lewis and Robert Dexter for 
the congressional hearing of the Wagner-Rogers Bill in April 1939, Chadwick and Antonín 
Sum offered to send approximately one hundred children per week, if better living situations 
could be found for them. While Chadwick continued to emphasize that Jewishness posed the 
greatest problem for children, Sharp advocated for the rescue of the children of “Aryan 
political” refugees. When asked for the number of children needing to leave, Sharp estimated 
that 500 to 1,000 children needed to find refuge elsewhere, but emphasized that this was only 
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an estimate, because “children [were] hidden all over [the] city with relatives and 
institutions.”146 
On June 16, 1939, Waitstill Sharp again communicated with Robert Dexter about the 
situation in Bohemian Lands and the future of Unitarian Service in the Protectorate. Should 
the Children’s Bill pass, Martha Sharp was willing to stay in Prague after their planned 
departure from in August to arrange the migration of children. The Sharps believed that the 
selection of children “ought to be closely tied up with the work with prospective American 
immigrants,” which the Sharps had been coordinating since the Nazi occupation of the 
Bohemian lands. Sharp continued, “Other things being equal, children should be taken whose 
parents are either preceding or following them to the USA.”147 By June, the Sharps appear to 
have had some disagreements with Chadwick and the other representatives of the British 
Committee for Children from Prague. In Sharps’s estimation, these officials seemed “very 
earnest to do all the selection of the children for the USA,” ignoring the fact that, “these 
children are being selected as prospective citizens of our country, not citizens of the British 
Empire.” Sharp further implored Dexter, “Don’t you agree that there ought to be 
coordination between adult immigration service and the selection of the kids?...This will help 
prevent broken homes, permanent separations.”148 
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Sharp continued with a warning for Dexter and a plan for how to proceed, should the 
Wagner-Rogers Bill pass: “I warn you now that this will have to be contended with from the 
start; the British workers have lived with their cases and naturally are devoted to them. And 
they should certainly be on deck when the selections are being made. But the selections, the 
British must be plainly informed, will be made by Americans. The British would not tolerate 
for a moment American selection of children for importation into the British Empire, but 
they cheerfully disregard the converse in this unusual situation. Quite typical of the 
British!”149  
Ultimately, the bill never came to a vote. On June 2, 1939, President Roosevelt 
declined to express his view on the Wagner-Rogers bill and the legislation faded away. 150 
But the Sharps’ correspondence about the British operation and their own participation in the 
action reveals the amount of strain that the international voluntary workers were under by the 
summer of 1939. For all their cooperation in organizing escape, these voluntary workers 
became committed to their own cases, their own goals, and their own methods. Still, the 
Sharps—in cooperation with Czechoslovak and British voluntary organizations—managed to 
assist in the migration attempts of several thousand individuals before they were told by the 
Nazis that their services were no longer needed. 
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“Office Declared Closed!” – The Sharps Leave the Bohemian Lands 
On June 22, all foreign refugee workers received notification from the Refugee 
Institute that “all work which concerns refugees executed by Czech or foreign persons must 
also be concentrated in the Institute [for Refugees at the Ministry of Social and Health 
Administration]. This agreement essentially changes the present work of all committees, 
including all foreign groups working in the migration field in Prague, some of which have 
been almost entirely independent.”151 In late June 1939, the Sharps and other refugee workers 
received official notification from the Protectorate government that their services would no 
longer be required in the Protectorate of Bohemia and Moravia and that the operations would 
be required to close on July 15.152  
Furthermore, the Butler Commission viewed their efforts as only temporary and 
began to break up in the middle of June. The Commission raised very little money in June 
and anticipated that little money could be raised over the summer, especially considering 
Hitler’s increasing aggression in Europe. Executive Secretary Brackett Lewis’ position ended 
on June 30. Although many of the leaders of the Commission were involved in founding of 
the American Friends of Czecho-Slovakia (in cooperation with Mayor La Guardia and his 
commission to complete the Czecho-Slovak pavilion at the 1939 World’s Fair), this 
organization was primarily interested in supporting Czecho-Slovaks who had managed to 
leave rather than sending more relief money to Nazi-occupied regions of Europe.153 
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With the knowledge that their operations were ending, the Sharps and the BCRC 
conferred about what actions should be taken next. One potential area of need were those 
refugees who had fled Czechoslovakia “illegally” into Poland shortly after the Nazi 
occupation. The BCRC requested that the Sharps “go to Poland to see what we could do for 
about 1,000 people who were stranded in freight cars in Warsaw and Gdynia. They had fled 
through the coal mines on the Czech-Polish border trying to escape” the Bohemian Lands.154 
Later, the AJDC asked the Sharps to help Jews trapped in Poland. Ultimately, the Sharps did 
neither, as they were scheduled to leave Europe in August to return to their family. Instead, 
their replacement, Duncan Howlett, who was now not welcome in Prague, volunteered to 
visit the Czechoslovak refugees stranded in Poland.155 
On July 20, Martha wrote in her datebook that “Office declared closed!” and that 
there were a “slew of people at hotel waiting for her.156 She met with Beatrice Wellington of 
the BCRC at the main train station and called Waitstill. Most of the British relief workers left 
Prague on August 1, asking the Sharps to tie up loose ends for a few of the BCRC’s cases.157 
Waitstill left Prague for a religious conference in Switzerland on August 8, at which point the 
border guards revoked his reentry visa, making Martha Sharp the last foreign refugee worker 
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to leave the Bohemian Lands.158 After receiving word from a Czech Quaker, Jaroslav Kosé, 
that the Nazis had plans to arrest and interrogate her, Martha Sharp left for Paris on August 
15.159 The Sharps spent a few days in Paris and London, before sailing back to the United 
States on August 30 at 12:29 in the afternoon.160 
The Sharps returned to Europe in 1940, and are perhaps most well-known for their 
efforts to assist refugees in France, for which they were designated by Yad Vashem as 
Righteous Among the Nations. There, they worked with the likes of Varian Fry (the first 
American Righteous Among the Nations) to provide food to those held in detention camps 
and to smuggle individuals across the Pyrenees into Spain. Less known is that the Sharps, 
after being forced to leave Prague, decided to move their work to France in 1940 to continue 
assisting Czech refugees. Though they would certainly expand their mission to accommodate 
the diverse group of refugees in Free France, the Unitarian Service Committee was 
established in May 1940 “to aid destitute Czech refugees in France.”161 
Ultimately, American relief arrived in the Bohemian Lands much later than British 
voluntary workers. However, by drawing on their Unitarian connections in London, Paris, 
Geneva, and Prague, the Sharps’s refugee assistance operation was running in a matter of 
weeks. The Sharps drew upon and cultivated preexisting connections to organize migration 
assistance with remarkable speed, working closely with their British counterparts, assisting in 
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operations like the Kindertransports, and developing their own methods for assisting several 
thousand refugees. 








CHAPTER 5: DECREASING POSSIBILITIES: FLIGHT FROM THE 




Despite the Nazi occupation of the Bohemian Lands on March 15, 1939, international 
voluntary workers remained in Prague until August 1939. The network-aided migration 
described in the previous chapters continued even as the Nazis mandated the closure of all 
Jewish voluntary organizations and arrested the leaders, including the leading workers for 
HICEM, Marie Schmolka and Hannah Steiner. In the summer of 1939, the Nazi authorities 
centralized control of Jewish migration under a new, Nazi-led institution, the Zentralstelle für 
jüdische Auswanderung. To coerce the migration of the Jewish population of the Bohemian 
Lands, the Zentralstelle ordered the Jewish Religious Community in Prague to coordinate 
migration. Yet the leaders of the newly reorganized JRC Prague had long been active in 
migration assistance. Drawing upon experience and the network established in the previous 
years, the leadership of the JRC Prague aided Jewish migrants in finding migration 
opportunities. 
Migration assistance continued in the ad hoc, nongovernmental system that had 
existed before the Nazi occupation until July 15, 1939, when the Zentralstelle für jüdische 
Auswanderung opened under the leadership of Adolf Eichmann. The Zentralstelle informed 
the foreign voluntary workers that they needed to leave the Bohemian Lands by early 
August. All Jewish organizations, except the JRCs, received orders to close their operations 
permanently. The JRC Prague, the Zentralstelle determined, was to be officially responsible 





for coordinating all aspects of Jewish migration from the Protectorate and to report directly to 
the Zentralstelle. Adolf Eichmann ordered that 30,000 Jews (or 200 per day) would need to 
emigrate from the Protectorate by the end of 1939.1 
Although migration assistance changed substantially once the last of the 
representatives left Prague in August 1939, the network the international voluntary workers 
had helped establish supported migration. International humanitarian organizations continued 
to provide aid—in the form of financial aid, contacting relatives to serve as guarantors, or 
negotiating new migration schemes. But during World War II, these groups no longer had 
direct contact with individual refugees. This task was left primarily to the Jewish 
organizations in the Protectorate, especially the Jewish Religious Committee in Prague and 
the Palestine Office. The individuals who would represent these two organizations—
especially Hannah Steiner—had been active in refugee assistance since the early 1930s. This 
chapter examines the ways in which the workers at the JRC Prague, like Steiner, drew on 
previous established experiences and connections to facilitate migration even as the JRC 
Prague was transformed from a communal religious organization into a migration institution 
under Nazi rule. In the process of this transformation, Jewish women rose into new positions 
of prominence.  
Although the Nazi authorities mandated the reorganization of the JRC Prague, the 
JRC Prague’s leaders believed in the project of migration. Those in leadership roles had long 
been assisting refugees from Nazism to flee the Bohemian Lands. Their work in the JRC 
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Prague was not a break with the past, but rather a continuation of the refugee work that they 
had begun in the 1930s. Flight, they felt, was in the community’s best interest. 
Jewish leaders—most of whom had Zionist sympathies—responded dynamically to 
the Nazi threat. Nazi anti-Jewish policies introduced new push factors encouraging 
Bohemian and Moravian Jews to leave, while simultaneously creating new obstacles to 
migration. The outbreak of World War II on September 1, 1939 resulted in new obstacles to 
migration. As more countries entered the war, communication abroad became increasingly 
difficult, as did access to necessary foreign currency to purchase costly steamship tickets and 
visa fees. Migration policies and requirements changed seemingly at the drop of a hat, as did 
the available routes out of the Protectorate. To overcome these obstacles, the leadership of 
the JRC Prague assumed a new level of importance for potential migrants. Their positions 
afforded them greater mobility than the rest of the Jewish population of the Protectorate. 
They used this ability to travel and drew upon their connections abroad to find foreign 
currency to purchase tickets and visas, negotiate individual migration opportunities, and find 
new pathways out of the Bohemian Lands. 
 
 
Coerced Migration: The Zentralstelle für jüdische Auswanderung in Prague 
 The reorganization of the JRC Prague around migration was mandated in July 1939 
by the newly established Zentralstelle für jüdische Auswanderung in Prague. The Prague 
Zentralstelle was modeled on the Zentralstelle established in Vienna. Five months after the 
Anschluss, on August 20, 1938, the Zentralstelle Vienna opened its doors under the direction 
of Adolf Eichmann, previously a little-known Sicherheitsdienst (or SD) Jewish expert on 





Zionism.2 Eichmann’s goal was the implementation of Sicherheitsdienst policy: to facilitate 
and expedite Jewish migration from Vienna. When Eichmann first arrived in Vienna, the 
Jewish population was in a state of chaos. The Jewish leadership had been arrested in March 
1938, after the Anschluss, and the process of migration was a confusing morass of agencies 
and meetings with officials. As historian David Cesarani describes, “Without leaders, official 
guidance, or institutions, Jews who wanted to emigrate were forced to scurry from one 
government and municipal office to the next with only a dim idea of what was needed to 
leave the country, let alone any inkling of where they could go.”3  
Amid this confusion, migration from Vienna ground to a virtual halt. Eichmann 
argued that the Jewish officials could be used to meet the Sicherheitsdienst’s goal of 
facilitating Jewish migration. After identifying several key officials with whom he could 
work, Eichmann obtained approval to reestablish the key Jewish organizations for 
coordinating migration: the Israelitische Kultusgemeinde Wien (or IKG, the Viennese 
counterpart to the JRC Prague), the Palestine Office, and the Zionist Association. These 
Jewish organizations operated under SD supervision to centralize and coordinate migration. 
The Zentralstelle Vienna officially opened on August 20, 1938, with SS officer Franz 
Stahlecker as the nominal head; in its first month of operation, the Zentralstelle Vienna 
processed 50,000 applications for migration (in the same time period, officials in Berlin 
processed only 19,000 applications).4 Whereas potential migrants had previously needed to 
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visit multiple offices to obtain the necessary documentation for secure exit and entry permits, 
the Zentralstelle served as a central clearinghouse for all migration documents. Migrants now 
visited one location to obtain all documentation necessary to emigrate. To “encourage” 
migration Eichmann instituted coercive tactics—interning a family member in a 
concentration camp until the rest of the family could prove that they would emigrate two 
weeks after their release—and forcibly driving groups of Austrian Jews over the border into 
Czechoslovakia or Hungary.  By June 1939, the Zentralstelle Vienna estimated that it had 
“facilitated” the migration of 110,000 Austrian Jews, nearly half of the country’s Jewish 
population. Between May 1939 and mid-1942, another 28,000 Austrian Jews emigrated.5  
 Eichmann’s early success at the Zentralstelle Vienna demonstrated that coerced and 
forced migration could be a solution to “the Jewish question.”6 Eichmann’s system forced the 
Jewish population of Vienna to leave the country quickly and facilitated the Nazi 
confiscation of Jewish property. When the applicants for migration visited the Zentralstelle 
Vienna, representatives of the IKG, the police, various officials, and the Gestapo examined 
the applicant’s paperwork. If approved, the applicant was required to pay the 
Reichsfluchtsteuer, or flight tax, of 25 percent on property worth more than 200,000 
Reichsmarks or on yearly incomes more than 20,000 Reichsmarks. Only then would the 
applicant receive a short-term passport, valid for just two weeks. If the applicant failed to 
leave in this two-week period, they were imprisoned in a concentration camp. 
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 The IKG was required to work with the Zentralstelle to encourage the migration of 
the Viennese Jewish population. The IKG sold emigration dossiers (Auswanderungmappen, 
which included all documents required by the Zentralstelle) to wealthier members of the 
population to raise money for the Zentralstelle and support the migration of poorer Jews. The 
IKG was required to submit weekly, monthly, and yearly reports to Eichmann, detailing their 
efforts to support migration, provide social services, and provide statistics on the status of the 
Jewish population.7 Eichmann’s initial quota was that the Zentralstelle Vienna process 350 
applications per day; but in the aftermath of Kristallnacht, Eichmann increased the number to 
between 600 and 700 applicants per day.8 Given the “success” of the Zentralstelle Vienna, 
the head of the Reich Main Security Office, Reinhard Heydrich (later the acting 
Reichsprotektor of the Protectorate of Bohemia and Moravia and often described as the 
architect of the Final Solution), asked Eichmann to open further Zentralstelle locations. In 
February 1939, Eichmann moved to Berlin to create a Zentralstelle office in the capital city. 
And, in spring 1939, Eichmann arrived in Prague to establish another Zentralstelle based on 
the Viennese model.9 
 In April 1939, Franz Stahlecker was transferred from Vienna to Prague to establish 
the Sipo-SD in the Protectorate. Stahlecker requested that Adolf Eichmann also come to 
Prague to set up another Zentralstelle, and assume control of all matters relating to Jewish 
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migration for the Prague area.10 Eichmann brought with him two others involved in the 
Viennese Zentralstelle, Alois Brunner and Hans Günther, both Austrian SS officers. 
Eichmann, Brunner, and Günther ordered the leadership of the JRC Prague to come to a 
meeting. At this meeting, the Nazi officials informed the Prague Jewish leadership that they 
were to be sent to Vienna to visit the IKG’s leader Benjamin Murmelstein to learn how 
Jewish migration operated under the Nazi bureaucracy.11  
 The Zentralstelle Prague’s goals were identical to those in Vienna and Berlin: to 
facilitate the migration of as many Jews as possible in the shortest amount of time. As in 
Vienna, the Prague Zentralstelle ordered the JRC Prague to assume control over processing 
all Jewish applications for migration, and submission of the applications to the Zentralstelle 
for final review. Furthermore, the Zentralstelle ordered the JRC Prague to find means to 
encourage Jewish migration from the Protectorate. As in Vienna, the JRC Prague had 
traditionally been a communal religious organization, and was not equipped to handle or 
process migration requests. Previously, migration coordination was the purview of the 
refugee committees, especially HICEM and the Palestine Office. The Social Institute, which 
had provided lunch programs, housing assistance, and clothing distribution to refugees, had 
been affiliated with the JRC Prague, but had maintained a separate administrative body.12 
Despite a brief halt in March 1939, the Palestine Office and the Social Institute continued to 
operate in the Protectorate. 
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Coerced Voluntary Migration During the Second World War 
Leaving the Bohemian Lands was far more difficult than leaving Germany or Austria, 
in part because the United States’ quotas for the Bohemian Lands was far lower, only 2,700 
per year. For Germany, the quota was 27,000 people per year. The outbreak of war resulted 
in the invalidation of 1,500 permits to Great Britain and elsewhere in the British empire. 
Additionally, “there were a great number of committees and organizations for the emigration 
of Jews from Germany established abroad, especially in England and other countries, which 
managed to collect enormous sums of money to support emigration. Such organizations did 
not exist for Jews from Bohemia and Moravia.”13 Additionally, the report pointed to the fact 
that German Jews began leaving Central Europe earlier in the 1930s, whereas Protectorate 
Jews had far fewer relatives or even acquaintances abroad who could help them find 
migration opportunities.14 
Prior to July 1939, the only Jewish institution working on migration as a practical and 
ideological goal was the Palestine Office. The JRC Prague later reported in 1940 that the 
Palestine Office had created a strong, workable institutional structure for supporting 
migration, but that “their goals demonstrated a certain restrictiveness. They formed a group 
more or less around the Zionist portions of the Jewish community.”15 Meanwhile, the JRC 
Prague had directed its efforts prior to 1939 on offering social assistance to the Jewish 
population. The social welfare provided by the Jewish Social Institute had been crucial: this 
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organization had offered food, cash assistance, housing, clothing, and other services to 
refugees from the Sudetenland and other poor members of the Jewish community. These 
services would still be necessary to facilitate migration, but the entire apparatus needed to be 
expanded.  
In order to meet migration goals, the JRC Prague needed to take a broader perspective 
on migration. In June 1940, the JRC reported that “On their own, neither the JRC nor the 
Zionist organizations had the means” to assist this diverse population.16 Thus, Zionist and 
Czech-Jewish organizations began working together (albeit not without significant tensions) 
to coordinate migration. Hannah Steiner, who had connections to both Zionist and Czech-
Jewish groups, was a point of connection. The Palestine Authority continued to focus its 
efforts on coordinating migration to Palestine (much of which was “illegal” immigration 
according to the British Authorities, known as Aliyah Bet) and training migrants to become 
farmers and manual laborers. The JRC Prague expanded to include a new Emigration 
Division, modeled in structure after the Palestine Authority, but with the responsibility of 
coordinating all other individual, group, and special transport migration to all other countries. 
In addition, the JRC Prague maintained the Social Institute (now officially absorbed into the 
JRC Prague apparatus) to provide relief and other social assistance to hopeful migrants and 
other poor Jews prior to their departure. 
According to a census on March 15, 1939, the Jewish population in the Protectorate 
was 118,310 people (as identified by Nazi racial policy). By June 6, 1942 (when the JRC 
Prague stopped taking statistics), they estimated that the number of overseas migrants from 
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the Bohemian Lands was 25,860 and the number of individuals who had gone elsewhere in 
Europe to be an additional 7,000 individuals. 17 The vast majority of these individuals fled 
elsewhere in Europe, South America, Asia, Palestine, and North America.18 These statistics 
provide a broad sense of the migration efforts but are not complete. The statistics kept by the 
JRC Prague do not reflect “illegal” migration, that is, those who did not go through an 
official process of filing for emigration and immigration paperwork, but instead fled across 
borders without papers. These four to six thousand migrants primarily fled through Poland 
and Slovakia on the way further east or south. 
The course of World War II changed the options and chances of migrants frequently, 
and without warning. With the outbreak of war, many countries forbade immigration 
altogether. Those that did not, required for immigration fees to be paid in foreign currency, 
which resulted in skyrocketing prices for steamship berths.19 The JRC Prague later credited 
the AJDC, which moved its European Office to Amsterdam, for the ability to overcome this 
difficulty.20 Through the end of 1939, the Amsterdam Jewish Refugee Committee and the 
Belgian Committee for Jewish Refugee Assistance assisted in arranging migration overseas. 
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Working with the AJDC, these committees arranged for overseas transportation for the 
migrants.21 When these countries were occupied in May 1940, the AJDC established its 
Lisbon office, which assisted primarily Protectorate Jews who had already left the Bohemian 
Lands, but had not yet left the European continent, particularly those in France.22 
After the fall of the Low Countries and France, the JRC Emigration Division 
attempted to send transports through Genoa, Italy and Budapest. The majority of Protectorate 
Jews went elsewhere in Europe in 1939 (10,940). These numbers dwindled in 1940 (only 
1154) and in 1941 (305). The Italian route was short lived, lasting only until Italy entered the 
war on June 10, 1940. By the summer of 1940, the only consistent route out of the Bohemian 
Lands was the overland route through the Soviet Union to Shanghai. But, in February 1941, 
Japan ceased to issue transit visas, effectively in the closing the overland route to Shanghai 
even before the German invasion of the Soviet Union. In 1941, the JRC Prague did not send 
a single migrant to Asia.  
Another blow was the closing of the consulates located in Prague. The Bolivian, 
Ecuadorian, Brazilian, Uruguayan, Chilean, and Paraguayan consulates in Prague all shut 
their doors throughout 1940, and finally the US Consulate on October 15, 1940.23 This was a 
major blow, as over 2,500 migrants had left for South America in 1939 and almost 2,000 in 
1940. Only thirty-three Protectorate Jews left for South America in 1941. The closest 
American consulate was then in Vienna, and it was “nearly impossible” for migrants to get 
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the necessary documents from this office. The American Consulate in Vienna ceased 
operations at the end of June 1941.24 In 1939, just over twelve hundred Protectorate Jews 
went to North America; in 1940, only 156, and in 1941, only 63. 
 
Shanghai Route 
The first half of 1940 was abysmal for migration, with consistently declining numbers 
from month to month, but the summer of 1940 brought substantial results. Between July and 
September 1940, the JRC in Prague together with the IRC of Vienna and the 
Reichsvereinigung der Juden in Berlin coordinated their efforts to replace the closed Italian 
seaports with an overland route. The three Jewish authorities negotiated with the travel 
agency Intourist in Berlin to arrange train tickets on the Trans-Siberian Railroad through 
Moscow to Yokohama. The most difficult part of the route for the Jewish authorities to 
organize was the procurement of ship berths on the Japanese lines Nyk and Osk or on the 
American Presidential Line. 
For Jews in the Germany, these negotiations ran rather smoothly. But for Protectorate 
Jews, the negotiations with Intourist travel agency initially broke down over the tickets for 
the Trans-Siberian Railroad. Through intense negotiations with the National Bank, Intourist, 
Hapag Lloyd shipping company, and the Czechoslovak travel agency Čedok, the JRC was 
able to negotiate an arrangement that would allow Protectorate Jews to board the Trans-
Siberian Railroad to Japan. This route was intended to provide migrants with a chance 
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ultimately to get to the United States. Yet, many migrants were stranded in Shanghai, as 
tensions between Japan and the United States increased and finally erupted in war.  
The steps for a migrant to get from Prague to the United States via the overland route 
were immense. First, a migrant had to contact the Migrant Department of the JRC Prague. 
The JRC Prague would then assist the migrant in contacting consulates for the U.S. the 
Soviet Union, and Japan. The JRC Prague also contacted the Reichsvereinigung der Juden in 
Berlin, who would then contact both the foreign exchange agency and the Manchurian 
consulate. Simultaneously, the JRC Prague would begin negotiating with the AJDC and the 
National Bank in Prague to purchase both the ships berths and the train tickets. Only after the 
completion of all of these steps and the approval from this diverse assortment of agencies 
could a migrant begin their journey.  
 
 
The Responsibilities of the Jewish Religious Community Prague under the Zentralstelle 
The war and limited options for immigration prevented more migrants from leaving 
the Protectorate. But for those 26,000 who did migrate from the Protectorate legally, this was 
largely due to the work of the JRC Prague and the Palestine Office. Beginning the last week 
of July 1939, the JRC Prague’s primary task was to coordinate migration. The JRC’s reports 
to the Zentralstelle reflect this commitment to migration. Until October 1941, when 
migration stopped and the deportations to Theresienstadt began, every report submitted to the 
Zentralstelle began with the JRC’s work on migration for the reporting period. The tasks of 
all other JRC departments were oriented in such a way so that they dealt, either directly or 
indirectly with migration.  





To prepare for the reconfiguration of the JRC Prague into a migration institution, two 
top JRC Prague officials travelled to the IKG Vienna offices, beginning a period of close 
contact between the two organizations. In the coming months, the Nazi authorities regularly 
approved JRC officials to visit Vienna, or IKG officials to visit Prague. The chairman of the 
JRC Prague, Dr. Franz Kafka, and the secretary, František Weidmann (who would become 
the JRC Chairman in October 1939, left for Vienna in mid-July 1939.  
Upon Weidmann and Kafka’s return from Vienna, the JRC Prague began a period of 
expansion, with departments oriented toward the goal of migration. The JRC Prague formally 
incorporated the Social Institute, and the Social Institute continued to support nearly 4,000 
needy Jews and refugees as a division of the JRC Prague on a smaller budget.25 Weidmann 
oversaw the creation of the new Emigration Department (staffed by ninety people), based 
largely on the model of the Viennese organization.26 The office of the JRC Prague’s 
Emigration Department was at Josefovská 9. Overlooking the Old Jewish Cemetery, 
Josefovská 9 had long been the home of the Prague Burial Society, which had been forced to 
vacate the building to make room for the Emigration Department.  The new Emigration 
Department grouped migrants into three groups: those going to Palestine; those going to all 
other countries; and those who were not members of the JRC. On the first day of the 
Zentralstelle’s operation, July 29, 1939, 148 individuals applied for exit documents, well 
below Eichmann’s quota. In the second week of the JRC’s operation, IKG officials visited 
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Prague to give recommendations about migration and about the reorganization of the JRC’s 
departments to meet the requirements set by the Zentralstelle.27 
Early in the reorganization of the JRC Prague, almost all activities were directed 
toward the migration of the community. The JRC comprised more than fourteen departments, 
each with multiple subdivisions. Until 1941, the Emigration Department was the largest. The 
Emigration Department had the following subdivisions: 
- Document Completion Division, which was responsible for processing the Emigration 
Dossiers and submitting them to the Zentralstelle 
- Emigration Support Division, which assisted migrants with secure migration 
opportunities to secure train tickets, steamship passage, visas, and coordinated with 
foreign consulates. This division additionally sought group migration possibilities and 
assisted in organizing these (largely unsuccessful efforts) 
- Transfer Division, which dealt largely with the financial aspects of migration (Both in 
terms of supplying funds to migrants and levying the taxes against those leaving) 
- Legal Division, which worked with the Protectorate government to ensure that migrants 
were able to leave 
- Regional Division, which communicated with the regional JRCs and their attempts to 
support migrants 
All other departments were brought in line with the mission of supporting migration. Even 
for departments indirectly related to migration (including the medical, housing, and social 
welfare departments), the JRC Prague understood their activities to be related to migration. 
To leave the Protectorate, people needed to be healthy and for that, they needed access to 
food and housing. And, in cases where the potential migrants had very little access to very 
money, they needed to save whatever they had to emigrate, and thus needed financial 
assistance to secure food and housing for the family. 
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Czechoslovak Zionists had an active culture of publishing weekly newspapers, as did 
(to a lesser extent) Czech-Jewish “assimilationists” in the First Republic. However, these 
newspapers ceased publication with the creation of the Protectorate of Bohemia and Moravia 
and the Nazi occupation.28 Almost immediately after the creation of the Zentralstelle and the 
JRC Prague’s Emigration Department, the issue of creating a new Jewish newspaper was 
firmly decided upon. The JRC Prague and the Palestine Office—under the influence of the 
Zentralstelle—began a joint publication Jüdisches Nachrichtenblatt – Židovské listy, with the 
first issue appearing on Friday, November 24, 1939. The influence of Adolf Eichmann and 
the Zentralstelle was evident from the beginning: there were also weekly newspapers in both 
Berlin and Vienna under the Zentralstelle with the name Jüdsiches Nachrichtenblatt as well. 
In Prague, the paper was bilingual. The paper began with German-language articles, followed 
by Czech translations in the second half of each issue. However, not everything was 
translated. There were articles, advertisements, letters, and features that only appeared in 
German or Czech. 
Although published by the JRC Prague, the paper would serve as “the official voice” 
of both the JRC Prague and the Palestine Office. The paper reflected the interests of all three 
parties involved: Czech-Jewish “assimilationists” included articles that offered Jewish 
readers a sense of connection with the now defunct Czechoslovakia, as well as features about 
Czechoslovak colonies in South America, Canada, and India. Zionists were satisfied with the 
prominent articles and letters related to immigration to Palestine. And newly passed anti-
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Jewish laws and regulations were also included in the paper as well as articles encouraging 
ways to emigrate quickly, which appealed to the Zentralstelle. 
The chief editor of the paper was Dr. Oskar Singer, former editor of the Prager 
Tagblatt, who remained in this role until the fall of 1941 when he was deported with his 
family to the Łódź ghetto.29 The Jüdisches Nachrichtenblatt – Židovské listy, according to the 
JRC Prague’s reports was, “an important instrument in the fight against the chaotic 
tendencies regarding the emigration question. It helps to execute emigration in an orderly 
manner and advertises emigration ideas.”30 In its very first issue, the head secretary of the 
JRC Prague, Dr. Franz Weidmann, wrote an introductory editorial for the paper, stating that 
“the JRC Prague must first and foremost encourage emigration and concern itself with 
[finding] a solution to the Jewish emigration question.”31  
With this goal in mind, the tone of the paper in its first two years was 
overwhelmingly optimistic.32 The paper included tips on how to complete the emigration 
dossier required by the Zentralstelle, articles about the importance of migration, answers to 
questions about how to transfer property in preparation for migration, information about 
consulates from various countries of immigration, letters from those who had already 
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emigrated, features on the opportunities in various countries of immigration (especially less 
popular destinations), and tips about preparing for migration. 
The paper additionally served as a way to communicate other information related to 
both Jewish life in the Protectorate as well as activities that supported migration. The 
newspaper advertised the retraining courses offered by the JRC Prague and the Palestine 
Office and even offered mini-language courses in the paper (including lessons on Hebrew, 
Spanish, and English). The paper also included an advertising section, in which readers could 
post requests to buy or sell various goods as well as dating advertisements. Additional 
notices reminded readers about holidays, fundraising drives run by the JRC, and the social 
services offered by the JRC Prague to support the rest of the community.   
 
Obstacles to Leaving 
Even with a centralized emigration authority, there were significant obstacles to 
migration, including location, funding, and timing. These challenges changed with the course 
of the war.  One obstacle was the decentralized nature of the Jewish population The Jewish 
population of Austria was largely concentrated around Vienna, and the IKG had a more 
direct means of communication and taxation for the majority of the Austrian Jewish 
population. The Jewish population of the Bohemian was much more dispersed. There were 
substantial Jewish populations in České Budějovice, Německý Brod, Olomouc, Brno, and 
Moravská Ostrava. This frustrated Zentralstelle officials, whose authority only extended to 
Prague and the immediate surroundings.33 Eichmann’s vision was that all of the Jewish 
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communities in the Bohemian Lands would soon be consolidated under the JRC Prague, as 
had been the case in Vienna. As a result, Eichmann ordered that all of the Jews of the 
Bohemian Lands be relocated to Prague by the end of September—a massive undertaking 
that would require new buildings, larger office space for the Emigration Department, and 
more funding for the Social Institute to continue offering services.34 Although this relocation 
did not happen for practical reasons, the order provided the occasion for the leaders of all 
Jewish Religious Communities in the Protectorate to meet in Prague on August 13. The JRC 
Prague explained the migration process and asked all the communities to collect statistical 
data on their constituents. The local communities were also strongly advised to offer 
retraining courses, which might help their constituents to emigrate.35 
The dispersed nature of Jewish communities in the Protectorate also caused 
difficulties for the JRC Prague. In the Protectorate, the JRC Prague had responsibilities to the 
entire Jewish population of the Bohemian Lands in terms of migration support (and would 
soon assume a greater proportion of the duties for all Jews living in the Protectorate), but 
with limited ability to collect money to finance those operations. JRC Prague collected only 
funds through taxes on members of the community and voluntary donation drives. 
The Zentralstelle controlled the distribution of exit permits necessary to leave the 
Bohemian Lands, but it would distribute them only to migrants who had submitted the 
emigration dossier. The emigration dossier alone required that applicants complete a 
significant amount of paperwork. A few copies of these documents remain, a testament to the 
daunting task ahead of those wishing to leave the Protectorate. Migrants first had to complete 
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an Emigration Questionnaire, which required typical passport information as well as 
personal information on family members, detailed migration plans, tax information, and a 
declaration of all tangible personal property. The declaration of assets form could only be 
obtained after submitting several additional forms to the central tax authority in Prague, 
including a stamped certificate from the tax authority confirming that the applicant had no 
outstanding taxes levied against them.36 
The paperwork required of Jewish migrants would only increase. The Emigration 
Department’s role as an intermediary required JRC Prague officials to distribute the 
paperwork required by the Zentralstelle to applicants. Before receiving the documents 
required by the Zentralstelle, applicants were required to provide a “statement of records” to 
the JRC Prague, which included the applicant’s detailed resume, plans for emigration, and 
information about family members. Once completed, applicants received the “emigration 
dossier,” or Auswanderungsmappe, a far more detailed application than those previously 
required by the Protectorate authorities.37 For families hoping to migrate together, each 
family member was required to have a finished emigration dossier, which had to be presented 
in person to the Zentralstelle through the Emigration Department of the JRC Prague. For 
those living outside of Prague, this required that the individual apply in advance for a short-
term travel permit to come to Prague. Upon arriving in Prague, the Emigration Department 
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carefully checked each emigration dossier before turning the documents over to the 
Zentralstelle.  
 Each emigration dossier required the applicant to offer personal details (with 
supporting documentation), answer questions about the proposed migration journey, and list 
financial information. The completed portfolio contained eleven different questionnaires for 
each applicant, covering the details of the individual’s moveable assets, immovable property, 
and intended exports. Furthermore, the emigration dossier required applicants to submit 
forms completed by fifteen different Protectorate and Reich authorities.38 This meant that 
applicants had to appear at each of these agencies in order to have the forms approved, and 
all of these agencies had severely limited the office hours for Jewish individuals.39 In 
addition to the questionnaires, applicants were required to visit the JRC Prague, the police 
headquarters, the Financial Division of the City Council, and the Tax Authority.40  
 After filing the documents with the Zentralstelle, applicants were forced to wait until 
they received a summons from the Zentralstelle, as it was forbidden for individual applicants 
to contact the Zentralstelle directly.41 Once the Zentralstelle reviewed the emigration dossier, 
and the applicant had personally gone to retrieve his or her passport with valid exit permit, 
the migrant faced still more bureaucratic hoops. Migrants were required to notify both the 
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police headquarters and the Supply Office of their departure, effectively de-registering at 
both institutions. This process required waits in long lines, additional forms, and the 
presentation of additional confirmation documents.  
 Unfortunately for some, by the time some applicants finished this entire process, their 
date of departure had passed – the train or steamship on which they had booked passage had 
already left – or the validity of their entrance permit or visa had expired. It is not hard to 
imagine why so many of those who wanted to leave the Protectorate were unable to escape. 
Nor is it difficult to understand why some individuals took the risk of fleeing through 
underground or unofficial channels. Organizing migration was often a frustrating experience 
for the JRC officials. Less than one month after the creation of the Zentralstelle, the JRC 
reported that, “In many cases, we can state that people who already have an emigration 
opportunity at their disposal are not able to take advantage of it, because they are unable to 
complete their emigration documents on time and in most cases, the consulates refuse to 
extend the validity period [of the visa] for immigration.”42 
 Very few survivors remember or discuss these lengthy, exhausting, and confusing 
processes in postwar interviews. This is in part due to the fact that in testimony collections 
like the USC Shoah Foundation Archive, the interviewers rarely find these tedious details 
relevant or interesting in comparison to other wartime experiences. Paperwork, especially 
bureaucratic paperwork, it seems, has always been and continues to be a source of boredom 
for many. 
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Support for Migration 
The JRC Prague relied upon its network and the experience gained in the previous 
months to support migration. To help migrants complete the lengthy emigration dossier, the 
JRC Prague created a new Emigration Department with several different subdivisions: in 
particular, one that handled migration cases for those who had already secured an migration 
opportunity and another for those who were still searching for a way to leave. The Division 
for Completion of Documentation (Abteilung für Dokumentenbeschaffung), which handled 
the cases of those who already had secure plans to leave, was immediately busy. As in Berlin 
and Vienna, some funds for migration assistance were raised through the sales of emigration 
dossiers to wealthier Jews. In the first week of August 1939, the division sold over 2,500 
emigration dossiers and assigned nearly 1,000 cases to the Zentralstelle for final review.43  
The Emigration Support Division needed an experienced director to handle cases 
without secure migration plans. Marie Schmolka, HICEM’s longtime director, served as the 
first head of the Emigration Support Division. Schmolka’s years of experience working with 
both refugees and the government made her a natural choice for this position. On August 19, 
Schmolka and the chairman of the JRC, Dr. Emil Kafka, were granted Gestapo approval to 
travel to an international HICEM and AJDC conference on refugees in Paris.44 The two left, 
with the intention of negotiating migration opportunities and discussing funding possibilities 
for the JRC Prague. While Schmolka and Kafka were in Paris, Germany invaded Poland, and 
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the pair did not return to the Protectorate.45 The Emigration Support Division required new 
leadership.  
Hannah Steiner, Marie Schmolka’s longtime friend and HICEM colleague, assumed 
that role. 46 When the JRC Prague took on the task of organizing Jewish migration in July 
1939 (and, with the exception of the Palestine Authority, all Zionist organizations were 
closed by order of the Nazi authorities), Czechoslovak Zionists like Schmolka and Steiner 
were determined to remain active in Jewish life in the Bohemian Lands. With the exception 
of the Palestine Office, the Nazi authorities had ordered all Zionist organizations closed on 
March 15, 1939. According to J.Z. Scheck, a Czechoslovak Zionist who survived the war, 
“After a brief, very heated discussion, the executive committee of the Zionist Organizations 
decided to actively intervene in all departments of the [JRC] and saw three particular areas 1) 
the continuation of emigration work; 2) the building of social institutions which Jews had 
been immediately shut out from, and 3) the building of retraining and education courses.”47 
The success of the JRC’s Emigration Department’s “rescue through emigration” 
operation was due largely to Steiner’s efforts. A report written near the end of the war 
describes the work of the Emigration Department to assist Protectorate Jews to leave. The 
report emphasizes that after the dissolution of HICEM on March 16, the “connections made 
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with foreign committees supported emigration,” especially the connections with the AJDC’s 
Paris office, led by Morris Troper.48 
According to Scheck, Steiner perused migration opportunities “with astonishing 
energy and perseverance.” Steiner dealt regularly with consulates on behalf of individual 
migrations, organized group transports, negotiated with the AJDC to obtain foreign currency 
necessary for landing money and transportation, and supported the Aliyah Bet transports to 
Palestine. Furthermore, Steiner was the inspiration behind negotiating the land routes to 
Shanghai through the Soviet Union and to Palestine through Syria. To do so, Steiner  
“pointed the primary stream of emigration to Slovakia as a transit country . . . where there 
were further emigration opportunities to Hungary or Romania.”49And, in her spare time, 
Steiner organized lecture circles and Hebrew courses for women interested in maintaining 
some semblance of a Jewish cultural life. 
Scheck’s postwar testimony is certainly a memorial to her lost friend and Zionist 
mentor (at the end of the testimony, Scheck criticizes assimilated Czech Jews for “clinging to 
their Czech patriotism for so long” and for thinking that “emigration would destroy” Czech 
Jewry), her testimony is one of several written in the immediate postwar period to praise 
Steiner’s efforts. By all accounts, Steiner was committed to sparking a Jewish consciousness 
in the young women of the Bohemian Lands, a tireless advocate for migration, and devoted 
to providing aid to Jews where she could. By all accounts, Steiner did not simply organize 
migration from the Protectorate because the Nazis ordered her to do so, but because she 
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believed in Jewish migration as an essential project and as the only way “out of the 
mousetrap.”50 
At the Emigration Support Division, Steiner assisted destitute Jewish families in 
leaving the Protectorate. This work proved incredibly challenging. In all of September 1939, 
only five people left the Protectorate through the Support for Emigration Division, all to the 
United States. In October 1939, the Support for Emigration Division assisted thirty-nine 
migrants (primarily to the United States and Chile), and in November, one hundred forty-five 
(primarily to Chile, the United States, Ecuador, and San Domingo).51 Steiner served as the 
primary contact for organizations and individuals from abroad for assistance in individual 
immigration attempts. Steiner kept detailed lists of the contact information for Jewish, non-
Jewish, and non-sectarian refugee committees in the United States and Switzerland, sending 
them to other divisions within the JRC Prague’s Emigration Department.52A case worker for 
the American Friends Service Committee wrote in August 1940 that “In Czechz [sic] cases I 
usually have turned for help to Kultusgemeinde [JRC] in Prague, Josefovskova 9; Miss 
Hanna Steiner of that agency has given us very helpful aid.”53 As Ruth Bondy later wrote, 
“Steiner continued to dispatch cables…and write urgent letters so that an individual, a 
family, a group of six might leave. Another five hundred people managed to emigrate before 
the gates were finally closed by Himmler in the fall of 1941, a testament to the iron will of 
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Hanna Steiner and her department, and to the concern of relatives across the sea, who spared 
no effort to remove the obstacles posed by bureaucracy, the absence of good will, and the 
mobile war area.”54 
Steiner also took the lead for the new Foreign Correspondence Division, opened on 
August 17. The Foreign Correspondence Division advised potential migrants and 
corresponded with friend, relatives, and even strangers abroad with the hope that migration 
possibilities could be secured. In its first week of operation, this new division sent 225 letters, 
wrote 180 more, and processed 35 applications for registration with various Emigration 
Action groups. Furthermore, this division corresponded with organizations abroad, including 
the Comite Israelite pour les enfants venant d’Allemagne et de l’ Europe Centrale in Paris, 
the Paris Hicem office, and the Jewish Committee in Amsterdam to fund steamship tickets 
for Czech Jews who had already left the Protectorate, to register children with a children’s 
migration scheme in Paris.55 This office also began corresponding with a Mr. William Eves 
of the American Friends Service Committee about whether the AFSC could provide financial 
assistance and assistance finding migration opportunities. 
Steiner worked closely with Dr. Franz Friedmann, the head of the Transfer 
Department and representative of the Jewish Agency. 56 Friedmann had negotiated the 
“Czech Transfer” agreement as part of the British Loan in January 1939. The “Czech 
Transfer” allocated £500,000 and 2,500 certificates for Czechoslovak Jews to migrate to 
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Palestine as part of the Haavara Agreement. Friedmann served as one of the Transfer 
Committee members managing the Czech Transfer during the Second Republic, and 
continued this work during the Nazi occupation. After the occupation, the British froze the 
Czech Transfer funds. Friedmann, along with other Zionist leaders (Franz Kahn, Otto 
Zucker, and Jakob Edelstein, and Paul März—renegotiated the Czech Transfer agreement 
over the spring and summer of 1939. The Czech Transfer enabled 2,500-3,000 Czechoslovak 
Jews to emigrate to Palestine between October 1939 and January 1940.57 
 As a member of the Transfer Department of the JRC Prague, Friedmann was 
responsible for financial matters related to migration and for organizing transports to 
Palestine. The Transfer Department uncovered funding for migrants, both in the Protectorate 
and abroad, and levied the taxes against those leaving. In this role, Friedmann frequently 
contacted and negotiated with the AJDC to provide foreign currency for the purchase of 
steamship tickets, landing money, and visas.58 Friedmann frequently requested the AJDC 
offices in New York, Paris, and Lisbon to release funds to travel agencies to pay for 
migrants’ transportation.59 
Not only did Steiner work with contacts in other JRC Prague Departments, but she 
also frequently communicated directly with friends or relatives of migrants (particularly in 
the United States) who could provide either affidavits or money for procuring steamship 
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passage. Often, the JRC Prague purchased passages through the local Čedok travel agency, 
who sent the bill on to the AJDC. In cases when family members were willing to finance 
emigration, the AJDC worked with the family to collect that payment.60 Steiner often wrote 
appeals or gave instructions to affiants about how to best support the migration attempt. Of 
course, given the rapidly changing circumstances of the war, these instructions were 
sometimes incorrect or had changed by the time the affiant had received Steiner’s letter. In 
one case, Steiner wrote on June 6, 1941, to a family member in the United States who was 
actively trying to procure steamship passage and affidavits for a relative in Brno with 
instructions to contact the AJDC for assistance purchasing the tickets. By the time the letter 
had reached the United States in July, the US Consulates in German-occupied Europe had 
closed, making it impossible for migrants to obtain visas, and thus making the purchase of 
steamship tickets unwise and unnecessary. 61 Throughout 1940 and 1941, Steiner worked 
closely with the Migration Department of the Reichsvereinigung Berlin. As consulates left 
Prague, Steiner required assistance in Berlin to arrange transit visas and obtain information 
about the immigration requirements of various countries.62  
Prague JRC officials noted that the beginning of the war made it impossible to get 
any information from foreign consulates about the issuance of foreign visas. “The English 
and French Consuls ceased to give out visas during the report period; however, people who 
were already in possession of a visa from one of these two countries can still emigrate.”63 
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Furthermore, the war necessitated that all correspondence with overseas relief agencies 
needed to go through Amsterdam. Thus, began a close relationship between the JRC Prague 
and the relief agencies in Amsterdam. In addition to serving as a communication hub, the Aid 
Committee in Amsterdam also assisted Czech migrants to purchase steamship passage and 
train tickets to port cities. The JRC Prague would release funds for this purpose and then the 
Amsterdam committee would secure the actual tickets.64 
Two of Steiner’s main contacts for arranging migration were with organizations and 
individuals she had met through her work with HICEM and WIZO earlier in the 1930s. The 
primary tasks of Steiner’s Support for Emigration Division were to arrange train tickets to 
port cities for migration attempts arranged by both the JRC Prague and the Palestine Office, 
arrange mass transports, and maintain close contacts with all offices and travel agencies to 
secure transit visas. In order to accomplish this, international voluntary organizations needed 
to recognize the JRC Prague as the new Jewish migration authority in the Protectorate. As 
Dalia Ofer has argued, “The foreign Jewish organizations tended to place their trust in those 
closest to them politically or in those who had been well-known as public figures before the 
Nazis came to power.”65 It took some time for the international community to recognize the 
JRC Prague as the one authority for Jewish migration issues in Prague, but the Jewish 
Refugee Committee in Amsterdam notified the JRC Prague that it was finally recognized in 
this role in the first week of September.66  
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Gertrude van Tijn led the Jewish Refugee Committee in Amsterdam. Van Tijn, like 
Steiner, had been assisting refugees from Nazi Germany since 1933. Like Steiner, van Tijn 
had developed close ties with other international aid organizations, especially the 
international HICEM (although this relationship was at times contentious) and the AJDC, 
especially with the AJDC European director, Morris Troper. Van Tijn had also played a 
central role in the Kindertransports from Germany, Austria, and Czechoslovakia. Van Tijn 
had requested funds from the AJDC to care for the children on their journey to Harwich—for 
most of the transports, the children spent a night in the Netherlands before continuing on to 
England. 67  
After receiving notification that the JRC Prague was now recognized as the migration 
authority in the Protectorate, the Emigration Department worked closely with van Tijn’s 
Jewish Refugee Committee in Amsterdam to arrange for steamship berths.68 The JRC Prague 
first secured transport for the migrant, and then notified both the AJDC and the Jewish 
Refugee Committee in Amsterdam. The AJDC released funds to van Tijn’s organization, 
which would then purchase steamship berths for the Protectorate migrants. In September 
1939, Van Tijn secured a AJDC grant of $30,000 to establish a “clearing office” for migrants 
coming from Prague, Berlin, and Vienna. Between September 15 and December 20, 1939, 
van Tijn’s committee assisted 308 migrants from Prague, along with several thousand 
additional migrants from elsewhere in Europe.69 
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In organizing illegal transports to Palestine, the JRC Prague’s most important contact 
was with Gisi Fleischmann. Steiner and Fleischmann had met through their mutual work with 
WIZO (Fleischmann served as the Slovak chapter president) and with refugees, involving 
HICEM and the AJDC. In wartime Slovakia, Fleischmann was the HICEM and Joint 
representative, and later served as the head of the emigration department of the Slovak 
“Jewish Center” (Ústredňa Židov, the Slovak Judenrat established in September 1940). In the 
spring of 1939, Fleischmann went to London to obtain British help for the migration of 
Jewish refugees in Slovakia. In late 1939 and 1940, Fleischmann was the Bratislava contact 
for the Aliyah Bet transports arranged by Berthold Storfer.70 The JRC Prague processed the 
emigration applications, the Brno group worked with Storfer to organize the transports, and 
Fleischmann provided relief services to these refugees as they passed through Slovakia. 
Fleischmann later led the “Working Group” (pracovná skupina) in the spring of 1942, which 
attempted to rescue Slovak Jews by securing certificates stating the individuals’ economic 
value to Slovakia and bribing Slovak officials.71 
Thanks to her previous work with WIZO and HICEM, Steiner had developed a 
working relationship with the AJDC in the mid-1930s. The AJDC proved to be one of the 
most crucial relationships for organization migration out of the Protectorate, as it offered 
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financial assistance to migrants. Steiner frequently communicated with the AJDC about 
matters relating to migration opportunities and had a friendly relationship with the AJDC’s 
European Director, Morris Troper. Steiner included personal notes to Troper and his wife in 
her letters. In one typed letter, Steiner signed the note “Your Hanna Steiner” and included a 
handwritten note, sending “Best wishes to Mrs. Troper.”72 
For destitute migrants, Steiner worked with the AJDC to identify friends or relatives 
abroad who were willing to finance emigration or provide necessary visa documents. On 
February 2, 1940, Steiner wrote to Troper about their “destitute emigrants” of which the JRC 
Prague had 197 submitted for that month to Shanghai, Argentina, Brazil, Bolivia, and 
Uruguay. Steiner wrote that “according to the regulations of the [Joint Distriubtion] 
Committee all our efforts will be concentrated to the endeavor [of] requesting the relatives of 
the petitioners to [give] contributions [for] the expenses.” Still, she requested that the AJDC 
commit to paying for twenty percent of the costs, imploring “I beg for your kind 
consideration in order to enable us to facilitate our hard social work.”73 
Steiner also found other ways to advocate for the needs of Protectorate migrants. On 
March 28, 1940, the former American Vice Consul in Prague returned to the United States. 
Steiner and Weidmann wrote a letter of introduction for Gilchrist to deliver to the AJDC’s 
leadership, Chairman Paul Baerwald and Executive Director Joseph Hyman. Steiner and 
Weidmann wrote that “During [Gilchrist’s] long stay in Prague, we frequently had the 
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opportunity to discuss with him the problems referring to the emigration of Jews from 
Bohemia and Moravia so that Mr. Gilchrist is exactly informed about the . . . problems. Mr. 
Andrew Gilchrist is disposed to discuss these problems also with you, in order to promote the 
interest. We should feel very much obliged to you, if you kindly would give the opportunity 
to Mr. Gilchrist to explain the problems thoroughly to you. This will be of help for our 
collaborative work. Would you kindly introduce Mr. Gilchrist to those circles too which 
might be of assistance at the solution of these questions in compliance with you.”74 
Steiner also used her connections with the AJDC to navigate the constantly changing 
requirements for immigration. On September 6, 1940, Steiner wrote to Morris Troper (former 
AJDC European Director until the spring of 1940) to inform him of the reasons why 
Protectorate Jews had been denied visas. These included not being “valuable” persons 
(though Steiner was unclear about what made a migrant “valuable” to the consular offices) 
and “unsatisfactory” documents that needed to be redone (without clear instructions about 
how to improve the immigration application). Steiner noted that “no can imagine the despair 
of these applicants . . . We are doing everything here to moderate, if possible the…situation,” 
and asked for Troper to clarify the requirements for a valuable immigrant with a satisfactory 
application. Steiner continued, “It is difficult to explain this situation to you very clearly, and 
you must point out to us in which ways you believe our interventions [at consulates on behalf 
of migrants] would be most successful.” 75 Steiner worked with other U.S. based 
organizations, especially HIAS. On July 17, 1940, Steiner wrote to the New York HIAS 
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office to ask if HIAS representatives could meet with the family members of Prague migrants 
who had purchased steamship tickets on the United States and Italian Lines. The fall of 
France and Italy’s entrance into the war had resulted in “changed maritime conditions” and 
the JRC Prague was “[compelled] to eliminate the booking of transportation for…relief 
supplicants via the Atlantic,” and instead sent migrants through the Soviet Union to Pacific 
Ocean port cities in China and Japan. The JRC Prague had booked passage for a number of 
migrants on the NYK- and OSK-Lines leaving Japan, and requested that HIAS convince the 
migrants’ families to cancel their previous books and deposit $118 with the AJDC for 
passage on the Pacific steamship lines.76  
By no means were all interactions with the AJDC or other international aid agencies 
friendly. The changing circumstances of the war and the desperation of Protectorate Jews to 
leave created a sense of urgency. When communications were interrupted, delays and 
misunderstandings occurred resulting in tense situations. The Czechoslovak Zionist Fritz 
Ullmann (the Jewish coordinator of the Kindertransports from the Protectorate) was living in 
Geneva by September 1939. Ullmann had made it his mission to be the intermediary between 
the outside world and the Protectorate. On June 17, 1941, an internal AJDC communication 
noted that “Dr. Ullmann severely criticizes the delay in carrying out the arrangement agreed 
upon (in his opinion, at any rate) between the Joint Distribution Committee and the 
Kultusgemeinde in Prague. He disagrees that payments in New York are to be conditional on 
proof that the persons concerned have actually left Czechoslovakia. He maintains, on the 
contrary, that the failure of the Joint Distribution Committees to comply with Dr. 
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Friedmann’s request that the money be paid in New York was partly responsible for the fact 
that 128 people (including Dr. Franz Kahn and his wife) were prevented from leaving on 
April 27th, the date scheduled for their departure. The situation now has all the characteristics 
of a vicious circle.”77 
 
Conclusion 
In mid-July 1940, the JRC submitted a report to the Zentralstelle documenting the 
results of the Nazi efforts to enforce Jewish migration. The JRC described the Jewish 
migration situation in the months before the Zentralstelle’s arrival in Prague as “chaos.”78 
Since the Jewish population of the Bohemian Lands was diverse and no single body 
represented the entire community, the report stated, “On their own, neither the JRC nor the 
Zionist organizations had the means to assist the diverse [Jewish] population.”79 The report 
praised the Zentralstelle for finally resolving the chaos and, though establishing order took 
four months, its efforts finally yielded results. In particular, the report emphasized that “this 
completely centralized management has led to a faster processing of all current [emigration] 
activities than the previous decentralized system.”80 Ironically, even as emigration dossiers 
were processed more efficiently, the number of migrants who were able to find immigration 
opportunities dwindled. The ability for migrants to leave the Protectorate was not, in fact, the 
result of the work of the Zentralstelle. Rather, migration from the Nazi-occupied Bohemian 
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Lands was the result of the work of individuals like Hannah Steiner, Franz Friedmann, and 
Fritz Ullmann. These JRC Prague officials relied on previous established connections with 
international voluntary organizations to uncover migration routes and opportunities even as 
the war closed off possibilities for escape.  
Very few migrants managed to leave the Protectorate after October 1941 through 
legal channels. Those who did manage to receive permission to travel from the Nazi 
government were Slovak citizens and a handful from Hungary and Italy. The “Support for 
Emigration” Division continued operating through the end of February 1942, when it merged 
with the division responsible for registering and deporting the Jewish population of the 
Protectorate to the Theresienstadt transit camp. The number of “foreign citizens” 
corresponding with the JRC Prague officials for migration assistance and submitting their 
emigration dossiers to the Zentralstelle dwindled to an eventual stop in the late December 
1942, when the JRC Prague was dissolved. 
In his important monograph on the Viennese JRC, Eichmann’s Jews, Doron 
Rabinovici explores the role played by the Jewish functionaries serving in the Viennese 
Kultusgemeinde. Rabinovici argues that the functionaries of the Vienna Jewish community 
were “authorities without power” who cooperated with the Nazis “because they cherished the 
hope of being able to rescue some of the community” and because “mass emigration was 
possible only through cooperation with the authorities.”81 Certainly the leaders of the Jewish 
Religious Community in Prague and Vienna faced a number of what Lawrence Langer has 
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called “choiceless choices.”82 Their horrible tasks included working with the Nazis to extort 
Jews as they attempted to leave, enforce Nazi emigration policy, register and police Jews, 
and later actively participate in the deportations to Nisko, Lodz, and Theresienstadt. 
Rabinovici describes in detail the ways in which the Viennese Jewish leadership continued to 
cooperate with Nazi officials after emigration was impossible. But, Rabinovici also points to 
instances in which the IKG leaders pushed back against Nazi orders by submitting petitions 
for exemptions from deportation. His most significant example is that of Franzi Löw, the 
head of the welfare department after 1942. Löw hid Jewish children, persuaded priests to 
issue fake baptism certificates, and delivered ration cards and other forged documents to 
hidden Jews.83 
Drawing on prewar connections, the JRC Prague officials demonstrated their prior 
commitment to uncovering migration opportunities and enabled over 26,000 Protectorate 
Jews to leave the Bohemian Lands under Nazi-occupation through legal means. And unlike 
the Viennese case, Jewish survivors from the Bohemian Lands did not blame the JRC Prague 
officials for cooperating with Nazis after the war. This was in part due to the dispersed nature 
of the Jewish population of the Bohemian Lands, who had far less direct contact the JRC 
Prague officials during the deportations to Theresienstadt; and in part due to the fact that the 
Viennese Jewish leadership supplanted the leaders from Prague. 
Instead, survivors from the Bohemian Lands remembered the incredible efforts of 
JRC Prague leaders like Hannah Steiner to help the Jewish community to leave the region. 
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When the deportations to Theresienstadt began and the work of Emigration Department came 
to a virtual halt, Hannah Steiner—like Franzi Löw in Vienna—mobilized a group of women 
(mostly former WIZO members) to provide social aid work to the community. She organized 
a contingent to help families pack, assist with housework, and provide food and medical care. 
Steiner also organized the preparation of care packages to be sent to Czechoslovak Jews in 
Theresienstadt.84 Then, in the summer of 1943, Hannah Steiner was deported to 
Theresienstadt with the remainder of the Prague Jewish leadership. Once in Theresienstadt, 
Steiner organized a group of women to care for the old and sick. Steiner was also active in 
the cultural life of the Theresienstadt ghetto, organizing courses, Shabbat ceremonies, and 
giving lectures.85 Those who were with Steiner in Theresienstadt remembered her as a source 
of goodness and hope, and always willing to offer assistance. In her postwar testimony of 
Steiner written for Yad Vashem, survivor Grete Grünbaum wrote, “My last memory of her. I 
will never forget her in her tiny room in Theresienstadt. Always caring, always helping, full 
of optimism, full of faith in the victory justice and goodness, full of deep, inner piety. The 
small room was so dear to all of us because it radiated her warmth and personality.”86 
Hannah Steiner remained at Theresienstadt until she was deported to Auschwitz on October 
10, 1944.87 
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When the Nazis forbade migration from Europe in October 1941, approximately 
88,000 Jews remained in the Protectorate. 78,150 Bohemian and Moravian Jews perished in 
the Holocaust. Only 11 percent survived. The name of each of the 78,150 Jews lost in the 
Holocaust is now inscribed by hand on the walls of the Pinkas Synagogue in the Prague 
Jewish Museum. Still, over 30,000 Bohemian and Moravian Jews managed to flee the 
Protectorate before October 1941. Of those, 26,110 received assistance from an extraordinary 
variety of international voluntary organizations and with Nazi approval. Many Czechoslovak 
Jews—and Jews who had fled Nazi rule in Germany and Austria—had escaped the region 
before March 1939. Some migrants certainly did not access the international network. An 
estimated 4,000-8,000 additional migrants left by “unofficial” or “underground” routes, 
without permits, visas, or other migration paperwork. Underground migration attempts 
explicitly avoided interaction with the Nazi bureaucracy for a variety of reasons: fear of 
political persecution, inability to obtain the necessary permits, or a desire to join the 
Czechoslovak Army-in-Exile. Underground migration routes typically took migrants over the 
“green border” to Poland or Slovakia, and these migrants often relied on personal or 
individual connections, rather than the international network described in the dissertation. 
There are two groups of migrants not discussed in this dissertation: those who 
escaped without the aid of networks and those who perished. Although the study of these 
individuals is beyond the scope of this study, many of these people’s stories intersected with 




at least one of the network agencies described in this dissertation. Despite the fact that their 
initial flight from the Bohemian Lands was not coordinated by the network, it shed light on 
the experiences of those who fled by underground routes or those who were unable to escape. 
After arriving in Geneva in November 1939, Fritz Ullmann—who had worked as a 
representative for the Prague Palestine Office, the JRC Prague, and the Kindertransports—
estimated that the majority of the migrants who had fled across the “green border” to Poland 
“were enabled to proceed to England through the assistance of the [British Committee for 
Refugees from Czechoslovakia].”1  
A more complicated case that demonstrates the tangential relationship and interaction 
between several network agencies and a family that for the most part made its own way out 
of the Bohemian Lands can be seen in the Fischl family. Forty-one-year-old Valter Fischl 
fled the northern Bohemian city of Liberec with his wife Markéta and five-year-old daughter 
Eva on September 18, 1938 – just twelve days before the signing of the Munich Agreement.2 
The Fischl family went first to the town of Úvaly, east of Prague, where they registered for 
permanent residence in the interior of Czechoslovakia. The small family eventually settled in 
Prague's bourgeois Vinohrady district (home to the largest Jewish community in interwar 
Czechoslovakia)3, and registered with the Refugee Institute as refugees on November 3, 
1938. At the time of their registration, the Fischl family was surviving on their own funds, 
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but had arrived in Prague with nothing other than their clothing, a few linens, blankets, and 
some family trinkets. The family funds quickly disappeared as both adults were unemployed 
and not looking for work, since they “under no circumstances wanted to cause any 
difficulties for anyone else.”4  
On their original Refugee Institute form, Valter Fischl stated the that family was of 
Czech nationality and Jewish religion and that they had left the Sudetenland because the 
family was well known for their Czech-orientated position (supporting Czech clubs, 
employing only Czech workers in their home and their business, sending their daughter to 
Czech schools, and providing financial assistance to the defense of the Czechoslovak state). 
Fischl told the Prague police that the local Germans “declared that they would seek revenge 
for our friendly relationship with the Czech people.”5 Nevertheless, they reassured the Prague 
police that they wouldn't be a burden to the Czechoslovak government. By the time that they 
had registered, the Fischl family had “taken all the necessary steps to emigrate and go to the 
United States, had saved the 20,000 crowns necessary for the journey” and that once all of 
the various formalities, “which take a great deal more work and patience,” had been taken 
care of, they would migrate.6 Indeed, the Fischl family had registered with the U.S. for 
emigration purposes on October 7, 1938, and had a letter from the United States Consulate 
stating that their visa should arrive on April 19, 1939.7 
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Several months later, at the end of February 1939, the president of the Prague police 
sent a classified memo to the Vinohrady police, requesting that they find “Walter Fischl” 
(spelling his name in the German, rather than the Czech, way that Fischl had himself used on 
his original form) and have him submit an additional refugee form. This form was required of 
all refugees claiming to be of “Jewish or Czech nationality and also of Jewish faith” in order 
to prove their nationality for purposes of the state statistical office.8 The memo asked 
refugees like Fischl to answer additional questions about their profession, proof of their value 
to the Czechoslovak economy, whether or not they had ever been (at any point in their lives) 
German citizens, information about their parents identity, and again asked about the 
individuals nationality.  
This form had several key differences from the first registration form that the Fischls 
were required to submit several months earlier. In contrast to the first refuge registration 
form, this addendum was completed not by the refugee, but by a civil servant working in the 
district police office. The second major difference lay in the description of nationality. On the 
first form, the refugee had simply been asked to provide his or her nationality or religion. By 
the end of February 1939, the Police Headquarters asked for the following declaration: 
“According to the certificate of the State Statistical Office in Prague . . . the individual 
declared his/her nationality on the previous census to be.”9  On this form, Fischl’s nationality 
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was not listed as “Czech with Jewish religion” but rather as “Jewish and a native speaker of 
German.”10 
The Fischls pursued emigration even more doggedly, as their race, nationality, and 
citizenship were already a threat to their safety. Indeed, the categories of race, citizenship, 
nationality, religion, and mother-tongue defined these individuals in various capacities as 
they moved internationally. As the case of the Fischls demonstrates, the question of race, 
nationality, and citizenship would be in constant flux over the next several years. Once it 
became clear that their U.S. visa would not be ready by April 19, 1939, the Fischl family 
registered with Martha Sharp at her office. Hoping to receive some assistance in getting to 
safer shores to await their U.S. visas, the Fischls stated that they would be prepared “to wait 
any place” for the visas and even considered sending their daughter Eva to England with the 
Kindertransports. For the Sharps’ purposes, the Fischl family was Jewish, non-Aryan, 
refugees from the Sudetenland holding Czechoslovak passports.11  
However, the family’s registration with the Sharps led nowhere. After becoming one 
of the Sharps’s 3,500 refugee cases, the Fishls had no further correspondence with them. 
Their daughter, Eva, never made it onto one of the children’s transports for England.12 
Instead, the entire family moved to Ruma, Yugoslavia, to wait for their “non-preference” 
visas to come up. Their visas were issued to them in Osaka, Japan on March 17, 1941, and 
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three days later, the family sailed for the United States. Walter, Margarethe, and Eva Fischl 
entered the U.S. as German speakers of Czechoslovak citizenship and Hebrew race. 
Even as networks shed light on cases like the Fischls, their documents also reveal 
much about the unsuccessful migration attempts of Bohemian and Moravian Jews, as in the 
case of the brothers Leopold and Herbert Kettner. Late on October 30, 1940, Hugo 
Dalsheimer of Baltimore received a telegram from the Jewish Religious Community in 
Prague regarding the increasingly desperate situation of his two cousins, Leopold and 
Herbert Kettner.13 The telegram stated that the brothers’ plans to immigrate to the Dominican 
Republic were unraveling; their visas had expired and they were having difficulty arranging 
passage on a steamship. The Kettners had been urgently trying to emigrate since March 1939, 
when the Nazis invaded Czecho-Slovakia and created the Protectorate of Bohemia and 
Moravia. Their efforts intensified in early 1940, when the Kettners and thousands of other 
Jews in the Protectorate were notified by Nazi authorities that they were required to surrender 
their home and leave the Protectorate immediately.14 The brothers quickly reached out to 
Hannah Steiner at the Jewish Religious Community in Prague, while their cousin Dalsheimer 
contacted Jewish relief organizations in the U.S. for assistance.15 Numerous organizations, 
including the American Jewish Joint Distribution Committee (AJDC) and the National 
Refugee Service, worked together to provide the Kettners with visas to the Dominican 
Republic by late spring 1940. For the Kettners, like so many others, the possession of visas 
did not guarantee successful escape. Indeed, the case file documents end in November 1940, 
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and ultimately, they were not able to leave the Protectorate and perished at Auschwitz. 
However, by November 1940, at least fifteen different organizations were involved in the 
Kettner migration case.16 Questions of escape and the international networks that facilitated 
flight are central to Jewish experiences from 1938-1941. 
In this dissertation, I have reconstructed an international network that assisted 
migrants to leave the Bohemian Lands. This network was multifaceted, but also contingent 
and ad hoc. Different voluntary organizations emphasized the rescue of different subsets of 
the refugee population. The voluntary organizations and the migrants possessed a variety of 
local and international connections. By the summer of 1939, migration assistance became 
centralized in the hands of the Jewish Religious Community. But, given all the experiences 
working with the WIZO, AJDC, BCRC, Winton/Chadwick, and the Sharps, they had the 
connections necessary to continue a broad range of migration assistance.  
I have presented three arguments. First, a loose, flexible network of voluntary 
organizations emerged during the interwar period to assist refugees from Germany and 
Austria as they arrived in Czechoslovakia. Second, as the Bohemian Lands became a country 
of emigration for Jewish migrants after the Munich Agreement, voluntary organizations 
transitioned from offering relief to offering migration assistance. Voluntary workers relied on 
previously established connections to aid escape attempts. Finally, voluntary organizations 
had different motivations for assisting migrants. Some had strong Zionist convictions. Others 
felt compelled to action after the Munich Agreement, which they argued had endangered 
political refugees. Still others deeply believed in Czechoslovak and the need for a stable 
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democracy in Central Europe. And some felt that Czechoslovakia should be a country only 
for Czechs and Slovaks. Despite the efforts of voluntary organizations to assist migrants, the 
movement away from the Bohemian Lands during this period is best characterized as coerced 
voluntary migration. 
Over the course of this dissertation, other questions have emerged that are worthy of 
further study. This study suggests that the exclusion of the Jewish population in the 
Bohemian Lands predated the Nazi occupation, and that national and ethnic categories 
hardened during this period. Bohemian and Moravian Jews were increasingly identified as 
being something other than “Czechoslovaks.” This was certainly true for Valter Fischl and 
his family. When the Fischls first fled registered as refugees in October 1938, they declared 
themselves to be of Czech nationality and Jewish religion. When the Prague Police revised 
the Fischl’s refugee registration in February 1939, the Prague Police declared the family to 
be of Jewish nationality and native German-speakers. When the family finally arrived in the 
United States, the steamship company declared them to be Germans-speakers of Hebrew race 
and Czechoslovak citizenship.  
Finally, this study suggests that women were central to migration assistance. In her 
book on Jewish daily life in Nazi Germany, Marion Kaplan explores the ways that Jewish 
men and women responded to their economic, social, and cultural exclusion. Using 
interviews, memoirs, letters, and diaries, Kaplan argues that gender impacted perceptions of 
and responses to persecution and that living under Nazi rule upended traditional gender roles. 
As men were excluded from the workforce, women took on traditionally male duties: 
intervening with the authorities on behalf of their husbands, obtaining paid work outside the 
home, and making decisions for the family.  




As men retreated into the home in response to exclusionary policies, Kaplan contends 
that this role reversal had a particular impact on decisions related to migration. Women often 
wanted to emigrate well before their husbands, coping with their gradual exclusion and 
isolation by learning languages, attempting to convince their husbands to leave, completing 
emigration paperwork, learning new skills, and joining voluntary organizations.17 Kaplan 
found that “women usually saw the danger signals first and urged their husbands to flee 
Germany,”18 but that “decisions regarding emigration seem to have been made by 
husbands.”19 However, once the decision to emigrate had been made, women typically took 
charge. Women were often responsible for obtaining the necessary paperwork to emigrate, 
smuggling out valuables, and packing to leave.20 
 While Kaplan focuses her analysis on women’s roles in their families, this study 
suggests that women had a significant impact on the migration of entire communities. 
Women played leading roles in HICEM, the British Committee for Refugees from 
Czechoslovakia, the American Commission for Service in Czechoslovakia, and the 
Emigration Department of the JRC Prague. They found migration opportunities, assisted 
families to prepare the emigration paperwork, communicated with individuals abroad who 
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could assist in migration, and negotiated with international aid groups to secure the necessary 
funds to procure transportation and landing money. 
Voluntary workers like Marie Schmolka, Doreen Warriner, Beatrice Wellington, 
Martha Sharp, and Hannah Steiner successfully drew upon their interwar connections to 
uncover opportunities for flight. As a result of their efforts to assist refugees in the 1930s, 
Jewish aid groups in the Bohemian Lands established durable and flexible connections with 
Jewish communities abroad. Social workers like Marie Schmolka and her colleagues then 
drew upon these connections after 1938 to support migration attempts away from the 
Bohemian Lands. In short, altruism toward non-Jewish refugees before 1938 facilitated the 
escape of Jews after 1938. The loosely connected voluntary organizations criticized by the 
Czecho-Slovak government for being too “partisan” in its response to the “triple refugee 
crisis,” actually benefitted migrants fleeing from the Protectorate. These loose connections 
allowed for the network to establish a set of broad international connections and to adapt 
quickly to the changes under a Nazi-occupied territory and a world at war. The decentralized 
nature of the migration assistance network was one of its greatest strengths. In the 
uncertainty of Europe, the decentralization allowed for greater flexibility in overcoming the 
numerous obstacles presented by bureaucratic hurdles. 
Although Jewish refugees could leave Nazi-occupied Europe until October 1941, they 
faced incredible obstacles that prevented many from leaving. The United States adopted a 
restrictive quota system that prevented many refugees from obtaining visas. Great Britain and 
other countries required refugees to verify that they would not become a burden on the state 
in order to obtain an entry permit. This was a difficult task when the Nazi government robbed 
Jewish migrants of nearly all of their property if they tried to emigrate. And much of the 




world, including the United States, was still deeply antisemitic and reluctant to accept Jewish 
refugees. Despite all the barriers, Jews from the Bohemian Lands scattered across the globe: 
Czechoslovak refugees made their way to far-flung places, including Shanghai, India, North 
Africa, and Ecuador. The network, which connected Czechoslovak, British, and American 
voluntary workers and organizations, created pathways that allowed members of the Jewish 
community of the Bohemian Lands to scatter across the globe. 
International networks played a crucial role in bringing individuals out of Central 
Europe. This dissertation demonstrates that these individuals, despite their different 
backgrounds, were connected by their international awareness and their previous 
involvement in social work. Still, they did not always get things right. They responded to a 
refugee crisis with insufficient funding, with different priorities, and under extreme amounts 
of stress. Voluntary workers frequently disagreed with one another, made judgments about 
which individuals were most in need of assistance, and constantly scrambled to obtain up-to-
date information about migration policies. Still, however imperfectly, they felt compelled to 
contribute their energies, skills, and resources to help refugees from Czechoslovakia. This 
study suggests that good work is not solely the realm of heroes, but of many humble 
anonymous individuals modestly doing their part to contribute to a larger project. 
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